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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (11 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694285


18 March 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


 ROBERT E. LYNCH
 Colonel, AGC
 Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

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I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. The Americal Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) during the reporting period. Enemy contacts varied from moderate to heavy from mid August to the first of September and declined to light and sporadic during the month of September. Continuous heavy rains during October limited operations by limiting air, ground, and foot mobility. There was a noticeable decrease in enemy activity throughout the TAOI.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers. Colonel (P) J.W. Donaldson replaced Brigadier General W.L. Clements on 22 Sep 69, as the Asst Division Commander-Maneuver. Colonel J.W. Donaldson was promoted to Brigadier General on 1 Oct 69.

b. Brigade Commanders. Colonel H.F.T. Hoffman, Jr., assumed command of the 11th Inf Bde on 18 Sep from Colonel J.L. Treadwell.

c. Colonels.

(1) Colonel J.G. Clemons became the Chief of Staff on 22 Sep 69, replacing Colonel J.W. Donaldson.

(2) Support Command. Colonel K.B. Barlow assumed command from Colonel J.G. Clemons on 22 September 1969.

d. Battalion Commanders.

(1) 4th Bn, 21st Inf. LTC G.R.H. Johnson assumed command from LTC D.F. Hanson on 9 September 1969.

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(2) 3d Bn, 1st Inf. LTC L.J. Stottle assumed command from LTC G.V. Ellis on 16 September 1969.

(3) 3d Bn, 21st Inf. LTC R.C. Bacon assumed command from LTC E.P. Howard on 20 August 1969.

(4) 1st Bn, 52d Inf. LTC A.R. Brown, Jr., assumed command from LTC R.E. Davis, Jr., on 2 September 1969.

(5) 6th Bn, 11th Arty. LTC P.R. Gleave assumed command from LTC J.H. Sloan, Jr., 19 August 1969.

(6) 1st Bn, 14th Arty. LTC C.J. Phifer assumed command from LTC J.J. Durbin on 23 August 1969.

(7) 723d Maint Bn. LTC H. Finch assumed command from LTC M.H. Singleton, on 20 August 1969.

(8) Americal Combat Center. LTC M.C. Snyder assumed command from MAJ B.J. Manual on 16 September 1969.

3. (U) Staff Changes.

a. LTC S.V. Wielga became ACofS, G1, on 4 August 1969 replacing LTC S.I. Melner.

b. LTC J.M. Misch became ACofS, G4 on 26 August 1969 replacing LTC R.R. Richardson.

c. LTC R.L. Harper became the ACofS, G5 on 3 September 1969 replacing LTC A.J. Dembroakey.

4. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period: Withdrawn, HQ, DA

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B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Finance.

a. Most significant activities during the period 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969 were Conversion Day Activities; and Physical and Administrative improvements to the Combat Center In-Processing Point.

b. Conversion Day Activities. Conversion day activities began at 0800 hours on 11 August 1969. The Division Finance Office went into 24 hours operations and individuals were assigned to specific team positions and given specific hours of duty. A team was dispatched to Duc Pho to convert units of the 11th Infantry Brigade and a team was dispatched to Landing Zone (LZ) Baldy to convert units of the 196th Infantry Brigade. When C Day Activities officially ended at 0400 hours on 14 August 1969, approximately 95% of Americal Division Units and personnel had converted their old 661 series Military Payment Certificates (MPC) to the new 681 series MPC. During the period the main finance office in Chu Lai and the two teams at Duc Pho and LZ Baldy converted \$3,689,774.50.

c. Physical and Administrative Improvements at the Combat Center In-Processing Point. To improve the in-processing procedures and give each new arrival a more favorable impression of the Americal Division and finance services, the entire finance in-processing at the Combat Center has been re-evaluated. In the past service members were given a briefing and requested to complete travel vouchers and other documents in a small, over crowded room without the benefit of tables. New arrivals were also required to return to finance during the hours of darkness to receive their pay and allowances. Under the new procedures and in conjunction with the Commanding Officer, Americal Division Combat Center, the First Infantry Hall has been made available to in process new personnel. The First Infantry Hall is larger, has better lighting and tables are available for service members to complete their documents processing. Also, three new cashiers cages have been built to give adequate working space to the finance cashier, the APO representative to sell postal money orders, and the American Express representative to open new checking accounts and other banking services. This one stop service will permit the service member to complete all of his personal financial transactions prior to reporting to his unit.

2. (U) Surgeon.

a. It was discovered that many units have been preparing their Command Health Reports improperly. Often the statistical data is completely inaccurate. Some of the problem lies in communication. There was a Fact Sheet

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distributed in January 1969 on the Command Health Report but this is now obsolete. Also the responsibility for the preparation of the Command Health Report in some cases has been partially shouldered by the unit SI. This has led to several discrepancies, and often valuable medical information is not transmitted. To remedy the situation a new Fact Sheet on the preparation of the Command Health Report was prepared and distributed, and a meeting was held on 25 October 1969 to explain the Fact Sheet and answer questions concerning the Command Health Report.

b. During the past quarter the Americal Division has experienced a remarkable decline in malaria rates compared with 1968. Below are the total malaria rates and vivax malaria rates for these periods:

		JUL	AUG	SEP
1968	Malaria	127	125	114
	Vivax	66	42	62
1969	Malaria	78	53	65
	Vivax	32	30	23

c. There are several factors significant in explaining these changes. The malaria tablet discipline has improved greatly because of increased command emphasis and the use of urine chloroquine testing. Malaria rates of US troops in Vietnam are known to be positively correlated with the level of enemy contact. This is because of the high rate of infection in NVA and VC troops. The average rate of combat injuries for the past quarter was 55 injuries per 1,000 men per year which is less than half of the 1968 average for the same period, 119 injuries per 1,000 men per year. The awareness of increased risk of malaria during high levels of fighting and of the value of giving command emphasis to malaria discipline will be continued.

3. (U) Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline - Redeployment of the 6th Battalion, 5th Artillery (Hawk)

a. Annex L (Personnel and Administration) to HQ, USARV OPORD 182-69 was received in the AG Section o/a 2 Jul 69. An AG Project Officer was designated, and actual operations toward the redeployment of the 6-56 Arty already had received the OPORD and was well into its operations for the redeployment of the unit. This "jump" which the unit enjoyed proved later to be of great benefit to the PO in ironing out problem areas.

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b. A thorough analysis and review of Annex L substantiated the fact that the redeployment of the only missile unit in RVN set the 6-56 Arty apart from all other departing units. Paragraph 4a(5)(b)5, Annex L, established the deployable criterion that warrant officers and enlisted personnel assigned to 6-56 Arty with missile MOS would redeploy with the unit regardless of time in RVN. This was only logical; for when the 6-56 Arty redeployed, there would be no positions against which these highly trained, critically short missile peculiar personnel could be assigned either within the Americal Division or USARV.

c. The other deployable criterion, the one applicable to all units and not just to the 6-56 Arty, was that personnel assigned to a unit selected for redeployment who would complete 10 months in RVN as of the redeployment date would redeploy with the unit. With these criteria, the records of all personnel assigned to the 6-56 Arty were screened and categorized based upon their status - missile peculiar MOS deployable, 10 months in RVN deployable, nondeployable, and normal DEROS prior to R-day.

d. While the deployable-nondeployable status was being determined through a manual screen of personnel records, the same was being initially determined by the Admin Machine Branch through the use of the 1005 Card Processor and data contained in the status card for each individual. The two determinations were then compared; and where discrepancies existed, the determination resulting from the thorough screen of the personnel records was reverified and then honored. Following this resolution, an initial set of rosters - deployable, nondeployable, and normal DEROS prior to R-day - utilizing the duplicated deck of status cards, were published. This initial breakout reflected:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Deployable	8	12	509	529
Non-Deployable	31	3	249	283
DEROS Prior	5	2	24	31

e. The 283 known non-deployables (31 officers, 3 warrants, and 249 enlisted) had to be reassigned to other units within the Americal Division, but not until their specific tasks were completed within the 6-56 Arty. Two rosters were prepared by Admin Machine Branch on these non-deployables - officers/warrants and enlisted - and given to the AG Officer Branch and Personnel Management Branch respectively. Assignments were made based upon the current needs of the division, and individual requests for orders were prepared on each of the 283 personnel involved. As the S1, 6-56 Arty acknowledged the availability of individuals, the pre-prepared requests for orders were referred to the orders preparing agency within the AG.

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f. Concurrently, the 6-56 Arty was establishing their own deployable-non-deployable rosters based upon individual interview sheets which every man in the battalion completed (See Incl 1). The AG-prepared rosters were compared with those of the unit, and a major problem area was encountered. Many individuals (initially 25, but quickly expanded to over 100 when it was learned that decisions were being made on a case-by-case basis) possessing missile peculiar MOS had indicated their desire to remain in RVN, and the unit identified these personnel as non-deployable. Paragraph 5b, Annex L, stated that personnel who volunteered in writing to remain in RVN to complete a normal tour would not accompany deploying units. The reasons for doing so were many, but basically boiled down to only two: qualify for the extended early release program, or reap the financial benefits incident to serving in a combat zone.

g. The problem was one of conflict between two paragraphs of Annex L, and was the direct result of the missile peculiar MOS mandatory deployment criterion applicable to the 6-56 Arty only. ACOFS, G1, USARV was advised of the conflicting paragraphs telephonically, and what effect they were having on our determining the deployable-non-deployable status of those missile peculiar personnel who requested in writing to remain in RVN. It was quickly determined that a major problem area such as this could not be resolved telephonically. Consequently, a message was dispatched in which the problem was presented and this command's position was stated (i.e., in view of the critical skills and training of missile peculiar MOS personnel, and because deployment of the 6-56 Arty would eliminate any position against which these personnel could be applied either within the Americal Division or USARV, all missile peculiar MOS warrant officers and EM should deploy with the unit). Three days elapsed without a decision being rendered. Finally it was acknowledged that no decision would be rendered until the names of all individuals concerned were acknowledged to HQ, USARV and HQ, USARPAC. This involvement in a name-for-name basis was extremely time consuming and ultimately resulted in ten days being wasted on awaiting the decisions. The problem was one of policy in general, and should not have been relegated to a case-by-case basis.

h. As a result of the inordinate delay during which this major problem was being resolved, other problems of varying magnitude were created, the foremost of which was determining the number of filler personnel required to bring the unit to 100% strength. Annex L required the unit to deploy with 751 personnel (35 officers, 13 warrant officers, and 703 enlisted). Shortfall from this would be overcome by attaching "filler" personnel to the 6-56 Arty for the purpose of accompanying the unit to CONUS. These "fillers" would be constituted from rotatees within the Americal Division whose normal DEROS fell within the period R-day and R+30.

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i. In anticipation of the filler requirement, the Admin Machine Branch furnished the PO with a status card on every individual whose DEROS fell within the time frame in question (2 Aug to 1 Sep). All indications pointed to the fact that the unit would deploy on 2 August; however, it was acknowledged that R-day could slide as far as 7 August. Based upon that possibility, no individual with a DEROS of 2-7 August was considered as possible filler personnel. Priorities were established for the selection of filler personnel within the remaining time frame (8 Aug to 2 Sep). Personnel reported as surplus on the most recent FIR were selected first, followed thereafter by DEROS date on a first-in-first-out basis.

j. A firm decision on the deployable-non-deployable status of missile peculiar warrant and EM was finally rendered on 26 July, R-7. This delay resulted in a number of required suspense actions being missed, notably the final configuration of the unit, preparation of the firm deployable roster, and the final submission of the morning reports to the USARV Data Service Center. The second major problem area over which the PO had no control was the continued receipt of replacement personnel possessing missile peculiar MOS. Until the last morning report was prepared and submitted to USARV Data Service Center on 27 July, these replacement personnel were merely added to the deployable status of the unit. The only problem was one of inconvenience to the individual. However, subsequent to 27 July, missile peculiar replacement personnel could not be assigned to the 6-56 Artillery, and they had to be reported to USARP for reassignment.

4. (U) Personnel, Administration (Reenlistment)

a. Reenlistment involves the activities required to retain the maximum number of qualified, competent, enlisted personnel in the Regular Army.

b. In order to achieve this objective, in March 1969, this division reorganized the reenlistment program and initiated vigorous command support of the previously attached to the major subordinate commands, reenlistment NCO's started to be appointed to the battalion level by most units. This enables the counselor to better monitor the reenlistment program at battalion level and also assists the company size units in their reenlistment programs. The battalion reenlistment NCO also assists in coordination of administrative processing between the units and the Division Reenlistment Office. This additional assistance has resulted in a tremendous increase of the 21st Term and AUS retention rate, and has enhanced the overall reenlistment effort within the division.

c. In the month of July, August, and September, 1969, the enlistments/reenlistments were 175, 164, and 206 respectively, for a total of 545 enlistments/reenlistments. These monthly figures surpassed the previous monthly high, which was reached in June 1969, when 112 soldiers enlisted or reenlisted.

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5. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

a. During the period; Military Justice/Military Affairs continue to comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter Aug - Oct 69, this command tried 10 general courts-martial and received 85 special and nine summary courts-martial cases for supervisory review. In addition, 1,335 Article 15 proceedings were received for administrative review, correction, statistical reporting and forwarding to USAFSSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter included 77 IOD's 76 Article 15 appeal advices, 242 Reports of Survey, 56 Reports of Investigation, 37 elimination cases, and 20 Congressional Inquiries. Quarterly rates for general, special and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.14, 1.20 and 0.13 respectively. These rates reflect the average number of cases per month per thousand troop strength.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2,108 cases during the quarter, including, but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, and powers of attorney and general counseling and advice.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention, with strong emphasis on War Crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the Americal Division Combat Center. Instruction is given on the Military Justice Act of 1968 as well as a Senior NCO-Officer class on search and seizure.

d. During the quarter 90 claims were received for payment for loss on damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

e. During the period 21-22 Oct 69, the US Army Vietnam Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel Wilton F. Persons, Jr., JAGC, made a command staff visit to the Americal Division to observe operations and to inquire into the impact of the Military Justice Act of 1968 upon the office and the Division. No formal report was submitted.

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C. Intelligence

1. (C) Enemy Situation

a. Quang Tin

(1) The period of low level enemy activity that was witnessed during July 1969, continued until 11 August when VC/NVA forces completed their period of retraining and resupplying. On 12 August, enemy activity increased sharply as LZ's West, Ross, Center, Siberia, Bayonet, Hawk Hill and the CIDG received well over 200 rounds of mixed mortar and rocket fire. One of the hardest hit LZ's was Hawk Hill which received over 100 rounds of mixed mortar fire and a ground attack which resulted in 12 NVA KIA. LZ West was subjected to an abortive ground attack which was pre-empted by A/4-31 Inf, 196th Inf Bde netting 50 NVA KIA and 5 NVA CIA along with 4 x B-40 rocket launchers, 3 x B-41 rocket launchers, 19 x B-40 rockets, 191 x ChiCom H/granades, 4 x 20lb shaped charges, 4 x AK-47's and 1 x AK-50 also CIA. The 60th Bn, 1st MF Regt and the 1st Bn, 3d NVA Regt were identified by captured PW's as the units involved in this attack on LZ West. LZ Bayonet received 25 unknown type mortar rounds while the CIDG received 9 rounds of unknown type mortar and 5 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. LZ Ross received 13 rounds of 82mm mortar HE and 2 rounds of 82mm CS type mortar fire on 14 Aug. On 16 August, LZ Baldy received 10 rounds of unknown type mortar fire along with small arms fire and several ground probes from an UNSEF. The results of this contact were 7 NVA KIA and the following equipment CIA: 1 x Russian 9mm pistol, 1 x Bangalore torpedo, 3 x ChiCom H/Grenades, 25 x Homemade H/Grenades, 2 x RPG rounds, 4 x sat-chal charges and 1 x AK-47 magazine.

(2) During the period 17 thru 23 August, enemy activity remained at a high level in Quang Tin (P). Significant ground activity in the Province was concentrated in areas 5 km SE of LZ West vic BT 0121 and 7 km west of LZ West vic AT 9328. In one contact on 18 August, B/4-31 Inf tallied 91 NVA KIA vic AT 9428 while in contact with an enemy force believed to have been from the 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Div. Also on 18 Aug, D/4-31 accounted for 52 NVA KIA vic BT 0022. On August 21, G/4-31 Inf discovered the bodies of 103 enemy KIA vic AT 9328. These contacts were further proof of the existence of the 1st MF and 3d NVA Regt's in the LZ East - Center - Siberia area. Sporadic enemy attacks by fire continued throughout Quang Tin (P) area. For the second time in the month of Aug, CS type agent in a mortar round delivery system was employed against US forces as elements of the F/17 Cav received 1 x 82mm CS round on 22 Aug vic BT 2343. Most Local Force and Main Force Units operated in their normal AO's except the 70th MF Bn and the 72d LF Bn. While NVA units conducted their offensive activities against US installations, these two units relocated their forces in the coastal areas of Thang Binh and Tam Ky Districts with the mission of disrupting the pacification program in GVN controlled villages.

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(3) In comparison to the high level of enemy activity that existed during 11 - 23 August, the remainder of the month showed a moderate decrease. Ground activity continued to be centered in the area of LZ West, vic AT 9327 and BT 0320. On 25 August, elements of the 196th Bde operating vic AT 9327 engaged an UNSEF resulting in 74 NVA KIA, 47 bunkers and 13 structures destroyed. Also on the same day, Americal Division Artillery engaged 200 NVA vic BT 0320 resulting in 52 NVA KIA. The 1st MF Regt continued to operate around LZ Siberia area as PW's located the Regt HQ's and the 90th Bn vic AT 9829 and AT 9629 respectively. The 3d NVA Regt continued to operate in the region south and southeast of LZ Center as the Regt HQ's moved from the Phnoc Chau area of Tien Phnoc (D) to vic BT 0020 and the 1st Bn relocated vic AT 9421.

(4) During the month of August 1969, Americal Forces accounted for 998 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy units expended approximately 366 mixed mortar rounds against US installations.

(5) During the first 10 days of September 1969, enemy activity in Quang Tin (F) decreased significantly. The decrease can be largely attributed to the death of Ho Chi Minh for whom the VC/NVA proclaimed a 3 day truce to last from 8 - 11 September. The only area of significant contact was south of LZ Center vic BT 0721 as elements of the 196th Inf Bde accounted for 81 VC/NVA KIA during the period 1 - 11 September. After the expiration of the VC/NVA Cease Fire on 11 Sep, enemy units increased their attacks by fire against US installations with LZ Siberia and the Hiep Duc CPZ being the primary targets. On 11 September, LZ Siberia received a ground attack preceded by RPG/RR fire that resulted in 32 NVA KIA. Later the same day, LZ Siberia received 13 x 60mm mortar rounds and 2 x RR rounds. A search of the area around LZ Siberia revealed the following enemy armament CIA: 7 x AK-50's, 6 x AK-47's, 4 x RPG -2's, 1 x RPG-7, 1 x Flamethrower, 1 x pistol, 20 x RPG rounds, 7 x Bangalore torpedoes, 189 ChiCom H/ Grenades, 1 x field phone and 1 shaped charge. A PW from the GE-35 NVA Sapper/Bacon Bn, 2d NVA Div stated that his unit participated in the attack on LZ Siberia on 11 September. Also on 11 September, elements of the 60th Bn, 1st MF Regt and other unidentified units, initiated attacks by fire and ground against the Hiep Duc CPZ. The enemy initially employed in excess of 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire against friendly elements, followed by ground attacks. Contacts increased in intensity throughout the night and part of the next day. The 2/5 ARVN, with elements of the 4-31st Inf, reinforced friendly elements. As a result of aggressive actions by the combined forces, the Hiep Duc CPZ was reported clear of enemy forces on 13 September. Results were 30 enemy KIA, 6 enemy CIA and 9 IWC. In two separate attacks against Hawk Hill on 11 September, an enemy unit expended 5 x 122mm rockets and 5 x 60/ 82mm mortar rounds. On 12 and 13 September, 4 x 82mm mortar rounds and 4 x 82mm Recoilless Gun rounds were directed against LZ Siberia in 3 separate incidents. Again captured PW's identified the 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Div as the unit involved in the attacks on LZ Siberia-Hiep Duc CPZ area. It is believed that the 1st MF Regt Bq's, 40th and 60th

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Bn's were located on Nui Chom Mountain vic AT8931 prior to these attacks and that following the attacks the Regt returned to this location. After sustaining moderate casualties, the 70th MF Bn and 72d LF Bn withdrew from the coastal area of Thang Binh and Tam Ky Districts. The 70th MF Bn relocated vic BT1522 while the 72d LF Bn moved to vic BT1918.

(6) Enemy units in Quang Tin (P) continued their harassing attacks against US installations during 14-20 September. Elements of the 1st MF and 3d NVA Regts continued to conduct their activities in the LZ Siberia-West-Center area. Throughout this period LZ Center received 68 mixed mortar rounds, LZ West received 13 mixed mortar rounds and LZ Siberia received 40 rounds mixed mortar. Following these attacks, it is believed that the 1st MF Regt relocated its forces along the Hiep Duc/Duc Duc (D) border line vic AT7930. The last week of September showed a sharp decrease in enemy initiated activity as enemy units were successful in their attempts to avoid significant contact with Americal Forces. On 22 September, B/3-21st Inf, 196th Inf Bde engaged an UNSRF vic BT0423 resulting in 15 NVA KIA. This contact was believed to have been with elements of the 2d Bn, 3d NVA Regt. Following this contact, the 2d Bn, 3d NVA Regt relocated vic BT0927. Also on 22 September, the 176th Avn engaged and killed 10 NVA vic BT0322. The only US installation subjected to an attack by fire in late September was LZ West which received 23x8mm mortar rounds throughout the period 21-27 September. From 29 September to 1 October, elements of the 1-6th Inf, 198th Inf Bde operating vic BT3111 found and destroyed the following: 35xRRG rounds, 45x60mm mortar rounds, 101xChiCom H/Grenades, 31xhomemade H/Grenades, 61xM-79 rounds, 3xclaymore mines, 23xhomemade mines, 16xstructures, 13xbunkers, numerous blasting caps, small arms ammunition, medical supplies and radio equipment. D/1-46th Inf, on 29 Sep, received 25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire vic BT1622. During the month of September, Americal Forces accounted for 366 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy units directed 325 mixed mortar rounds against US installations.

(7) After suffering heavy casualties during the months of August and September 1969, VC/NVA Forces in October faced numerous problems such as food shortages, morale difficulties, and a need for new replacements. Due to this, enemy units returned to their more secure base areas with the mission of resupplying and retraining for future offensive activities. Contact with enemy forces was limited to widely scattered encounters mainly with squad-size units. Throughout the month, enemy disposition remained relatively the same with no major moves occurring. The 1st MF Regt Hqs moved to vic ZC 1926 while the 40th Bn continued to operate vic AT7930 and the 60th and 90th Bn's operated vic AT8627 and AT8532, respectively. The 3d NVA Regt Hqs and the 1st Bn continued to operate in northern Tien Phuoc (D) vic BT0020 and BT0921 while the 2d and 3d Bns operated in southern Thang Binh (D) vic BT0927 and BT0126. Reports have given the 3d NVA Regt the mission of providing protection for rice gathering parties that are operating in Thang Binh and Tam Ky Districts. After providing support for the 1st MF Regt in attacks during August and September, the GK-33 NVA

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Mortar Bn, 2d NVA Div moved to vic AT9133 and has operated at this location since 30 September. On 5 October, G/1-45th Inf operating vic BT218121 found a VC/NVA base camp that consisted of 7xnuits, 3xbunkers, 5xIW, 12xChiCom H/Grenades, 1xsewing machine, miscellaneous equipment and documents. On 10 October, F/8 Cav engaged 5 NVA and 1 VC vic BT1231. Results were 5 NVA and 1 VC KIA, 3xpacks, 1xChiCom H/Grenade, miscellaneous equipment and documents CIA, 2xstructures and 3xbunkers destroyed. On 11 October, LZ Siberia received 47x82mm mortar rounds. On 14 October, LZ Center received 12x82mm mortar rounds. Elements of 2-5 ARVN on 19 Oct, vic BT189110, found 5xIW, 1x122mm rocket, 4xAT rifle grenades, 1xmachine used to make H/Grenades and 7,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Also on 19 October, vic FT312062, G/1-6th Inf found and destroyed 50x60mm mortar rounds, 2x10 lb explosive charges, 10xmortar charges, 15xChiCom H/Grenades, 17xRPG rounds and evacuated miscellaneous documents and pictures. D/1-46th Inf, on 22 October, destroyed a total of 20xstructures, 2xcaves and miscellaneous military equipment vic BT1800. On the same day, F/8 Cav destroyed 25 structures vic AT9610. On 29 October, the CIDG received 4x122mm rockets resulting in minor damage to a UH-1H and a 5-ton vehicle. During the month of October 1969, Americal Forces accounted for 165 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy units expended approximately 154 mixed mortar rounds against US installations.

b. Quang Ngai

(1) The relatively low level of activity which prevailed throughout the end of July continued into the first ten days of August. Incidents were characterized by scattered attacks by fire and light contact. On 2 Aug, G/4-3 Inf, vic BS680382, found a base camp consisting of 20 bunkers destroyed by artillery. Activity began to pick up when on 11 Aug, LZ Doitie received a mortar attack followed by a sapper attack. The attacking unit was identified through PWs as elements of the 406th Sapper Bn which took 19 KIA. On the morning of the 12th, elements of the 21st NVA Regt moved against the Tra Bong CIDG Camp under the cover of a mortar attack. Two outposts were abandoned and later recovered. Later on the 12th, vic BS631853, 2/6 ARVN accounted for 20 enemy KIA. On the morning of the 13th, LZ San Juan Hill received a ground probe, supported by mortars, from elements of the 90th Sapper Bn (90th Engr Bn), 3d NVA Div. On the same day, A/3-1 Inf, vic BS562743, engaged an NVA company resulting in 10 NVA KIA. On 15 Aug, vic BS807377, a combined RF/FF cordon and search operation resulted in 6VC KIA and 10 VC CIA from C-219th LF Co. This accounted for about 15% of that unit's strength. The week of 17-23 Aug was dominated by attacks by fire, with 175 mortar rounds and 12x140mm rkts directed against US positions. On 22 Aug, vic BS814358, D/19 Engr was ambushed by unidentified UNSEF; a reaction force was called and the contact resulted in 15 NVA KIA. PWs and agent reports for the last week indicated that there would be a lull to retrain and resupply for the 2d phase of the Autumn offensive. During this period, B/5-46 Inf, found a total of 450,000 lbs of salt vic BS749836 and BS755835. LZ Bronze and San Juan Hill received 23x140mm rkts during the week. A/1-1 Cav received 10 122mm rkts, vic BS835331, on 27 Aug; this was the first report of the use of this rocket in Duc Pho (D) since Feb 69.

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(2) During August, 3d NVA Div HQ remained in southern Minh Long (D), although there were indications of elements moving to a new base area north of the An Lao Valley, on the Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh border. The 2d MF Regt stayed in the hills south-southwest of Duc Pho (D) through the remainder of the month.

(3) The 22d NVA Regt spent most of the month in the hills around the upper Song Ve Valley. Elements of this regiment were tentatively identified in the attacks on LZ San Juan Hill which occurred during September. The 21st Regt withdrew to the vic of inactive BA 120 after the action around the Tra Bong CIDG camp. From here, the regiment sent large elements on food gathering missions to the coastal plains in southwestern Binh Son (D), western Son Tinh (D), and western Nghia Hanh (D). Main Force units in Quang Ngai (P) remained in their normal AO's, with the exception of the 406th Sapper Bn which sent two companies out of inactive BA 120 to participate in the attacks on LZ Dettie. The 38th LF Bn dispersed their companies throughout the delta of the Song Ve, in eastern Tu Nghia (D) and northern Mo Duc (D). Reports near the end of the month indicated that they were moving to the An Chi base area, on the north bank of the Song Ve, for training and resupply. The 48th LF Bn continued to operate in the area west of the Batangan peninsula, astride the Son Tin/Binh Son border. In August, the 526th Sapper Bn HQ was dropped from OR holdings and the subordinate units (21st LF Sapper Co, 506th A LF Sapper Co, 506th B LF Sapper Co) are now held as individual units, subordinate to Province control. Throughout the month of August, a total of 492 VC/NVA were killed by American Forces. US installations and NDP's received a total of approximately 600 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire.

(4) Activity in the beginning of September picked up from the low level witnessed the last week in August. Most of the significant contacts of this month were in line with the primary aim of the second phase of the Autumn offensive, which was to gain control of as much of the population as possible by driving people from GVN areas into VC dominated areas. On 2 Sep, elements of 1-1 Cav, vic BS 819331, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 22 NVA KIA, 8 x AK-47's, 1 x 7.62mm IMG, 1 x 57mm RR, and 1 x RPG-7 Rkt launcher CIA. Throughout the week, the 1-1 Cav had almost daily contact with the enemy, accounting for approximately 80 KIA. A PW identified the enemy unit in contact as elements from the 93d Bn, 2d MF Regt. A PW captured after a ground and mortar attack against the 1/6 ARVN, vic BS 473795 resulting in 38 enemy KIA, identified his unit as the 4th Bn, (AKA 60th Bn), 21st NVA Regt. On 3 Sep, D/5-46, vic BS 749836, found 13 tons of salt. On 6 Sep, C/1-52, vic BS 517777, observed 1000-1800 Vietnamese moving east. This group moved to the base of OP# 1, giving VC activities and offensive plans as their reason for relocating. On the morning of 11 Sep, An Chau Refugee Camp, vic BS 600914, received 20-25 satchel charges from an element of the 95th A LF Sapper Co. At the same time, Doan Xuan Refugee Camp, vic BS 760819, received 10 x RPG rounds, and 50 x H/Gren

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from an estimated platoon size VC force. Both attacks resulted in several civilian casualties and destroyed structures. On 13 Sep, CAP 1-3-9 and an RF Co received 6 x 82mm mortars, 160 x 60mm mortars, RPG rounds, satchel charges, SA fire and a ground attack from an estimated 2 NVA companies. With Americal G/S and A/S supporting CAP 1-3-9 and 2/6 ARVN, the results of the contact were 116 VC/NVA KIA, 1NVA CIA, and 6 IWC. There were 260 structures destroyed by the enemy in this contact. The PW captured was from the 80th Bn, 21st NVA Regt. Elements of the 3-1 Inf found and destroyed 3 base camps during the week vic, BS 525644, BS 522628, BS 507663, totaling 38 structures. On 15 Sep, vic BS 544531, Minh Tri (V) was attacked by an estimated 200 VC employing rockets, mortars, handgrenades and SA fire. This action resulted in 21 Vietnamese civilians KIA and 75% of the village destroyed.

(5) Friendly forces accounted for 23 VC/NVA KIA. On 16 Sep, C/1-20, vic BS 614438, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 13 VC/NVA KIA. On 17 Sep, vic BS 443846, A/1-52 Inf and H/17 Cav engaged an UNSEF resulting in 22 VC/NVA KIA. On the same day, a 57th Trans Bn truck convoy was ambushed along QL #1, vic BS 825339, destroying two 5000 gallon fuel tankers. On 21 Sep, 1/4 and 4/4 ARVN, vic BS 695585 and BS 695595, engaged an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 17 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA CIA and miscellaneous equipment CIA. During the last ten days of September, there was a noticeable decrease in activity. On 21 Sep, vic BS 688586, 4/4 ARVN found 30-40 bodies killed by A/S. On 21 Sep, A/1-3, vic BS 577415, found and destroyed a base camp with 22 bunkers and 8 fighting positions; while at this location, they received 45 x 82mm mortar rounds and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. On 26 Sep, vic BS 433802, D/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 20 tons of salt. On 28 Sep, C/1-52 Inf, vic BS 122890, found and destroyed 30 structures, one of which seemed to be a classroom, one a briefing room, and one a messhall with 12 bunkers. On 30 Sep, D/1-1 Cav, over a five hour period observed 150 bunkers and approximately 150 NVA with packs and weapons vic BS 373804, BS 350800, BS 357900 and BS 368788. Airstrikes in the area resulted in 100 bunkers destroyed and one large secondary explosion.

(6) Reports have indicated that the 3d NVA Div HQ moved from southern Minh Long (U) to north of An Lao Valley, astride the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh border. The 2d MF Regt again remained in the hills west and southwest of Duc Pho (D). The 22d Regt moved from the upper Song Ve Valley to southern Minh Long (D) for resupply. The 21st NVA Regt remained in old BA 118 except for its attack on An Hoa Refugee Camp and OP George. Main Force units did not move significantly from their normal AO's, however the 406th Sapper Bn and the 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn moved deeper into BA 121. Local force units also stayed in their normal AO's. During this month, the 9th LF Sapper Co was split into two separate units, 95A and 95B. The 95A LF Sapper Co operates in Binh Son (D), east of QL #1, while 95B LF Sapper Co operates west of QL #1 in Binh Son (D). Also, based on a PW and a Hoi Chanh, the 120th Montagnard Bn is thought to be split into elements operating in Son Ha (D), Minh Long (D), and Ba To (D). Preliminary indications are that the death of Ho Chi Minh has had little or no effect on enemy units.

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in the Americal Division AO.

(7) This month's comparative lull in activity is reflected by the fact that Americal Forces accounted for 302 VC/NVA KIA for the period. US Installations and NDP's received a total of 214 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire.

(8) Activity for the beginning of October picked up slightly from the lull during the last week of September. On 3 October, B/4-21 Inf, vic BS 804239, found a recently used battalion size base camp with sleeping positions for 350 men. On 4 October, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS 776284, engaged an estimated platoon size NVA force resulting in 11 NVA KIA. On 5 October, a VC/RTM, who rallied vic BS 547737, stated he saw a document concerning LF units of Tu Nghia(D). The document concerned a 2 phase offensive, with the first phase to take place between 3-15 October, and the second phase to take place between 12-31 October. Several agent reports and Noi Chanhs also reported an offensive with a similar time period. Targets most frequently mentioned were locations in Quang Ngai City, Chieu Hoi Centers, Refugee Camps, GVN controlled areas and QL #1. While Americal Forces experienced very little contact, other FIMAF units were in constant contact with the enemy. CAP 1-3-5, vic BS 722956, received 10 x 60mm mortar rounds on 8 October. CAP 1-4-4, vic BS 722956, received 7 x 60mm on 5 October and 35 x 82mm mortar rounds on 9 October from an estimated 2 VC platoons. On 9 October, CAP 1-4-5 and the 380th RF Co, vic BS 737791, received approximately 80 x 82mm mortar rounds and SA fire from an estimated VC company, resulting in 11 VC KIA. Captured documents identified the attacking unit as the 48th LF Bn. On 12 October, B/4-3 Inf, vic BS 7383, found and evacuated 5 tons of rice. On 12 October, CAP 1-3-4, vic BT 6201, received heavy SA fire, 23 x 82mm mortar rounds, 3 x RPG rounds, an unknown number of satchel charges and H/Gren from an estimated reinforced company size force resulting in 6 VC KIA. On 16 October, B/4-3 Inf, vic BS 6343, engaged a squad size VC force resulting in 4 VC KIA. On 17 October, R/6 ARVN, vic BS 7389, BS 6983 and BS 7188, engaged an unidentified UNSKF resulting in 28 VC KIA. On the same day, the Mo Duc(D) PF, vic BS 7449, engaged an unidentified UNSKF resulting in 20 VC KIA. On 18 October, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS 7656, engaged an unidentified UNSKF resulting in 10 VC KIA. Also, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS 8831, received 15 x RPG rounds and 59 x RR rounds plus SA fire from an unidentified UNSKF.

(9) Activity involving Americal Units increased for the week 19-25 October. On 19 October, A/1-52 Inf, vic BS 601871, found and destroyed 12 bunkers (12' x 8' x 10'). On 19 October, CAP 1-3-8, vic BS 574923, received SA/AW fire, 100 rounds of mixed RPG and mortar fire, and satchel charges from an unidentified UNSKF resulting in 4 VC KIA. On 20 October, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS 759593, received SA fire and an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds from an estimated VC company size force resulting in 6 VC KIA. On 23 October, C/1-52 Inf, vic BS 570794, found and destroyed 18 bunkers and one tunnel 200 feet in length. On 24 October, A/4-3 Inf, vic BS 615436, found an NVA base camp consisting of 11 structures, 2 caves, documents and miscellaneous equipment. On 25 October, LRRP Team Idaho, vic BS 777267, engaged an estimated NVA company size force resulting in 4 NVA KIA.

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(10) On 26 Oct, H/17 Cav, vic BS 481772, engaged 7 NVA resulting in 7 NVA KIA and miscellaneous equipment CIA. On 26 Oct, IREP Team Nevada, vic BS 664341, engaged an estimated NVA platoon size force resulting in 4 NVA KIA. On 26 Oct, B/4-3 Inf vic BS 679385, found an enemy base camp and destroyed 20 bunkers. On 27 Oct, A/4-3 Inf, vic BS 622458, found an enemy base camp and evacuated miscellaneous military equipment. On 28 Oct, A/4-3 Inf, vic BS 620451, found and destroyed an enemy base camp consisting of 7 structures. On 29 October, B/1-20 Inf, vic BS 793448, found and evacuated 2 tons of rice. On 31 Oct, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS 755598, BS 765598, and BS 760607, engaged an UNSOP resulting in 10 VC KIA.

(11) October was characterized by a general lack of contact between the enemy and Americal Forces and a lack of movement on the part of enemy units. Significant dispositions for the month were: 3d NVA Div HQ remained astride the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh border; the 2d MF Regt operated in southern Duc Pho (D) and Ba To (D) along the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh border; the 22d NVA Regt operated west of BA 123 in Mo Duc (D); the 21st NVA Regt stayed basically in the area of BA 118. The Main Force and LF units operated in their normal AO's. Captured documents revealed that the 93d Bn, 2d MF Regt was to receive sapper training and operate in Binh Dinh (D). The two phase offensive failed to materialize to any large degree.

(12) Throughout the month, a total of 167 VC/NVA KIA were accounted for by Americal Forces. A total of 99 rounds of mortar fire were directed against US LZ's, NDP's and installations.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Project Duffel Bag/Target Mission Force continues to expand its operations throughout the Division TAOR. Additional Target Mission Force monitoring sites have been established at LZ West, vic AT 990250, LZ San Juan Hill, vic BS 634380, and OP-1, vic BS 517778. Two additional sensor officers have arrived and have been assigned to the 196th and 11th Infantry Brigades. The strength of TMF is now 27 enlisted personnel and 4 officers. Since 14 Jan 69 a total of 6030 rounds have been fired on 2703 detected enemy. TMF continues to supply maneuver units with sensor coverage and support as equipment becomes available. In addition, a platoon of 30 ARVN personnel of the 2d ARVN Division have been trained by TMF and are now operational in the vicinity of Nghia Hanh. Plans for the expansion of TMF coverage continue.

b. The G2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continued to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 634 infra-red missions, 172 SIAR missions, 66 APD missions, 301 photo missions and 785 visual reconnaissance missions were completed. A total of 3528 targets were acquired as a result of IR & SIAR missions. Of these, 742 were engaged by artillery fire. We are presently assisting the 2d ARVN Division G2 Air section in the planning of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance in southern I Corps. The eventual goal is to have the 2d ARVN Division assume full responsibility of those intelligence gathering capabilities for their operational areas.

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3. (U) Military Intelligence Detachment: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. (C) Counterintelligence Services:

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a slight increase during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period, this office conducted 18 investigations as compared to 17 reported the last quarter.

(3) This office provided the following totals of CI services:

Announced CI Inspections:	39
Unannounced CI Inspections:	10
Courtesy CI Inspections:	4
DAME Assists:	24
Miscellaneous Investigations:	55
PSI:	17

(4) During this reporting period, the CI Section Case Officers conducted approximately 417 Source Meetings and turned in approximately 458 Information Reports. This quarter shows a marked decrease over the last quarter totals of 510 Source Meetings yielding 532 Information Reports.

<u>Previous Quarters</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>IR's</u>
Nov 68 - Jan 69	Unk	306
Feb - Apr 69	440	372
May - Jul 69	510	532
Aug - Oct 69	417	468

(5) The decrease for this quarter is attributed to a number of problems. The first is the shortage of agents at the team levels. Secondly, the Source Program in the 196th Bde AO at LZ Baldy was completely turned over to the Marines. Third, with the onset of the monsoon season, the sub-sources do not go out as far or as often into the hills as in the dry season.

(6) Volunteer Informant Program.

(a) Expenditures:	No. of Informants
Aug 69 \$2,580.41	260
Sep 69 \$2,500.10	326
Oct 69 \$1,230.76	73 (to 22 Oct)

(b) Funds expended for information - approximately 6 to 8%.

(c) Total - \$6,311.27.

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(d) Due to very limited funds, the overall Volunteer Informant Program has shown a marked decrease from last reporting period.

(e) The Program's purchases are still heavy on arms and ordnance, but not enough emphasis is placed on the collection of intelligence information. The majority of funds expended was for arms and ordnance.

b. (C) Imagery Interpretation

(1) During the past quarter the Americal II section compiled an image interpretation manual and distributed it to all major intelligence sections of the Americal Division. This booklet is designed to illustrate the capabilities and limitations of the II section, and to assist potential requesters in determination of best methods of utilization of assets available to them. Explanation was made of the various types of photography available and possible applications thereof. Also mentioned were types of special studies available upon request, and some limitations of the reconnaissance support systems. There is no adequate means by which the effectiveness or failure of this booklet can be properly ascertained, short of a verbal or written survey of potential users. But it must be noted that the practicality of recent requests indicates that this attempt at education has been well received.

(2) During the past quarter the Americal Division II Section conducted an all source study of infiltration activity in the Division TAOI. A draft report was published and disseminated to the subordinate brigade intelligence sections for review and possible update. To date, response has been light with minor additions to the original report.

c. (C) Interrogation:

(1) During the reporting period, the IPW Section interrogated and classified 901 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification compared to the previous period illustrates that the significant proportional change in detainee levels are in the categories of Civil Defendants and Innocent Civilians.

	<u>Aug - Oct 69</u>	<u>May - Jul 69</u>
NVA/PW	63	34
VC/PW	41	24
Civil Defendant	367	425
Returnee	39	43
Innocent Civilian	391	551

This significant drop in the level of Innocent Civilians detained compared with the level of other classifications indicate better screening of detainees in the field. There has been a substantial decrease in the number of persons detained throughout the month of September, but a slight rise noted in October.

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(2) Thirty-nine man-days were spent in support of Cordon and Search operations, screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field.

(3) Information from 18 interrogations resulted in response by tactical units. The breakdown of the classification of detainees providing such valued information is as follows:

Returns	3
PW	6
CD or IC	9
Total	18

Responses were made to reports of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, unit base camps and other unit locations and rocket firing positions.

(4) The Interrogation Section has made a diligent effort to maintain a close working relationship with personnel of the 8th ARVN MID. On 20 September 1969, a conference was held at which 8th ARVN/635th MID representatives discussed and established a Standing Operating Procedure which outlined mission responsibilities for both organizations. 8th ARVN has assigned personnel to work in areas of Order of Battle, Interrogation and Document Exploitation.

d. (C) Order of Battle:

(1) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section concentrated on strengthening the internal structure of the section while increasing the number of special projects. With the addition of 7 new enlisted men, the personnel situation was improved. SFC Joseph Novotny replaced SSG Lawrence Adams as the NCOIC, upon SSG Adams' departure in October.

(2) The Order of Battle Section conducted a number of informal conferences with members of the Order of Battle Section, 8th ARVN MID. The section has also published a 45 page summary on the 2d NVA Division and a 119 page AKA (also known as) Study. The section has also increased the number of special area studies while decreasing the preparation time. The targeting analysts are beginning to use 1:25,000 photo maps for the special area studies.

e. Kit Carson Scouts:

(1) The KCS program within the Americal Division has made great strides towards further improvement during the past three months. Improvement are forthcoming in recruiting, administration, training facilities and transitional vocational education.

(2) Prior to entering local Chieu Hoi Centers, all Chieu Hoi reports are screened for the Hoi Chanhs that have the best background. The Chieu Hoi Center is then entered asking for specific individuals. The overall effect has been an upgrading of the KCS trainees and a very favorable response from the Hoi Chanh. It also allows the KCS recruiting personnel to set up appointments with Hoi Chanhs who were absent during the normal recruiting

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mission. This method does not preclude on-the-spot recruitment, but is an extremely valuable supplement. It gives the "personal touch" to an otherwise impersonal activity.

(3) The Americal Division KCS Program is issuing new ID cards. Temporary ID cards are issued to each new KCS for 60 days beyond graduation. The permanent ID cards are issued after 60 day trial periods. The permanent ID cards carry the official stamp of the Province Police Chief, a sub-section of the National Police. This was arranged by providing the Police Chief, the biographical data sheet, ID card, draft deferment numbers and FBI type finger print cards to each new scout. This system provides a temporary ID card to each new scout during the period of maximum attrition and a permanent ID card, approved by GVN authorities, after the scout has proven himself.

(4) The KCS training program has undergone four (4) major changes:

(a) Americal Division KCS Training Center is utilizing Vietnamese cadre for an increasing amount of training. Vietnamese are even beginning to teach more language classes. This, as well as the duties, responsibilities and privileges of a scout, are being taught by experienced scouts, who have worked in the field.

(b) Helicopter familiarization training has become the most popular, and perhaps one of the most valuable classes. Due to the value of actual helicopter support time, a helicopter mock-up was built for the initial familiarization training.

(c) The KCSTC has begun sending several of the Americal KCS Cadre to the three month IRO language school. Aside from increasing their value to the KCS program, this training will be of enormous value to the cadre's future.

(d) Our "buddy day" program has been receiving 100% support. It is a voluntary program for the using units, and is certainly proving to be worthwhile. Initial orientation to the American buddies is conducted in Vietnamese. After their initial shock they realize the magnitude of the language barrier, then Vietnamese language classes begin for the buddies with the KCS Scout as a tutor.

(5) Close liaison with the Chu Lai Industrial Relations Office (IRO), and the Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO), have created a transitional vocational educational program for many veteran and disabled scouts. After an extensive period of time in the field, being wounded on multiple occasions or receiving a disabling injury, KCS are of limited value to the program. To show appreciation for a "job well done", KCS training personnel are programing these KCS into IRO vocational training classes. The CPO has been of enormous aid in their enrollment and their placement on Chu Lai base after graduation. The ex-KCS is paid while going to school and graduates with a trade.

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(6) The most valuable link in the administration of the Americal Division KCS Program is still that full-time KCS Coordinator at each brigade. This man administers the program at that level, educates using units, makes assignments, supervises payment of KCS and solves grievances in a timely fashion. He is the direct link between the Division Coordinator and the KCS Program at using unit level.

4. (C) Co G (Ranger), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities

a. One of the most important programs initiated during September and October has been the use of attached indigenous personnel on Ranger teams. On 21 Sep 69, Ranger teams Texas and Illinois, with one attached indigenous individual, located an NVA base area at BS 344092. With the help of the indigenous individual's knowledge of this type of warfare, the Ranger team captured the following enemy weapons: three (3) AK-47 Rifles, three (3) SKS rifles, one (1) M-14 rifle, four (4) ChiCom grenades, and (1) M-33 handgrenade, one (1) M-26 handgrenade and one (1) 60mm mortar with 16 rounds of HE.

b. Inter-service coordination proved highly successful when Ranger teams Oklahoma and Georgia were given a mission to find the wreckage of a Marine F-4B Phantom. Ranger team Georgia located the wreckage. One body was found and extracted by CH-46. A more thorough reconnaissance of the area revealed the wreckage of a Marine CH-46 helicopter that had been missing in action. USN and USMC VIP's were inserted and linked with the teams. Ranger teams Georgia and Oklahoma led the VIP's to the wreckage. Because of successful coordination between USMC and USN personnel and Ranger teams, seven (7) bodies were located that would have been otherwise continued missing in action.

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D. Operations

1. (C) Operations Summary:

a. General: Americal Division forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division TAOI during the period 1 August to 31 October 1969 with contact varying from moderate to heavy from mid August to the beginning of September; declining to light and sporadic during the end of September and October as the monsoon season began in the Americal Division TAOI. From 8 to 10 September, a three day VC/NVA cease fire was called in memory of Ho Chi Minh, during which time all combat units went into a defensive posture conducting only local security patrols. Continuous heavy rains during October limited operations by curtailing the effectiveness of visual reconnaissance missions causing delay and/or cancellation of close air support missions and limiting air, ground and foot mobility. The main area of enemy activity was in the Frederick Hill Area of Operation (AO). During the reporting period, Operation Lamar Flain, designed to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division operating in the mountains around Base Area 117, terminated on 13 August 1969. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach and Iron Mountain, conducted in conjunction and close coordination with the 2d ARVN Division, continued throughout the period.

b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Americal Division and 2d ARVN Division forces were engaged in 3 large scale battles with enemy forces. Two engagements took place in the Frederick Hill AO and one in the Geneva Park AO. All were reactive in nature.

(1) During the period 18-29 August 1969, elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 5th ARVN Regiment engaged an NVA Regimental size force at two major areas of contact (vicinity BT004244 and AT947278) in the largest battle fought during the reporting period. Initial contact was made south of FSB West vicinity BT004244 by D/4-31 Infantry at 1145H as they engaged an unknown size NVA force. A day long battle was fought on the ground and supported with a heavy concentration of artillery, gunships and airstrikes. Over 1200 rounds of 105mm ammunition were fired to destroy the enemy's dug in positions. By the end of the day, over 90 NVA had been killed, 52 by D/4-31. Meanwhile, B/4-31 Infantry engaged an NVA force east of Hiep Duc vicinity AT938278 at 1335H killing 91 NVA and capturing 2 individual weapons. Friendly losses for both companies for the day were 13 US KIA and 48 US WIA(E). The day's contacts established the two areas where extensive combat operations would be conducted. Near the area of contact south of FSB West, a Command and Control (C&C) helicopter from 3-21 Infantry with eight persons aboard, including the Battalion Commander, his Command Sergeant Major and an Associated Press

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news correspondent, was engaged by .51 caliber automatic weapons fire, caught fire in the air and crashed vicinity BT005227. The personnel on board were listed as missing in action. A, B/3-21 Infantry on 19 August combat air assaulted into the area of the crash site to recover the missing bodies. They were immediately taken under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and remained in contact until the evening of 20 August. By nightfall, the two companies had killed 20 NVA and suffered 6 US KIA and 10 US WIA(E).

(2) On 21 August, two companies from 1-46 Infantry plus elements from 2/7 Marines were deployed into the area around Hiep Duc and two companies of 2-1 Infantry were deployed south of FSB West to reinforce the combat operations already in progress. Two more days of fierce fighting ensued as all elements employed met continued enemy resistance. At 0825H on 24 August, as enemy resistance began to decrease, C/3-21 Infantry located the downed aircraft and recovered the eight missing bodies. On the morning of 25 August, B/1-46 Infantry engaged an unknown sized NVA force vic AT941266 killing 12 NVA. Less than one kilometer to the east at 1510H, B/2-1 Infantry and B, D/1-46 Infantry vic AT932266 engaged an NVA force resulting in 74 NVA KIA. In the area south of FSB West vic BT026198, A, B/3-21 Infantry and B/3-82 Artillery engaged approximately 200 NVA and killed 52. US Forces continued to conduct combat operations to drive the enemy out of the area until 29 August when they no longer met enemy resistance. The ability to mass ground forces and make maximum use of artillery and air support lead to the eventual defeat of the enemy force with a confirmed count of over 540 NVA killed. The heavy casualties inflicted by allied forces significantly reduced the threat of attack on Hiep Duc and severely impaired the enemy's lines of communication and supply around Base area 117.

(3) During the early morning hours of 11 September 1969, the enemy launched a two pronged attack against FSB Siberia (AT901232) and Hiep Duc. Elements of 4-31 Infantry and Regional and Popular Forces in a night defensive position repelled the initial phase of the attack. The second phase of the attack centered on Hiep Duc in a day long battle fought with the defending Regional and Popular forces. On the morning of 12 September 1969, 2/5 ARVN Battalion was combat air assaulted into the area of contact from the previous day to provide reinforcements for the defending forces. Contact was established early and another day long battle was fought against the 60th MF Battalion. By 1200H on 13 September 1969, the allied forces had beaten back the enemy's attack killing over 50 of the enemy and completely eliminated enemy forces from the Hiep Duc Controlled Fire Zone. This operation, conducted mainly by the 2d ARVN Division forces supported only by American Aviation and Artillery Assets, is one of many examples of the GVN forces ability to react to enemy attacks in support of local population centers.

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(4) On 13 September 1969, an estimated force of 2 NVA Companies launched a pre-dawn attack, the first of two on An Phong Village and OP George (vic BS474864) but was successfully repelled by the defending CAP 1-3-9 forces. At first light, several hours after the first attack, the NVA forces regrouped and launched another attack. Two Regional Force Companies from Binh Son City were combat air assaulted into the area of contact to aid in the successful repulse of the second enemy attack. That afternoon, reinforcements from 1-52 Infantry and H Troop 17th Cavalry moved into the area of previous contact to find, destroy and completely eliminate any remaining NVA forces. Contact was moderate to sporadic the remainder of the day as allied forces conducted combat operations around An Phong Village. The results of the action, 116 NVA killed, eliminated the threat of attack on the nearby local population centers.

c. Summary of Operations:

(1) Terminated Operations: Operation Lamar Flain

Operation Lamar Flain, initiated on 16 May 1969 with 1-501 and 1-502 Infantry Battalions of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 1-46 Infantry Battalion of the 196th Infantry Brigade, terminated on 13 August 1969 having successfully relieved the pressure on the GVN population center of Tam Ky and New Ban Duc by eliminating the forces of the 2d NVA Division and their VC counterparts who had previously been operating in Base Area 117. In the first 13 days of the reporting period, three battalions concluded the third phase of Operation Lamar Flain, a large scale combat operation in the Song Tram Valley initiated with combat air assaults into the area after a series of Arc Light strikes, and began redeployment from the area. In the last days of Operation Lamar Flain, allied forces met little enemy resistance and were able to successfully conclude the operation with negative significant incidents. Results for Operation Lamar Flain during the reporting period are as follows:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
6 US KIA	32 VC KIA
21 US WIA(E)	19 NVA KIA
2 US WIA(M)	17 DET
	1 PW/VC
	10 INC
	3 CSWC

Total results for Operation Lamar Flain since its inception are as follows:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
105 US KIA	178 VC KIA
298 US WIA(E)	346 NVA KIA
35 US WIA(M)	422 DET

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8 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
2 CE/VC
256 IWC
62 CSWC

(2) Operations by AO:

(a) Operation Frederick Hill: Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in conjunction with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period with contact varying from moderate to heavy through the first half of September, and declined to light and sporadic during the remainder of the reporting period. The reporting period opened with elements of 2-1 Infantry and F Troop 17th Cavalry concluding operations on Northern Barrier Island while Regional and Popular forces with elements from the US Marine Corps established blocking positions. Contact with the enemy remained extremely light as the deployment of allied forces into the area caused the enemy to exfiltrate the area avoiding contact. Several staging and harvest areas were destroyed and the northern portion of Barrier Island was neutralized as the operation concluded on 16 August. A two month lull in enemy activity ceased on the evening of 11 August 1969 as the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks upon US forces, installations and GVN population centers. The focal point of the offensive was in the Frederick Hill AO. Several of the Fire Support Bases (FSB's) in the AO received heavy mortar attacks followed by ground probes and sapper attacks. US casualties were moderate to heavy as they successfully repelled the ground probes and sapper attacks; inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy. On the evening of 11 August 1969, D/3-21 Infantry vicinity AT973100 received small arms fire and hand grenades resulting in 7 US WIA(E). During the early morning hours of 12 August 1969, A/4-31 Infantry, in a night defensive posture at FSB West (AT990250), received one 82mm mortar round and small arms fire followed by a ground probe. They successfully repelled the ground probe employing organic weapons, artillery and gunships resulting in 5 US WIA(E), 50 NVA KIA, 5 NVA CIA, 5 IWC and 7 CSWC. At 0230H the same morning, the GVN population center of Tam Ky received six B-40 rockets and six 82mm mortar rounds scattered throughout the city resulting in 1 PF KIA, 5 civilians WIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. A half hour later, C/1-1 Cavalry and A/3-16 Artillery, while defending FSB Hawk Hill (BT231315), came under heavy mortar fire as they received approximately 100 rounds followed by a sapper attack that penetrated the perimeter before the attack was repelled by organic weapons fire, artillery and gunships. Results of the encounter were 13 NVA KIA, 4 IWC and 2 CSWC with 7 US KIA, 51 US WIA(E). At 0400H, F Troop 8th Cavalry (Air) vicinity BT228402 engaged and killed 15 NVA. On 13 August 1969 at 0847H, 3-21 Infantry while securing FSB Center (BT052259) received six 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 5 US WIA(E). During the following four day lull in enemy activity, the 1st Marine Division assumed the Quang Nam Province portion of the Americal Division TAOI, establishing a new northern boundary. By 18 August 1969, the first

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ENEMY
8 PU/VC
3 PW/NVA
2 CH/VC
256 IWC
62 CSWC

(2) Operations by AO:

(a) Operation Frederick Hill: Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in conjunction with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period with contact varying from moderate to heavy through the first half of September, and declined to light and sporadic during the remainder of the reporting period. The reporting period opened with elements of 2-1 Infantry and F Troop 17th Cavalry concluding operations on Northern Barrier Island while Regional and Popular forces with elements from the US Marine Corps established blocking positions. Contact with the enemy remained extremely light as the deployment of allied forces into the area caused the enemy to exfiltrate the area avoiding contact. Several staging and harvest areas were destroyed and the northern portion of Barrier Island was neutralized as the operation concluded on 16 August. A two month lull in enemy activity ceased on the evening of 11 August 1969 as the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks upon US forces, installations and GVN population centers. The focal point of the offensive was in the Frederick Hill AO. Several of the Fire Support Bases (FSB's) in the AO received heavy mortar attacks followed by ground probes and sapper attacks. US casualties were moderate to heavy as they successfully repelled the ground probes and sapper attacks; inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy. On the evening of 11 August 1969, D/3-21 Infantry vicinity AT973100 received small arms fire and hand grenades resulting in 7 US WIA(E). During the early morning hours of 12 August 1969, A/4-31 Infantry, in a night defensive posture at FSB West (AT990250), received one 82mm mortar round and small arms fire followed by a ground probe. They successfully repelled the ground probe employing organic weapons, artillery and gunships resulting in 5 US WIA(E), 50 NVA KIA, 5 NVA CIA, 5 IWC and 7 CSWC. At 0230H the same morning, the GVN population center of Tam Ky received six B-40 rockets and six 82mm mortar rounds scattered throughout the city resulting in 1 EF KIA, 5 civilians WIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. A half hour later, C/1-1 Cavalry and A/3-16 Artillery, while defending FSB Hawk Hill (BT231315), came under heavy mortar fire as they received approximately 100 rounds followed by a sapper attack that penetrated the perimeter before the attack was repelled by organic weapons fire, artillery and gunships. Results of the encounter were 13 NVA KIA, 4 IWC and 2 CSWC with 7 US KIA, 51 US WIA(E). At 0400H, F Troop 8th Cavalry (Air) vicinity BT228402 engaged and killed 15 NVA. On 13 August 1969 at 0847H, 3-21 Infantry while securing FSB Center (BT052253) received six 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 5 US WIA(E). During the following four day lull in enemy activity, the 1st Marine Division assumed the Quang Nam Province portion of the Americal Division TAOI, establishing a new northern boundary. By 18 August 1969, the first

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reactive operation of the period was initiated by elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 5th ARVN Regiment as they engaged an NVA Regimental size force in the largest battle during the reporting period. This battle continued to the end of the month (Reference paragraph B (1)). From 1 to 8 September, only scattered enemy contact was made. During the same time period, elements of 2-1 Infantry, 9th Engineers (USMC) and F Troop 17th Cavalry and Regional forces from Tam Ky conducted a land clearing operation northwest of Tam Ky (vic BT2524) targeting VCLF/VCL. Allied forces met little resistance as they moved into the area. Contact throughout this operation was scattered and light. On 16 September at 1100H, D/3-21 Infantry vicinity BT052206 engaged 10 NVA and killed 6 with negative friendly casualties. At 0001H on 8 September, a three day cease fire was initiated during which time all elements went into a defensive posture. The day following the end of the cease fire, the enemy launched an attack at 0210H on FSB Siberia (AT902232) and Hiep Duc which initiated the second reactive operation within the Americal Division TA01 (reference paragraph B (2)) in which B/4-31 Infantry, Popular and Regional Forces and 2/5 ARVN Battalion successfully defeated the enemy. On the same day, 2/5 ARVN Battalion, still operating around Hiep Duc, engaged and killed 29 NVA while suffering only light casualties. On 16 September at 1330H, the 71st Aviation Company, flying in support of the 196th Infantry Brigade, engaged 120 VC vicinity BT280380 killing 12 VC. At 1735H on 17 September, A/3-32 Artillery vicinity BT282371 engaged 100 VC and killed 12. On 22 September at 0945H, B/3-21 Infantry combat air assaulted into a hot landing zone (BT043227). They engaged and killed 15 NVA and captured 1 crew-served weapon. Three UH-1 helicopters were shot down as they left the landing zone. Friendly casualties were 5 US KIA and 15 US WIA(E). At 1725H, 176th Aviation near the same area, engaged and killed 10 NVA. Light and sporadic enemy contact continued through the end of September. The monsoon season started at the beginning of October. Continued rainfall throughout the month, with heavy downpours during the first half of the month and scattered showers for the remainder of the month, resulted in limited combat operations. The beginning of the monsoon season also brought with it a sharp decline in enemy activity which continued through the end of the reporting period. Only three significant enemy contacts were recorded during the month of October. On 7 October 1969 at 1852H, A/4-31 Infantry vicinity AT940273 received twenty 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). On 21 October, C/3-21 Infantry at 0800H engaged an unknown size NVA force vicinity BT090327 resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA(E). On 27 October at 1415H vicinity BT220149, D/2-1 Infantry detonated a booby trapped 105mm artillery round killing 4 US personnel, 7 US were wounded (evac). The reporting period closed with no further significant enemy contacts. Results of operations during the reporting period in the Frederick Hill AO are as follows:

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<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
112 US KIA	417 VC KIA
598 US WIA(E)	1039 NVA KIA
123 US WIA(M)	215 DET
	4 PW/VC
	5 PW/NVA
	16 CH/VC
	43 CIV DEF
	141 IN CIV
	140 IWC
	35 CSWC

(b) Operation Geneva Park: Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period concentrating on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City and/or the Chu Lai complex. 1-6 Infantry was utilized for security measures in the Rocket Belt around Chu Lai, targeting elements of the 409th Sapper and 78th VCMF Rocket Bn. Saturation patrolling and extensive night ambush operations combined with a heavy concentration of pre-planned air strikes and scheduled artillery fires plus utilization of sensor devices severely inhibited enemy attempts to shell the Chu Lai complex. Only two indirect fire attacks were launched against the Chu Lai complex during the reporting period resulting in light damage and very few casualties. On 11 August 1969 at 0015H, C/1-52 Infantry vicinity BS517812 engaged 35 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA. FSB Stinson vic BS538824 at 0120H on 12 August received eighteen 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA(E) and one 81mm mortar tube damaged. At 0133H, Headquarters Battery, 1-14 Artillery on FSB Bayonet vic BS49016 received 20-25 mixed 60/82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC and 1 US WIA(E). On 13 August, 1-52 Infantry with 26th Engineers and 6th ARVN Engineers began a land clearing operation north of the Song Tra Khuc (River) vicinity of BS5476. On the morning of 14 August, the Chu Lai Defense Command received moderate damage when two 122mm rockets impacted in the Chu Lai POL dump. The last half of the month of August passed with no significant enemy contact. The first part of September also saw no significant enemy contacts. The three day cease fire was observed without incident. The third reactive operation in the Americal Division T&OI was initiated on 13 September as an estimated force of 2 NVA Companies launched a series of attacks on AN Phong Village and CP George (vicinity BS474864). CAP 1-3-9 and Regional forces from Binh Son City successfully repulsed the enemy attack (Reference paragraph B (4)). At 1750H on the same day, D/1st Squadron 1st Cavalry and 176th Aviation, flying in support of the 198th Infantry Brigade, engaged and killed 58 NVA in the vicinity of BS474864. On 15 September at 1720H, south of Hau Duc in the vicinity of BS0690, A, B, and C/5-46 Infantry conducted a bomb damage assessment (BDA) through 20 September finding 8 crew-served weapons. On 18 September at 1730H A/1-52 Infantry

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engaged an unknown size NVA force in the vicinity of BS443846 and killed 22 NVA. During the remainder of the month, there was little enemy activity. On 29 September, elements of 1-6 Infantry conducted an operation with 3/6 ARVN Battalion in the vicinity of BT3310. Their objective was to clear the area northeast of the Ky Tra CFZ. The operation met little enemy resistance and terminated on 3 October. On 27 September, the land clearing north of the Song Tra Khuc (River) terminated having cleared 3 square kilometers. On 15 October at 1745H, B/1-52 Infantry in the vicinity of BS487848 detonated a mine killing 1 US and wounding 6. Three days later, elements of 1-6 Infantry and the 6th ARVN Regiment returned to the area around Ky Tra CFZ to conduct combat operations. Little enemy resistance was met and the operation terminated 2 days later. At 0700H on 25 October B/1-52 Infantry engaged an unknown size VC force in the vicinity of BS595822 with small arms and automatic weapons fire plus a heavy concentration of artillery. By 0900H A/1-52 had combat air assaulted 1 platoon into the area of contact to provide reinforcements. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA while enemy losses were 6 VC KIA, 6 individual weapons and 1 crew-served weapon captured. On 26 October, H Troop 17th Cavalry in the vicinity of BS481772 at 0900H engaged an NVA squad. The results were 10 NVA KIA, 7 individual weapons and 1 crew-served weapon captured. On 30 October, the second rocket attack against the Chu Lai complex occurred as four 122mm rockets impacted within the defensive perimeter causing light damage and 1 minor casualty. Operations conducted during the month of October met only scattered resistance as the reporting period came to a close. Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted within the Geneva Park AO by 5-46 Infantry and the 6th ARVN Regiment. From 5 August to 12 August, a rice denial operation in anticipation of the beginning of the harvest season was conducted. On 12 August, FSB Dottie (vicinity BS630-855) with 2/6 ARVN Battalion, A/1st Squadron 1st Cavalry, B/26th Engineers, D/3-82 Arty and A/1-11 Arty in a night defensive posture received an unknown number and type of mortar rounds plus a sapper attack that was successfully repelled with 2/6 ARVN Battalion accounting for 16 of the 20 VC KIA and capturing 8 individual weapons. Americal Division losses were 4 US WIA(E). On 25 August, elements of 5-46 Infantry discovered a salt cache and began a four day operation to evacuate all the salt and distribute it to the nearby villages. By 29 August, 282 tons of salt were placed in the hands of the Vietnamese civilians. To further support the pacification program in the Nantucket Beach AO, one ARVN Battalion and one US Infantry company with engineer support opened and secured the Quang Ngai/Batangan Peninsula Road. On 23 September at 1030H, D/1-1 Cavalry vicinity BS795851 engaged 12 VC killing 5. On 5 October, an extensive pacification operation was conducted with Popular and Regional forces in three hamlets vicinity BS6879. On the same day at 2240H, B/5-46 Infantry in a night defensive position was engaged by an UNSEF. They received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire plus a barrage of mortars resulting in 4 US KIA and 15 US WIA(E). Operations conducted throughout the reporting period continued with no significant enemy contacts. Totals for the reporting period for Operation Nantucket Beach were as follows:

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	<u>FRND</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>
12	US KIA	65	VC KIA
69	US WIA(E)	6	NVA KIA
20	US WIA(M)	38	DET
		1	PW/NVA
		4	CH/VC
		35	CIV DEF
		18	IN CIV
		20	IWC

Results for Operation Geneva Park for the reporting period are:

	<u>FRND</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>
13	US KIA	98	VC KIA
94	US WIA(E)	124	NVA KIA
24	US WIA(M)	200	DET
		3	PW/VC
		1	PW/NVA
		10	CH/VC
		1	GH/NVA
		86	CIV DEF
		79	IN CIV
		101	IWC
		14	CSWC

(c) Operation Iron Mountain: Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period concentrating on security of major lines of communication and combat operations to increase the level of security of pacification operations along the coastal plain. Enemy activity was light during the first part of the month of August until the evening of 11 August when E/1 Cavalry vicinity BS540753 engaged an unknown size VC force killing 9. At 0223H on the 12th of August, FSB 411 (BS539732) received two RPG rounds, six 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds and three 60mm mortar rounds resulting in negative casualties or damage. The only other activity in the Iron Mountain AO on 12 August was directed towards GVN population centers. At 0100H, Quang Ngai City received small arms fire and a ground probe. Elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment repelled the attack killing 12 VC and capturing 12 individual weapons, 100 hand grenades and 1 VC. The 6th ARVN Regiment suffered only minor casualties. Approximately 15 minutes later, Duc Pho City received an unknown number of B-40 rockets resulting in 1 FF KIA and 6 FF WIA. Enemy activity for the remainder of the day was light with only minor incidents reported throughout the AO. At 0200H on the morning of 13 August, FSB San Juan Hill (BS634380) received 35-40 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 6 US WIA(E). At 1830H, A/3-1 Infantry and E/1-1 Cavalry vicinity BS562742 engaged an unknown sized NVA force killing 10 NVA and capturing 12 individual and 3 crew-served weapons. The two units suffered casualties of 5 US KIA

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and 6 US WIA(E). On 15 August, B/4-3 Infantry engaged an unknown size NVA force vicinity BS622344 with small arms fire and artillery fire killing 21 NVA and capturing 8 individual weapons. Five days later, C/3-18 Artillery, supporting ground elements from FSB Crunch (BS534516), received 70 60mm mortar rounds killing 1 US soldier and wounding 8 others. On 22 August, C/4-21 Infantry, while securing FSB Debbie (BS872324), successfully repelled an early morning ground probe. Two NVA were killed while 3 US were killed and 14 wounded (evac). Two hours later and still before dawn, A/4-3 Infantry received a ground probe in their night defensive position vicinity BS654357 and repelled it killing 5 NVA and suffering no friendly casualties. At 1430H on the same day, 123d Aviation, flying in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, engaged an unknown size NVA force killing 11 NVA. On 26 August at 1500H, C/1-1 Cavalry, in a day laager vicinity BS829331, received fifty 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 5 US WIA(E). On 27 Aug vic BS799289, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol team Illinois engaged and killed 6 NVA. On 29 August, C/1-1 Cavalry engaged an unknown size NVA force vicinity BS828319 resulting in 51 NVA KIA and 5 US WIA(E). On the 2d of September, A/1-1 Cavalry and C/4-3 Infantry vicinity BS819311 engaged an unknown size NVA force resulting in 22 NVA KIA, 11 individual weapons captured and 4 US WIA(E). The three day cease fire was observed without incident. On 11 September vicinity BS852361, B/4-21 Infantry engaged and killed 5 VC and captured 3 individual weapons with no friendly casualties. The moderate but sporadic enemy contact that prevailed throughout the month of August and the first portion of September, decreased considerably for the major portion of September and October. The 11th Infantry Brigade and the 4th ARVN Regiment initiated a preemptive operation on 15 September to secure the population center of Quang Ngai and support the Accelerated Pacification Program. Elements of 3-1 Infantry, E Troop 1st Cavalry and the 9th Engineers conducted land clearing operations along the Song Tra Khuc (River) Valley to the northwest of Quang Ngai vicinity BS5474. Enemy contact was light as Americal forces deployed into the area and the enemy exfiltrated to the west avoiding sustained contact. The operation terminated on 3 October. The security of the local population center of Quang Ngai was increased as 2,790 acres of land were cleared and made available for civilian use. On 13 October, elements of 1-20 Infantry and E Troop 1st Cavalry initiated a land clearing operation along the coast with Naval support. An amphibious assault was conducted onto the beach areas between the Cities of Ms Duc and Duc Pho vicinity (Center of Mass) BS7853. 2,718 acres of land were cleared by the end of October to further support the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Program in the Iron Mountain AO. Enemy activity during the month of October was light throughout the AO as only one significant contact was made. While in a defensive position, C/4-21 Infantry vicinity BS885307 received five B-40 rockets at 0045H wounding 5 US personnel. On 29 October, 4-3 Infantry and the 4/4 ARVN Battalion combat air assaulted into Base Area 124 (Center of Mass) BS7527 to find, fix and destroy base camps,

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supply points and staging areas of the 97th Battalion, 2d MF Regiment and the 300th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion. In the remaining two days of the reporting period, there were no significant enemy contacts made. Operations continued throughout the AO with no significant enemy activity. Results of combat operations in the Iron Mountain AO for the reporting period are as follows:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
89 US KIA	298 VC KIA
365 US WIA (E)	393 NVA KIA
99 US WIA (M)	318 DET
	4 PW/VC
	13 PW/NVA
	9 CH/VC
	161 CIV DEF
	132 IN CIV
	129 IWC
	15 CSWC

2. (C) Plans

a. The following operations plans and orders were in effect or initiated during this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 1-69A (Operation Russell Beach/BATANGAN) was in effect. OPORD 3-69 (Realignment of Forces) was in effect. OPORD 4-69 (Iamar Plain) was in effect until 13 August 69, at which time the operation was terminated. OPORD 5-69 (Movement of the 196th Inf Bde) was published and implemented during the reporting period. OPORD 6-69 (Redeployment of 1/101 Abn Div (AM) to XXIV Corps) was implemented on 6 August. OPORD 7-69 (Golden Fleece - Rice Denial) was published and in effect during the reporting period.

(2) OPLAN 3-69 (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 5-69 (Reinforcement of 1st Marine Division), and OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation) continued as published contingency plans.

(3) OPLAN 9-69 (Natural Disaster Relief Plan) was published on 1 Aug, superseding OPLAN 4-68; OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley) was published on 3 Sep, superseding OPLAN 5-68; OPLAN 11-69 (Redeployment) was published on 10 Aug; OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsals) was published on 19 Aug, superseding OPLAN 6-68; OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction) was published on 13 Sep.

b. Numerous Fragmentary Orders have been published applicable to the operations listed in paragraph 1.

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c. A planning directive for implementation of the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program (ICIPP) was prepared and distributed on 21 Oct 69.

3. (U) Organization

a. Effective 1 October the 132d Aviation Company and the 178th Aviation Company were detached from the 123d Aviation Battalion and attached to the 14th Aviation Battalion.

b. Effective 1 October D Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry was attached to the 123d Aviation Battalion. This attachment gives the 123d Aviation Battalion three air cavalry units. The concept of operation will be to employ the same unit in support of a Brigade; Company B, 123d Aviation will support 11th Infantry Brigade, F Troop, 8th Cavalry will support 196th Infantry Brigade, and D Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry will support 198th Infantry Brigade.

c. A copy of the current troop list is attached as Inclosure 2.

4. (G) Training

a. The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O-3 who are assigned or attached to the division. During the reporting period 66 courses were completed and 6138 personnel completed training.

b. 171 junior leaders completed the training conducted in the Americal Combat Center Leadership Course.

c. 26 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course Training.

d. The Americal Combat Center conducts a 14 day Combat Leadership and Orientation Course for Junior Officers of RF and FF units throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. This course is designed to develop leadership ability and impart a knowledge of leadership principles and techniques to enable the student to command a platoon effectively. The course is also designed to train the student in the application of public relation principles and techniques for gaining people's confidence. 150 RF/FF junior officers completed the RF/FF Leadership and Orientation Course.

e. The 198th Bde PSYOP Section has been conducting combined combat loudspeaker operations with the personnel of the 6th Regiment FOIWAR Section. These combined operations are designed primarily to provide operator training on the UIR5 and UIR6 loudspeaker systems and to provide employment concepts for their ARVN counterparts.

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f. On Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS), Vietnamese medics are utilized to provide treatment under the supervisions of US medical personnel. In addition, the 23d Medical Bn is conducting a 10 week training program for 6 Vietnamese medical personnel on a continuous basis.

g. The Americal Division Support Command supports a medical training program conducted by the 23d Medical Battalion for the medical corpsmen, dental technicians and optometry assistants from the 2d ARVN Div Med Bn. This program is ten weeks long; the first program started on 22 Sep 69 and will end 29 Nov 69. 6 to 8 personnel are taught at each class and these classes will be held on a continuing basis. The 723d Maint Bn conducted on the job training for 6 EM in the mechanical maintenance field from the 2d ARVN Div Log Bn from 16-23 Oct. Additional courses will be conducted in the future. The 23d S&T Bn is conducting training for seven ARVN personnel from the 2d ARVN Div Log Bn in the area of stock control and storage. This training started 3 Nov 69 and will end on 8 Nov 69. Additional training is planned. The Americal Division Band has a continuing program which began in July 1969. Two band members per week are exchanged with the 2d ARVN Div Band; in addition, joint concerts are presented.

h. The 26th Engineer Battalion conducted a three week Engineer Equipment Maintenance Course for six EM of the 2d ARVN Engr Bn. Future programs will include an officer and NCO on the job training program in the Battalion S3 office for a period of three days, to familiarize ARVN leaders with US operations. Another future program is a maintenance on the job training program which will employ ARVN Engineer mechanics in the 26th Engr Bn motor pool to familiarize them with operation and maintenance of engineer equipment.

i. Training of Americal personnel for the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program (ICIPP) has been in coordination with the 1st Combined Action Program School. Three NCO's from the Americal Division graduated from the Combined Action Program School on 18 Oct, and ten NCO's and one officer on 25 Oct. Presently one officer and two NCO's are attending the school. Americal Division will continue to receive available allocations to the Combined Action Program School. One of our most valuable training vehicles has been the OJT program conducted with the 1st Combined Action Group. Under this program, nine selected Americal soldiers join Marine Combined Action Platoons for a ten day training period. In addition, the 1st Combined Action Group has provided six USMC advisors, two with each ICIPP Platoon.

j. On 26 Oct 69 two Kit Carson Scouts conducted a demonstration of sapper techniques for the base camp defense group at LZ Bronco. The 11th Infantry Brigade's base camp defense officer at LZ Bronco commented that the two Kit Carson Scouts performed in an outstanding

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manner and would be a great aid in the improvement of the 11th Infantry Brigade's counter sapper training program. The use of fougasse and CS dispensers was also demonstrated at this time. The 11th Brigade conducted demonstrations of sapper techniques utilizing these two Kit Carson Scouts at 11th Brigade fire support bases during the period 27-31 Oct 69.

k. The individuals assigned to the 60th IP(SD) departed the Americal Division on 19 Oct and departed Vietnam on 20 Oct enroute to Ft Gordon, where a school is being established to train future mine and tunnel detection teams. Three members of the platoon remained behind to train new mine dog handlers. These new handlers came from various units throughout Vietnam, and upon completion of their training will return to their parent organization. The training began on 20 Oct and will last from three to six weeks depending on the adaptability of both dog and handler. Following the training period the three members of the 60th IP(SD) who remained behind as instructors, will return to CONUS.

l. The Americal Division is currently conducting an organizational maintenance course for generator operators and an organizational supply course for unit supply sergeants in conjunction with the division's Material Readiness Training Program. A TAERS Clerk Course (MOS 71T) was conducted on 20-22 Aug and 25-27 Aug 69 to provide personnel in an OJT status in 71T positions with the necessary instruction to become familiar with appropriate records, maintenance and accounting procedures in order to decrease the OJT time necessary for individuals to be qualified for reclassification as 71T TAERS clerks.

m. The Americal Division Staff Judge Advocate's Office has completed instruction on the Military Justice Act of 1968 for all field grade officers of this command and for instructors for all subordinate units.

5. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the Americal Division employed 2,226 Close Air Support (CAS) and Combat Skyspot (CSS) missions, using 2,989 aircraft sorties. This was a reduction from the 2,979 missions and 4,458 sorties from the previous quarter, and slightly less than the quarter ending 30 April 1969. The reduction is due to the departure of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) during the early part of the reporting period, a lull in enemy activity during the last two months, and monsoon rains causing weather cancellations during October.

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(1) CSS Missions: Combat Skyspots (CSS) totaled 988 missions and 476 sorties during the reporting period as compared with 1100 missions and 588 sorties during the previous quarter. The USMC flew 956 missions with 449 aircraft sorties, and the USAF flew 32 missions with 27 aircraft sorties.

(2) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS Missions: A total of 1238 CAS missions using 2513 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Americal Division during the quarter, a sharp decrease over the 1979 missions and 3870 sorties of the previous reporting period. A 50 percent cut was noted in allocated preplanned CAS missions from the beginning to the end of the current reporting period. The USMC flew 967 missions with 1,958 aircraft sorties, and the USAF flew 271 missions with 555 aircraft sorties. During the reporting period, the USAF initiated a regular program of FAC - controlled Close Air Strikes at night using artificial illumination (Nite Owl Missions) as a training program to maintain proficiency of FAC's and fighter pilots in night CAS techniques. Air Force FAC's also implemented the Armed FAC program with the OV-10A FAC aircraft, adding 14 EE rockets to the previous load of 14 WP rockets. FAC aircraft were also equipped with a secure voice FM and UHF radio capability.

(3) Ordnance expended: Total ordnance expended by CAS and CSS missions during the reporting period was 5,061 tons of bombs, 789 tons of napalm and 3,974 rockets. These totals represent reductions from the previous period of 27 percent in bomb tonnage, 36 percent in napalm tonnage and 11 percent in number of rockets expended.

b. Arc Light Strikes were placed on 11 different target boxes using 41 aircraft sorties with a total of 984 tons of bombs dropped. The Arc Light Strikes were employed against enemy base camps, staging areas and supply/logistical complexes to disrupt command and control, training and resupply activities. The sharp reduction in the number of targets struck was due to the lower level of enemy activity during the month of September and October and a cut in available Arc Light sorties during the period. The even sharper reduction in the amount of ordnance dropped resulted from the policy of engaging selected targets with a reduced number of aircraft.

c. Bomb damage assessment made by Forward Air Controllers during the reporting period: 1,394 structures destroyed, 628 structures damaged, 1047 bunkers destroyed, 293 bunkers damaged, 258 secondary explosions, 524 secondary fires, 115 enemy killed by air strikes (KEAS), 351 fighting positions and spiderholes destroyed, 43 tunnels destroyed, 49 AA/AW and mortar positions destroyed and 8 bridges damaged and 4 caves collapsed. Damage observed was only 7 percent less than that during the previous quarter, despite the much larger reduction in total ordnance expended.

6. (U) Artillery - A separate CRLL for the Americal Division Artillery will be submitted on 15 November 1969.

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7. (U) Aviation - A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 15 November 1969.

8. (C) Chemical

a. During the period 25 - 27 October 1969, the 90th Chemical Detachment defoliated the "Horseshoe", vic BS5175, using the AGEVENCO helicopter borne spray apparatus. The defoliation mission progressed satisfactorily until hostile sniper fire damaged the "windmill assembly" on the AGEVENCO which caused the mission to be discontinued.

b. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities:

- (1) 131,680 pounds of persistent CS was dropped for terrain contamination.
- (2) 152 E-155 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed.
- (3) 66 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were run.
- (4) Approximately 4,4460 acres were defoliated using 13,380 gallons of defoliant.

9. (C) Engineer

a. Activities for the quarter (1 August to 31 October 1969) consisted of organic engineers devoting primary effort to direct combat support of the Americal Division while nondivisional units devoted primary effort to improvement of QLI (LOC) and operational support construction.

b. QLI continues to receive the priority horizontal effort in the Americal TAOI with two engineer battalions fully committed and one engineer battalion partially committed to restoration of QLI. Engineer battalion dispositions within the TAOI were substantially changed during the reporting period. One nondivisional battalion has been relocated out of the Americal TAOI and a Seabee Battalion (MCB 58) was replaced with another Seabee Battalion (MCB 7).

(1) The 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and the attached 73d Engineer Company (Construction Support) were displaced to II Corps Tactical Zone during the reporting period. Before their departure, the units devoted primary effort to upgrading and paving QLI from I/II Corps border to Duc Pho vic R3806378.

(2) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), augmented by the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) and the 137th Engineer Company (Light

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Equipment), devoted primary effort toward upgrading QLI (less paving) from Quang Ngai (BS647723) to Mo Duc (BS733543) and upgrading and paving QLI from Mo Duc to Duc Pho.

(3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 58 (MCB 58) departed Chu Lai for CONUS on 12 October 1969. MCB 58 performed QLI maintenance from Binh Son (BS596927) to the Chu Lai Main Gate (BT520044).

(4) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 (MCB 7) replaced MCB 58 and assumed its maintenance responsibilities on QLI.

(5) The 9th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force (FMF), devoted primary effort toward upgrading and paving QLI from Chu Lai Main Gate to the Song Ba Ren River (BT702510).

(6) The 104th Engineer Battalion (Combat) ARVN, provided limited assistance to the 9th and 39th Engineer Battalions for QLI restoration.

(7) RMC/BRJ Contractors completed paving QLI from Quang Ngai to Mo Duc.

c. Engineer operations in the TAOI consisted generally of the following:

(1) The 19th Engineer Battalion Combat, until 14 September 1969, devoted maximum effort to minesweeping, upgrading, maintaining and paving QLI as specified in paragraph 9b(1) above. Their disposition is as follows:

- (a) HHC (Forward): LZ DEBBIE.
- (b) HHC (Rear): LZ HIGHBOY.
- (c) 1st and 2d Platoons, Company A: LZ CHARLIE BROWN.
- (d) A Company (-): LZ HIGHBOY.
- (e) B Company: LZ DEBBIE.
- (f) C Company: LZ HIGHBOY.
- (g) D Company: LZ DEBBIE.
- (h) 73d Engineer Company (CS): LZ HIGHBOY.

(2) Subsequent to completing paving from the I/II CTZ boundary to Duc Pho, the Battalion executed a phased move to II-CTZ. The Battalion (-) departed the Americal TAOI on 14 September 1969 and Company C, 19th Engineer Battalion, was placed under OPCON of the 39th Engineer Battalion. The 73d

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Engineer Company (CS) was attached to the 39th Engineer Battalion on the same date. The two companies continued to operate the quarry, crushers, and asphalt plant at LZ HIGHBOY in support of the 39th Engineer Battalion paving operations north of Duc Pho. On 10 October 1969, LZ HIGHBOY was closed and the two companies rejoined the 19th Engineer Battalion.

(3) The portion of QLL from I/II CTZ boundary to Duc Pho was turned over to the senior advisor to Danang Highway District for further turn-over to the RVN Ministry of Public Works on 14 October 1969.

(4) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was mainly committed to minesweeping, upgrading QLL from Quang Ngai to Mo Duc and minesweeping, upgrading and paving QLL from Mo Duc to Duc Pho. The battalion had completed all subbase work and had completed the base course work except for the 2.5 kilometers between map coordinates BS771461 and BS780439. However, the rains of 29-30 October 1969 caused such extensive damage to base course that all of the unpaved portion (6.3 kilometers) will need additional base course.

(a) The battalion continued to minesweep and make tactical repairs on QLL between Binh Son and Quang Ngai.

(b) Upon the departure of the remainder of the 19th Engineer battalion, the 39th Engineer Battalion assumed responsibility for minesweep and tactical repairs from Duc Pho to I/II CTZ boundary.

(c) The battalion repaired sections of QLL in its area of responsibility which were damaged by the floods resulting from the rains of 1-14 October 1969.

(d) The battalion also contributed a platoon (10 dozers and 16 dozer operators) to the Land Clearing Company (Provisional), the activities of which are described in paragraph c(9) below.

(e) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

1. HRC, A, D, and the 511th Engineer Company (PB): Chu Lai.
2. Company B: LZ DOTTIE.
3. Company C and the 137th Engineer Company (LE): LZ MAX.

(5) The 9th Engineer Battalion, FMF continued to minesweep, upgrade, maintain and pave QLL between Chu Lai and the Song Ba Ren River. At the end of the reporting period, paving was complete from Chu Lai to map coordinates ET 207375.

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(a) During the period 1-20 October 1969, the battalion commenced repairing the very extensive damage from flood waters resulting from the heavy rains which fell during the period 1-14 October 1969.

(b) The battalion furnished the command element and one platoon (14 dozers and 28 dozer operators) for the Land Clearing Company (Provisional), the activities of which are described in paragraph c(9) below.

(c) The Battalion furnished three platoons in support of living-bunker construction at LZ HAWK HILL.

(d) The disposition of the battalion at the end of the period was as follows:

1. HHC, Service Company, Company B (-), and Company C (-): Chu Lai.
2. One platoon, Company B: Tam Ky.
3. Company A: BT199389.
4. Company D: (-) BT135453 and one platoon BT108428.

(6) The 104th Engineer Battalion (Combat) ARVN supported LOC restoration by committing effort on QLL constructing bridges south of Quang Ngai. They continued to minesweep and maintain Rt 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phong on an "as required" basis. The battalion cooperated with the 26th Engineer Battalion in the construction of bridges on the high priority road now being built between Ma Duc and Hill 43 to the east.

(7) RMK/ERJ Contractor completed paving QLL from Quang Ngai to Ma Duc, produced base course aggregate, asphaltic concrete and ready mix concrete during the period.

(8) MCB 58/7 is tasked with maintenance of QLL between Chu Lai and Binh Son, base construction at Chu Lai, rehabilitation of airfields at isolated Special Forces Camps and providing air-mobile equipment in support of 26th Engineer Battalion.

(9) The Land Clearing Company (Provisional) was formed from assets within I CTZ and placed in direct support of the Americal Division. The company consists of a platoon of Army Bulldozers (10 -D7E) and a platoon of marine bulldozers (14 - Eimco). The Land Clearing Company has been employed in both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. To date the company has cleared 243 square kilometers of land and destroyed 1166 bunkers.

(10) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat):

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(a) The disposition of the battalion at the end of the period was as follows:

1. HHC: Chu Lai.
2. Company A: LZ HAWK HILL (BT230315).
3. Company B: LZ BAYONET (BT549014).
4. Company C: LZ BRONCO (BS813385).
5. Company D and E: LZ FAT CITY (BT435077).

(b) Relocation of the 196th Infantry Brigade: The 196th Brigade relocated from LZ BALDY to LZ HAWK HILL during the period. Company A, assisted by three platoons from the 9th Engineer Battalion and one platoon from Company B, 26th Engineer Battalion, constructed the fighting bunkers, living bunkers, and all other related facilities for the 196th Infantry Brigade and supporting units. On 20 August, Company A sent one platoon to LZ HAWK HILL to begin the construction of the bunkers. The remainder of the company was displaced by the end of August. Company A completed the majority of the structures on LZ HAWK HILL by 15 October and at that time the 196th Brigade displaced from LZ BALDY to LZ HAWK HILL. To date, the following have been constructed:

1. 182-20'x32' Living Bunkers.
2. 34-8'x6' Fighting Bunkers.
3. 1-60'x60' Brigade TOC.
4. 1-Hospital Bunker.
5. 1-FDC Bunker.
6. 2-Mess Halls.

(c) Relocation of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry: Company D was tasked to accomplish the horizontal construction for the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Base Camp which was relocated from LZ HAWK HILL to the southwest corner of Chu Lai. Project started 10 August 1969 and consisted of constructing administrative roads, tank trails, and hardstands for troops and maintenance areas. Since the start of the project 50084 cubic yards of laterite, 6209 cubic yards of 2"(-) base rock, and 161 cubic yards of blast rock have been hauled into the area.

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(d) Horseshoe Land Clearing Operation: The land clearing in the Horseshoe area was going on during the last reporting period and was therefore reported in the last Operations Report. Company B continued the operation of clearing a series of villages along the north side of the Tra Khuc River west of Quang Ngai until heavy rains forced them out of the area on 27 September 1969. The operation started with four D7E dozers, one CEV, and security from the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry and the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. Mines were frequently encountered and three dozers and an M3 tank were combat losses because of mines. The combat engineer support for the clearing operation was performed by the 2d ARVN Engineer Battalion. Through the combined efforts of the US and ARVN Engineers, 2.1 square kilometers of land were cleared and 462 enemy bunkers destroyed.

(e) Pinkville Land Clearing Operation: An area east of Quang Ngai along the south China Sea (BS737791) was designated by the Quang Ngai Province Chief and the 198th Infantry Brigade to be cleared. The operation started on 1 August and was completed on 24 August 1969. This was truly a joint US and ARVN effort with the bulldozers being provided by Company B, 26th Engineer Battalion, the 39th Engineer Battalion, and the 103rd ARVN Engineer Battalion. The combat engineer support was from the 103rd ARVN Engineer Battalion and security forces were from the 6th ARVN Infantry Regiment. This area was heavily mined and the ARVN Engineers found and destroyed numerous mines and boobytraps. The ARVN security element sustained one KIA and four WIA and the US engineers had one WIA. Several dozers were damaged by mines with one dozer blade a complete loss. 2.5 square kilometers of land were cleared and 57 enemy bunkers destroyed.

(f) Tien Phouc Opening (Route 533): The Battalion was tasked to minesweep and repair Route 533 for the passage of five convoys during the reporting period. The concept of operation for each road opening was to insert sweep teams the day before at Tien Phouc and LZ YOUNG (BT1821A6). The team at Tien Phouc sweeps east, the two teams at LZ YOUNG sweep both east and west and the team from Tam Ky sweeps west and carries the bridging and AVLB's. Company D provided the minesweep teams and Company E provided the AVLB and tactical bridging for all road openings. On 15 August 1969 the road was opened for an artillery convoy at 1530 hours. There were no casualties or damage to equipment. Security was provided by NF/FP, ARVN, CIDG and C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. On 23 August 1969 the road was opened at 1330 hours. Security was the same as above except that F Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry replaced C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. There were two WIA from semiautomatic weapons fire and negative damage to equipment. On 20 September work began on the road so that convoys could be passed on 22, 24, and 26 September. On 20 September the security element, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and a bridge crew from Company E came under mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. The security force had three WIA and one APC damaged. On 22 September the road was opened at 1100 hours. Two Vietnamese civilians were killed by a mine that

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was placed under the end ramp of a dry span bridge. The final opening on Route 533 during the period occurred on 26 September 1969. The road was opened at 1000 hours. One member of the security force was KIA when he detonated an explosive placed under the dry span bridge and one member of the sweep team was WIA by semiautomatic weapons fire. During the last three openings two AVLB's were launched and three MAT6 dry spans had to be secured 24 hours a day during the period 22-26 September 1969.

(g) Minh Long Road Opening (Route 516/517): Company C was tasked to open the Minh Long Road on 18 August 1969. The concept of operation was to insert a sweep team at Minh Long to sweep northeast and a team at Quang Ngai to sweep southwest. Security forces were provided by the 11th Infantry Brigade, CIDG, and ARVN. The road was opened at 1330 hours and there were no casualties or damage on the operation. Purpose of opening was to move MCB 58's equipment into Minh Long to repair the air strip at that location. On 1 October 1969 the road was again opened to bring the equipment out. The road was opened at 1130 hours and there were no casualties or damage to equipment. 11th Brigade provided all of the security for the opening. One 155mm round emplaced as a mine, one booby trapped hand grenade and one 20mm dud were found and blown in place.

(h) LZ 4-11 Road Opening (Route 518): On 11 September 1969 Company C was tasked to open Route 518 from Quang Ngai airfield to FSB 4-11 so that the Land Clearing Company could move into the Horseshoe. The road was opened at 1100 hours. There were no casualties and negative damage to equipment. Security was provided by 11th Brigade. On 28 September 1969, Company C was tasked to open Route 518 from Quang Ngai airfield to FSB 4-11 for the Land Clearing Company (Provisional) convoy. While attempting to blow a mine in place, the mine detonated resulting in three KIA and one WIA. The road was opened at 1130 hours.

(i) Fire Base Support: Commitment of engineer effort to fire support base (FSB) construction/closure continued to be extensive throughout the TAOL. MCB 58 and MGB 7 assisted the 26th Engineer Battalion by providing airmobile equipment and operators when the battalion's assets were insufficient to accomplish assigned tasks in a timely fashion. The following FSB's received engineer support consisting of clearing fields of fire, construction of bunkers, artillery positions, heliports, sumps and roads: LZ's WEST, CENTER, SIBERIA, PROFESSIONAL, PARADISE, MINUTEMAN, STINSON, SAN JUAN HILL, and LZ BOXER which was reopened and closed.

(j) Bridging Operations: The 26th Engineer Battalion was engaged in four bridging operations during the period. Most of the bridging effort involved repairing the flood damage to QIL caused by the rains from 1-14 October 1969. The Battalion received three additional sets of Bailey Bridge, two Bridge Erection Boats, and two Armored Vehicular Launched Bridges during the period. Bridging operations are shown in chronological order below:

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1. On 13 August an AVLB was emplaced over a damaged timber trestle bridge (QLL-403) while an M4T6 Float Bridge was constructed as a bypass. The AVLB was removed upon completion of the bypass and bridge repair work commenced.

2. Company E, 26th Engineer Battalion, and Company G, 39th Engineer Battalion removed the M4T6 Float Bridge from the bypass of Bridge QLL-403 on 20 August 1969.

3. From 8 to 10 October Company E erected a 150 Double Bailey Bridge at BS207378 to span a washout on QLL. The 9th Engineer Battalion, FMF, completed the bypass around the Bridge on 25 October and the Bailey was removed.

4. On 15-17 October 1969 Company E launched and retrieved an AVLB daily in order to keep a washed out bypass open at BS638731. On 17 October the AVLB was replaced by a 45 foot M4T6 Dry Span. Security was provided by RF/EF's.

d. QLL paving completed at the end of the reporting period is as follows:

(1) I/II Corps border (BS909149) north to BS792413.

(2) BS774455 north to BE207377.

(3) There are approximately 15 kilometers of two lane road that remain to be paved in the Americal TAOL.

e. LOC interdictions continued to be a problem during the period.

(1) Casualties/damage by mines and other LOC interdictions follow:

<u>INCIDENTS</u>	<u>ROADS</u>				
	QLL	535	533	516/517	518
Vehicles					
Combat Loss	3				
VN Vehicles	1				
Personnel					
WIA (US)	10	3			7
WIA (VN)	30		5	1	
KIA (US)	2		1	3	3
KIA (VN)	36		3		
Total Mine Incidents	64	7	13	3	3
Road Barriers	5				
Culverts Blown	10				
Bridges Blown	4	2	1		

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(2) During the period major bridges received damage as follows:

<u>BRIDGE NO</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
409	BS691646	12 Aug 69	South bound lane had hole blown in deck.
403	BS736533	12 Aug 69	Five holes blown in deck and pile bent cap damaged.
406	BS706618	17 Aug 69	Four stringers, one pile, and north abutment blown.
435	BS219359	14 Sep 69	Southeast abutment blown.

(a) QLL-409 was never closed to traffic. The hole blown did not interfere with one lane traffic.

(b) QLL-403 was reopened to traffic by first launching an AVLB across the blown bridge while a M16 Float Bridge was being constructed as a bypass. The bridge was repaired on 19 August and the Float Bridge was removed on 20 August 1969.

(c) QLL-406 was opened to traffic by upgrading the bypass.

(d) QLL-435 continued to pass one way traffic.

10. (U) Signal

COMSEC Logistic Support Section: During this reporting period the COMSEC Logistic Support Section reviewed the basis of issue (BOI) on the various Nestor COMSEC equipment. This review indicated that as a result of the reorganization of the Americal Division, and the assignment of new organizations, such as the 16th Combat Aviation Group, that current BOI's for radio sets AN/ERC-77 and associated voice security devices were incorrect. Based on assigned units, the BOI's were re-evaluated and recomputed in accordance with USARV's Requirement and Distribution Plan. Recommendations and justifications for an increase of the Nestor program equipment were forwarded to USARV and the approval for subject increase were received on 10 Sep 1969.

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E. (C) Logistics

1. (U) General: The current period (1 August - 31 October 1969) has been characterized by a widespread operational support construction and repair effort, an increase in the division unit readiness rating, and the initiation of a highly successful Division Strip Program.

2. (U) Services Division:

a. The new construction effort during the period was drastically reduced in scope in accordance with recent USARV guidance except in the area of operational support construction. In the area of operational support, an extensive program was initiated in part to replace and repair bunkers throughout TACR prior to the Monsoon Season, but mainly to support the movement of the 196th Infantry Brigade from LZ Baldy to Hawk Hill and the movement of the 1-1st Cavalry from Hawk Hill to an area located southwest of Chu Lai. Approximately 80% of the bunker complex at Hawk Hill has been completed at this time, but the majority of the requirement for SEA Huts has not been completed at either Hawk Hill or the new 1-1st Cavalry area.

b. The inactivation of the 6-56th Artillery from a logistical stand-point was completed in August on-schedule with the shipment of the unit's missile peculiar equipment to CONUS and the redistribution of the common equipment to units primarily within the Division.

3. (U) Supply Division: Major achievements in the supply field, completed during the quarter included the obtaining and redistribution of refrigeration assets and the securing of secondary items of equipment in sufficient quantities to increase the division unit readiness rating.

a. The USARV G4, through temporary loan provisions, provided 14 refrigeration units to the division. A refrigeration study was completed by the ACoS, G4, and the refrigeration requirements for each fire base determined. Stringent redistribution policies coupled with the additional assets resulted in equitable distribution of refrigeration capability among LZ's and fire bases. The division now has one unit for each 225 personnel per fire base.

b. During the last quarter, the securing of secondary items of equipment to increase the division unit readiness rating was given priority and accomplished during the second month of this quarter. emphasis is being placed on maintaining this rating through continued proper management of resources and assistance messages to USARV to verify requisitions and obtain equipment releases. A means that provided the best assistance from the support depot was the consolidation of all MILSTRIPs into one message for a selected quantity of items of equipment.

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c. The division is experiencing difficulty in obtaining PPS-5 Radar Sets. Two each AN/PPS-5 and five AN/PPS-4/4A Radar Sets have been provided to the division to provide a stop-gap solution until the required AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets are received. Assistance from USARV has been requested.

d. Project Orange Ball, a new system for the requisition and issue of dry batteries, was implemented in September. Units now submit dry battery requirements to the Class I Point in the same manner as ration requests. This project is a means of providing refrigerated factory fresh batteries to the user.

4. (C) Maintenance Division:

a. Project Strip is an internal program within the division designed to identify and retrograde excess material. It was initiated on 10 July 1969. The program is constituted along the lines of the USARV Project Strip and consisted of a free turn-in period which was followed by an inspection conducted by a team formed from division resources. The program, by identifying and eliminating excess material, is designed to aid the commander in managing his logistical operations more effectively; therefore, reducing additional work necessary to maintain unused and/or unauthorized material. Project Strip has been a success and has identified 366 short tons of excess material.

b. The M16 exchange program is approximately 97% complete with current on hand figures indicating 21,524 chrome barrel weapons on hand and 758 nonchrome barrel weapons on hand. It is anticipated that the division will complete the exchange program in early November.

c. The Americal Division CMMI Team conducted 10 courtesy and 11 record inspections (7 receiving satisfactory ratings) during the period 1 August through 31 October 1969. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 352 roadside spot-check inspections during the same period.

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F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

1. (U) Organization:

a. LTC Robert L. Harper assumed duties as ACoS, G5, on 3 Sep 69.

b. New Civic Action/Civil Affairs regulations were published during the period. Sub-Zone Coordinator Regulation 40-3, Medical Civic Action Program II (MEDCAP II), is directed at clarifying and improving our support function in light of the increasing emphasis on pacification. Also published was Americal Circular 525-2, Military Operations--1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (1969 APC). Sub-Zone Coordinator Regulation 550-1, Foreign National Community Relations Program: the purpose of these committees and friendship councils is to discuss policies set forth by the military and discuss problems which have arisen. Community Relations Council and Friendship Council Meetings serve as a mechanism for improving coordination in community civic action projects. Presently, each of the brigades has a community relations committee. Friendship Councils have been established by the 198th Inf Bde in Ly Tin, Binh Son, and Son Tinh Districts. The 196th Inf Bde has Friendship Councils in Binh An and Binh Lam villages in Thang Binh District. The 11th Inf Bde has a Friendship Council established in Duc Pho District.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Operation Golden Fleece continues as part of the program to deny vital resources to the VC/NVA. Although the primary responsibility for resources denial rests with the GVN, a protective screen for harvesters and logistical support is provided upon request by Americal units. The plan for rice denial/protection for this harvest was characterized as a GVN operation. GVN did the planning and provided the bulk of the security forces. US/FMAP are utilized as back-up forces and, with a few exceptions, played a relatively minor role in actually securing the crops. During the reporting period, 125,370 pounds of rice were captured and evacuated and turned over to province and district officials. An additional 30,370 pounds of rice were destroyed because of the tactical situation and to prevent its use by enemy units.

b. Refugees: Refugees still represent an acute problem within the Americal TAOI. During the reporting period, the 4th, 6th and 9th AA Platoons from the 29th Civil Affairs Company continued to work in refugee camps in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The refugee population in the Americal TAOI numbers approximately 109,000.

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c. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) material. This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai during the reporting period. The following supplies were sent:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Health supplies (CONEX)	1
General supplies (boxes)	11
Plywood (pallets)	4
Insecticides (pallets)	12
Insecticides (cases)	124
Bundles of pallets (10 pallets per bundle)	17
400 KW generator with component parts	1

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification:

a. The Americal Division supports the GVN Pacification Program throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.

b. Although Phase II of the GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign was planned to be concluded this reporting period, the GVN has extended Phase II until the end of this year. A 1970 APC will be instituted by the GVN at the beginning of 1970.

c. The goals for Phases I and II of the 1969 APC were:

- (1) Security for 90% of the population.
- (2) Elimination of VCI.
- (3) Organization of more People's Self Defense Forces groups.
- (4) Establishment of local governments.
- (5) Rallying of more Hoi Chanhs.

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- (6) The increase of propaganda and information efforts.
- (7) Resettlement of refugees.
- (8) Stimulation of rural economy.

d. The Americal Division considerably increased its activity in support of the GVN Pacification Program during the reporting period. This support is reflected in the increased number of combined operations and cordon and search operations. These operations have met with success in neutralizing VCI and providing local security. 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, instituted the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program (ICIPP) during October 1969. This program utilizes a modified CAP concept in that platoon elements are placed into targeted hamlets with PFs to provide security and to assist in hamlet development. 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, has a company working in and around seven targeted hamlets. 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, has one company working with ARVN forces in and around two targeted hamlets.

e. Progress in the pacification program in the Americal TAOI, 1 August to 31 October:

- (1) Security of population (31 October):
 - (a) Quang Tin Province: 294,276.
 - (b) Quang Ngai Province: 528,971.
- (2) VCI neutralized (1 August to 31 October):
 - (a) Quang Tin: 235.
 - (b) Quang Ngai: 103.
- (3) People's Self Defense Force (1 August to 31 October):

	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>ARMED</u>
(a) Quang Tin:	69,325	44,805	13,084
(b) Quang Ngai:	76,756	52,249	9,747

(4) Government status—all villages and hamlets in Quang Tin have elected officials. All villages in Quang Ngai have elected officials and only seven hamlets appointed officials.

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(5) Hoi Chanh - 1 August to 31 October:

(a) Quang Tin: 767.

(b) Quang Ngai: 450.

f. Another significant method of supporting Revolutionary Development is through the MEDCAP II program. During the reporting period there was an increase in the controls and coordination required under the new MEDCAP II regulation. We feel that the quality of the treatment has increased and greater progress has been made for assumption of these duties by GVN personnel.

	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
11th Inf Bde	98	10,928
196th Inf Bde	44	8,814
198th Inf Bde	112	13,711
1-1st Cav	2	298
9th Engr	14	237
1st CAG	373	64,659
MAG 12	59	2,670
MAG 13	34	2,240

g. Voluntary contributions are another aspect of our support to the GVN program. These contributions, generally directed at specific institutions, are completely administered by the units concerned.

Money	99,136\$VN
Clothing	2,819 lbs.
Soap	27,629 bars

4. (C) PSYOP Activities (August - October 1969):

a. Leaflets dropped by C47 aircraft, by campaign:

<u>Campaign</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Chieu Hoi	34,814,000	31,157,000	18,891,000

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<u>Campaign</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Rewards	3,132,000	-	-
Anti VC	2,626,000	624,000	1,401,000
Anti NVA	2,164,000	697,000	-
Pro GVN	5,967,000	7,220,000	1,088,000

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by the 9th Special Operation Squadron, USAF support of the Americal Division:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
848	646	331

c. Total newspaper distribution:

<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
33,000	4,700	-

d. Aerial loudspeaker missions during the period:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Aerial tape missions	639	307	154
Aerial tape time	94:30	48:25	25:05
Early word missions	171	180	206
Early word time	58:45	33:00	37:40
Heliborne mission	1	2	7
Heliborne broadcast time	4:00	3:00	33:00

e. Ground loudspeaker broadcast:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Missions	29	22	15
Broadcast hours	165:30	135:45	123:00

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f. Waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Missions	6	3	None
Broadcast hours	14:00	5:50	-

g. Movie missions conducted during period:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Movie missions	10	9	12
Movies shown	138	61	79
Movie hours	65:30	29:00	38:30
Attendance	8,325	3,580	3,805

h. During the period there were a total of 28 new leaflets developed at the request of the Americal Division.

5. (C) Indicators of PSYOP Effectiveness:

a. Number of Hoi Chans in the Americal Division:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
	325	299	603

b. Number of informants and amount paid out for information and munitions:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Informants	260	99	59
\$VN paid out	214,495	124,850	33,100

6. (C) Recent Significant Developments:

a. In an attempt to augment the aerial support provided by the 9th Special Operations Squadron, the 196th and 198th Brigades devised systems for mounting sound amplification systems in supporting helicopters. The 196th Brigade utilizes a PRC 25 radio with a retransmission capability mounted in a LOH to give their system an Early Word capability. These systems proved extremely valuable during periods of inclement weather when the 9th SOS aircraft could not get to the brigades' areas of operation.

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b. Innovations: Division artillery units began dissemination of leaflets by 105 howitzer shells. The BS MB4 round is used with leaflets placed within the projectile rather than the smoke canister. This mode of delivery proved to be accurate and extremely effective in exploiting artillery strikes and delivering small quantities of leaflets during inclement weather.

c. Enemy Propaganda: Enemy propaganda efforts increased in the Americal TAOI during the past quarter. Eight separate incidents of loudspeaker or face-to-face propaganda was directed against Vietnamese nationals and FVMAF. On two occasions enemy propaganda leaflets directed against American forces were found. The 198th Brigade found two marble printing plates, roller, ink, and printed material. A chronological listing of known enemy PSYOP activities is as follows:

12 Aug 69 - One package of enemy propaganda leaflets was found following a mortar attack on LZ Bayonet.

21 Aug 69 - 7 VC attempted to gather Vietnamese woodcutters for a propaganda meeting.

26 Aug 69 - An enemy PSYOP team broadcast to Americal forces on FSB 411.

2 Sep 69 - C/4-3 Inf captured several propaganda leaflets directed against the American soldier near Ba To.

24 Sep 69 - An enemy PSYOP team broadcast to the local Vietnamese near Duc Pho.

29 Sep 69 - A/1-6 Inf found anti-American leaflets tacked to trees and a tunnel complete with enemy propaganda, printing plates and equipment.

22 Oct 69 - C/4-21 Inf observed a Vietnamese man speaking to a group of the local villagers urging them to support the VC or be killed.

26 Oct 69 - B/1-20 Inf observed a number of enemy troops in a treeline urging the local populace to support the VC.

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28 Oct 69 - VC used a loudspeaker to inform inhabitants of a village at the base of OP 1 that the village was still controlled by the VC. To prove this point the school was burned down. The loudspeaker team directed the villagers not to interfere or they would be shot.

31 Oct 69 - An enemy PSYOP team broadcast from a hilltop in the vicinity of LZ Lis. The broadcast was in Vietnamese and included ethnic Vietnamese music.

d. Special Campaigns: Divisional PSYOP elements supported Operation Golden Fleece with special and standard leaflets and tapes. The Objectives of the PSYOP efforts were to publicize the rice denial operation and to influence the local populace to support the GVN in its efforts to help the people.

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II. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations
Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Authenticity of Service Members' Claims

a. Observation: Personnel arriving in the command through replacement stations are required to complete a travel voucher upon arrival at ultimate assignment. It has been noted that in some instances, personnel are arriving at times and dates that have a tendency to create doubt as to authenticity of claims. For instance, a person arriving on the last day of the month in the latter hours of the day are processed the next day (first day of following month). Payment of pay and allowances is based upon dates used in initial processing, as these are the only dates available for use by the paying finance officer. Also, personnel arriving on first day of month (early hours) back-date claims a few hours to meet the requirement of arriving in the command in the previous calendar month, thereby taking advantage of tax exemption and qualification for hostile fire pay for that month. Upon arrival at member's new duty station, vouchers are prepared upon basis of information furnished by member, which may result in either underpayment or overpayment to member.

b. Evaluation: Many facets are involved in recording of proper and accurate dates:

- (1) Savings to government of undetermined amounts of monies paid.
- (2) Correct and timely payment to members upon arrival at permanent station within RVN.
- (3) Recording of required data on DA Form 481 (Military Leave Record) when entering hostile fire area for purpose of leave balance accrual.
- (4) Date of start for hostile fire pay.
- (5) Date member (enlisted) eligible for foreign duty pay.
- (6) Date of termination of clothing monetary allowances.

c. Recommendation: That Financial Data Records Folder and 201 Personnel Records Jacket as a minimum be stamped on inside cover right wing under all documents to include date of departure for CONUS port and date of arrival in Republic of Vietnam. Any periods of excess lapsed time (such as leave enroute, hospitalization, etc.) should be explained and statement signed by appropriate in-country processing personnel.

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2. (U) SUBJECT: In-Processing

a. Observation: When new units have been assigned to the Americal Division or as support elements for the Americal Division, it takes a great deal of time to in-process the members individually. This causes the service member inconvenience and causes long lines for the in-processing section of the Finance Office.

b. Evaluation: A long wait before a man can be in-processed and paid at Finance is a factor which would lead to poor morale and would cause unnecessary delays in getting service members to the jobs they are needed to perform.

c. Recommendation: A system was arranged whereby a team was sent to the area where these units were staying during their in-processing so that they could be mass processed. This allowed the men to take care of their other processing while their finance records were being prepared and allowed them to get to their units more quickly.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Cashier "Express" Line

a. Observation: The additional workload during the pay day period caused by the number of personnel being paid within the office in addition to the normal in-out processing and emergency payments has caused an excessive delay in getting personnel paid and back to their jobs.

b. Evaluation: During the pay day period numerous monthly pay vouchers are processed in addition to the normal daily business of in and out processing, re-enlistments, cash collections, etc. As a result service members can spend a considerable time waiting in the cashier line to receive payment. Currently all persons wait their turn even though it may only take a minute to process a regular pay voucher and up to several minutes for an in-processing member.

c. Recommendation: That a cashier be established and designated as the "Express" cashier. This cashier should pay only MPV's - no travel, in-processing or collections. This would alleviate the burden on the normal cashier making payments and collections on in or out processing personnel. Service control would provide an "Express" line for their voucher processing to make this work as planned.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Changing of Concept of Assigning Number of Chaplains to a ROAD Infantry Division

a. Observation: When the Americal Division was composed of separate brigades, five chaplains were assigned to each brigade. Brigades with

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four maneuver battalions had a chaplain per battalion plus a brigade chaplain for overall supervision. One of the chaplains, of necessity, was of the Roman Catholic faith. If the Catholic chaplain was senior, he served as brigade chaplain and gave Catholic coverage to all brigade personnel. If he was junior to a Protestant chaplain, he could be given administrative responsibility of a maneuver battalion, and still provide Catholic coverage for the entire brigade. In this case the Protestant brigade chaplain provided the Protestant coverage for the maneuver battalion to which the Catholic chaplain gave administrative support. When the Americal Division became organized under the Infantry Division ROAD TOE, four chaplains were assigned per brigade. Since two of the brigades had four battalions each, it was not possible to assign a chaplain per maneuver battalion. The division also has a separate cavalry squadron which performs strictly as a separate maneuver battalion and which is being employed outside its normal role. (Normally, a cavalry squadron attaches its troops to brigades where they receive chaplain coverage from brigade chaplains). This unit is without a TOE-assigned chaplain. An overstrength DISCOM is limited to two TOE-assigned chaplains serving close to 4,000 men. The Combat Aviation Groups are adequately covered by the augmentation of two chaplains.

b. Evaluation: The ROAD Infantry TOE calls for 19 chaplains. The augmented Combat Aviation Group authorizes the Americal Division two additional chaplain spaces bringing the authorized strength to 21 chaplains. This oversized division needs a minimum of 25 chaplains.

(1) The ROAD concept of assigning four chaplains per brigade is not valid in a situation where the brigade fights with a fixed number of four or more battalions. In such a situation at least one chaplain must divide his ministrations between two battalions. Although this may well meet the requirement to afford a given amount of religious coverage to the units within the affected battalions, commanders are highly dissatisfied with the coverage. Numerous complaints have been given by battalion commanders that this kind of coverage results in losing the chaplain as a staff officer. These commanders maintain that since the chaplain is serving two battalions, his loyalty is split, his identity with the men and unit hindered, his time spent with men severely limited, and his overall effectiveness hampered.

(2) An oversized DISCOM cannot be effectively served by two chaplains when it approaches a strength of 4,000 men.

(3) When the cavalry squadron performs consistently as a separate maneuver unit it needs the services of an organic chaplain.

(4) Although it has been impossible to augment the unit TOE's to include the chaplain requirements given in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above,

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the USARV Chaplain has recognized the need and provides the additional chaplains to meet all of these requirements with the exception of one additional chaplain for one of the brigades with four maneuver battalions. The USARV Chaplain has been unable to provide this chaplain because of overall space restrictions imposed by higher headquarters. Of the 25 chaplains needed, the division is operating with 24.

c. Recommendation: That consideration be given to changing the concept of the assignment of a fixed number of chaplains and chaplain assistants to a ROAS Infantry Division. The number of assigned chaplains and chaplain assistants should be based on factors to include: the number of maneuver battalions in the division; the nature of conflict; augmentations to DISCOM, DISARTY, or other units which would raise the strength to a point where additional chaplain support is required.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Provost Marshal - Misappropriation of Government Vehicles

a. Observation: During this quarter the high rate of violations involving misappropriation of government vehicles was brought to the attention of the Provost Marshal and unit commanders during roadside spot checks.

b. Evaluation: The current policy of military police conducting road and gate spot checks to determine ownership of government vehicles has resulted in an increase in the detection of stolen and misappropriated vehicles.

c. Recommendations: Continued use of current stolen vehicle listing, updating daily as additional vehicles are reported stolen or misappropriated and others are recovered. The following additional techniques are proving successful:

- (1) Daily bulletin announcements, requesting that unit commanders conduct inventories of all assigned vehicles against unit property records.
- (2) Turning in all unauthorized vehicles to the Office of the Provost Marshal.
- (3) Command emphasis placed on securing vehicles at all times.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Personnel - Deployment Criteria

a. Observation: When a unit which alone possesses the authorization for a particular MOS is redeploying, thus removing the need and authorization for certain MOS within USARV, the OFORD should not allow personnel to remain in RVN to complete a normal tour.

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b. Evaluation: Paragraph 4a(5)(b)5, Annex I to USARV OPORD 182-69 stated warrant officers and enlisted personnel assigned to 6-56 Arty with missile MOS would deploy regardless of time in country. Paragraph 5 of that annex allowed individuals to remain in RVN to complete a normal tour. Valuable time was lost in resolving this major discrepancy because an accurate and detailed criterion for redeployment was not furnished on a timely basis.

c. Recommendation: Contingency plans must include non-conflicting criteria for redeployment of personnel with special consideration given to unique units. The OPOSD must not allow MOS peculiar personnel to remain in RVN to complete a normal tour when no authorizations exist for their MOS. Provisions should exist to allow individuals to volunteer to serve a pro-rated adjusted tour in Korea or Thailand where the extended early release program is likewise applicable if authorizations exist in their MOS. No consideration should be given to individuals who merely want to complete their RVN tour for financial gain.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Unit Reenlistment Personnel

a. Observation: It is noted that unit commanders and unit reenlistment personnel were not thoroughly familiar with the basic reenlistment facts to include options, benefits, and advantages, and that unit commanders were not knowledgeable of proper interviewing techniques and were not conducting the timely interviews as required by AR 601-280 and USARV Supplement One to AR 601-280.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The unit commander's reenlistment interview is the most important single item in the Army Reenlistment Program, but it's often the most misunderstood. Knowledge of the Army, its advantages and benefits, and knowledge of how and when to interview or counsel an individual concerning reenlistment, is of utmost importance. A successful reenlistment program depends on a systematic approach; it cannot be built on or around a hit-or-miss, spur-of-the-moment basis. Adequate preparation, and a strong desire by the individual conducting the program to do a good job is all important. In this respect, it is very important that unit commanders and unit reenlistment personnel have an excellent working knowledge of the Army, its benefits and advantages, and last but not least, the proper methods of interviewing personnel who came from every part of the globe and from all walks of life.

(2) A Reenlistment Guide for Unit Commanders (company and battalion) has been implemented by the Americal Division Reenlistment Office to assist the commander in conducting his reenlistment program. Also, pertinent information is published frequently in newsheets, daily bulletins, and newsletters to keep him informed of changes and of new information pertaining to reenlistment.

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(3) The Americal Division Reenlistment Office held its first reenlistment seminar on 15 Sep 69. This seminar was held for the battalion reenlistment NCO's to explain to them the facts on reenlistment and the needs to know if they are to conduct an efficient reenlistment program in their unit. Reenlistment seminars are being scheduled on a quarterly basis.

c. (U) Recommendations: That the following action be taken:

(1) That all units comply with the Americal Supplement to AR 601-280 and appoint full time reenlistment NCO's at battalion level.

(2) That unit commanders become familiar with the reenlistment regulation and that they conduct the prescribed reenlistment interviews as outlined in the Americal Supplement.

(3) That reenlistment seminars be continued on a quarterly basis in order to compensate for the rotation rate of reenlistment personnel.

(4) That when necessary, personnel holding MOS, OOE, be assigned to the Americal Reenlistment Office.

B. Intelligence. None

C. Operations

1. (U) SUBJECT: Police of Positions Prior to Abandonment

a. Observations: Captured enemy soldiers continue to report that they acquire the largest proportion of their American-made ammunition from abandoned night defensive positions (NDP).

b. Evaluation: NDPs must be carefully checked prior to departure to insure that no ammunition has been discarded. Stay behind patrols or artillery fire (15-45 minutes after departure) can be used to discourage the enemy from entering the former NDP sites. Resupply in the field must be carefully coordinated to insure that ammunition in excess of the unit's needs is not delivered.

c. Recommendation: Commanders must continue to insist on the thorough police of all friendly positions and the individual soldier must be made aware of the necessity for accounting for his basic load of ammunition. Also, resupply of ammunition in the field should be made in small lots, rather than by the case.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Armored Cavalry Operations During the Monsoon Season

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a. Observations: The ability of armored cavalry units to operate effectively during the monsoon season is related to the commander's ability to employ special techniques peculiar to Southeast Asia.

b. Evaluation: Monsoon conditions require that cavalry units adopt formations other than the file. The successive passage of tracked vehicles over the same route eventually causes a traction loss for vehicles in the rear of the file. When a file formation is necessary, units utilizing the same axis should be no larger than a platoon. The movement of armored cavalry units during the torrential downpours common throughout the monsoon season can prove quite effective due to the reduction in the enemy's ability to audibly or visually perceive the unit's movement. Mining incidents are common during the monsoon season because of the restrictions on cross-country movement. Dirt roads, river crossing sites, old tracked vehicle trails and gaps in rice paddy dikes are likely locations of enemy mines. Caution must be exercised in these areas and every effort should be made to circumvent restricted areas and other suspect locations.

c. Recommendation: The above techniques and procedures should be employed during the monsoon season to insure that the superior mobility, shock action, and fire power of armored cavalry units can be fully exploited.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Security of ACAVs at Night

a. Observations: During a recent night mortar and RPG attack on an armored cavalry position, an unusually high number of casualties and damaged vehicles resulted from using the ACAV as a fighting position by all personnel.

b. Evaluation: During daylight hours, the usual fighting positions for an ACAV crew are on the ACAV. At night, however, that arrangement is not practical since the enemy can creep within RPG range, infiltrate between ACAV's and throw grenades or satchel charger into the vehicles.

c. Recommendations:

(1) One but no more than two men should remain on each ACAV to maintain radio watch and guard with the .50 cal machinegun.

(2) The remaining personnel from each track should occupy foxhole positions between and near the ACAV.

(3) A section of cyclone fence should be carried on each ACAV and placed in front of it for protection against rocket propelled grenades at night.

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(4) Once the ACAV's are in a night laager position, the rear ramp should be closed at all times.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Fire From the Rear

a. Observation: ~~R~~ Troop, 1st Cav has had three (3) ACAV gunners killed by fire coming from the rear of the ACAV. To counter this threat the troop commander has mounted minigun ammunition cans filled with dirt to the rear of the ACAV gunners.

b. Evaluation: There is no protection for an ACAV gunner above the waist except in the direction in which he is firing. The expedient ammunition cans filled with dirt provide the gunner with six (6) inches of rearward protection. These ammunition cans will block the gun from firing to the rear, however, this minor problem may be alleviated by releasing the cans.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that this expedient be conveyed to other Cav units.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Departing from Night Locations

a. Observations: On 160730 Oct 69, a platoon from B Co, 3-1 Inf was engaged by an estimated 10-15 NVA with automatic weapons while moving from their night ambush position to the company CP. The contact lasted approximately one minute and resulted in 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E).

b. Evaluation: The platoon moved into their ambush position at 1900 hours on 15 Oct. They established their ambush and remained in position throughout the night. The following morning the platoon failed to dispatch patrols, fire any claymores, or take other precautionary measures to preclude the enemy from moving in proximity to their positions. The NVA moved to within fifty meters of the platoon and on signal ambushed the US platoon.

c. Recommendation: When establishing an ambush always move into position after dark. Security should be established along probable avenues of approach into the ambush position. Prior to leaving the ambush position, security patrols should be sent out to detect any enemy forces near the ambush site. If the situation permits, individual weapons and claymores should be fired to preclude an enemy counter ambush.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Revolutionary Development Support

a. Observation: Company B, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, is currently supporting the RD effort in Duc Pho District in conjunction with four (4) FF platoons, two (2) RF companies, and one ARVN company. To facilitate coordination and cooperation between the Vietnamese and US forces, the company headquarters, weapons platoon, and one rifle platoon stay with the FF

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platoon in the center of the company's operational area. One rifle platoon is responsible for providing liaison with the three Vietnamese units to the north. They accomplish this by having one US squad live and operate with each of these three Vietnamese units. The remaining rifle platoon provides liaison with the three Vietnamese units to the south in the same manner. These squads assist the Vietnamese forces in tactical training with emphasis on patrolling and ambushing. In addition, they conduct combined operations with the Vietnamese forces and provide these forces with brigade assets, such as armed helicopters, medical evacuation helicopters and artillery, not readily available to Vietnamese forces. Company B has also formed a "Ranger Squad" composed of five US personnel, two RF personnel, and one FF personnel. This unit operates throughout the company's area directly under company control with the primary mission of patrolling, ambushing, and reconnaissance. Due to its size, the unit is very mobile and can easily move without being detected. To fully coordinate all activities and resolve any problem areas, a daily meeting is conducted with unit commanders, district representatives, and battalion representatives.

b. Evaluation: Since Company B has been operating in this manner there has been a marked improvement in the aggressiveness of the Vietnamese forces. When accompanied by US forces, the Vietnamese forces are not at all hesitant to make and maintain contact, knowing that the US forces have air support, artillery support, and medical evacuation support on call. Since this support is available to them, their morale and their belief that they can defeat the enemy is greatly increased. When the US forces see the Vietnamese forces operating actively and helping to drive the enemy from the area, they feel that the war is not hopeless, but can be won, and their morale is raised. With the increased friendly activity in the area, the civil government officials, such as village and hamlet chiefs, have returned to their hamlets and villages to live, thus bringing the government of RVN back to the people. Also, the Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams and the Peoples Self Defense Forces are again living with the people, not just visiting during the day. The people have started to support the allied forces and in several instances have provided timely intelligence on location and movement of Viet Cong forces.

c. Recommendation: Whenever possible, US units collocate rifle squads with Vietnamese companies and platoons when engaged in joint pacification efforts. Coordination and cooperation will be significantly improved and Vietnamese forces, knowing that they have the assets of the US forces behind them, will become more aggressive and use better tactics. With increased protection, civil authorities leave the district headquarters and move back to their hamlets and villages, restoring these hamlets and villages to the control of the GVN. With this evidence of government control and power, the people take an active interest in the fight against the Viet Cong.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Employment of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)

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a. Observation: Each engineer company within the Divisional Engineer Battalion is authorized one CEV. The direct and general support companies can not fully utilize their CEV because each company does not usually employ the CEV on a full time basis. In many cases the company's CEV is idle, because the supported infantry brigade does not have a requirement for the vehicle. In other instances, the engineer company requires more than one CEV for a particular operation or operations.

b. Evaluation: The CEV's could be employed with greater efficiency if they were consolidated in either the Bridge Company or heavy equipment platoon. The CEV's could then be sent out to the engineer companies on a mission basis. The Battalion S3 would set the priorities for the employment of the vehicles.

c. Recommendation: The Divisional Engineer Battalion's Combat Engineer vehicles be consolidated at the Battalion Bridge Company.

D. Organization. None.

E. Training

(U) SUBJECT: Training Range

a. Observation: The 3-1 Inf Bn has developed a technique of maintaining student interest on the firing range.

b. Evaluation: The 3-1 Inf Bn has developed quick-kill targets using 81mm mortar powder bags for "bulls eyes." When tracer ammunition strikes the "bulls eye", the powder bag ignites indicating to the student firer that he has hit the target. Another technique is to use poster board and/or overlay paper as targets for the M79/90mm canister rounds to indicate the dispersion pattern of each round. Bunkers constructed of FSP with slots for aiming points have been established for the M-72 LAW and 90mm HE round. The principle involved in these target techniques is to present a challenge to the student firer and provide him the satisfaction of knowing that he hit the target.

c. Recommendation: Training should be made as interesting and as challenging as possible so that the student participates freely and receives the maximum benefit.

F. Logistics

1. (U) SUBJECT: New Rucksack, Tropical (DDA10069003)

a. Observation:

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(1) Advantages of new rucksack:

- (a) Waterproof bag
- (b) Lightweight frame
- (c) Quick emergency release
- (d) Larger improved sack

(2) Disadvantages of new rucksack:

- (a) The lower back becomes fatigued faster
- (b) Sets too high on back, becomes a handicap when moving under thick, low vegetation.

b. Evaluation: Units in the field usually carry a minimum of three days of essentials i.e. food, batteries and medical supplies. During the monsoon season when resupply becomes erratic, more than three days essentials must be carried. The added requirements of suitable rain gear and cold weather items increase the individual's load. As a result, the sack of the new rucksack is both suitable and practical. However, the frame rides too high on a man's back causing undue back strain. The frame from the more common lightweight rucksack 106G has been found to be both comfortable and practical.

c. Recommendation: Further studies be made to combine the advantages of the new sack with the frame from the lightweight Rucksack 106G.

2. (U) SUBJECT: External Loads

a. Observation: The 4-21 Inf Bn experienced considerable delay while resupplying its two FSB's by CH-47 helicopter. The delay was due to the use of internal loading and unloading as opposed to external loading.

b. Evaluation: Incorporating the use of a 1½ ton trailer enabled resupply to be slung externally and materially reduced ground time. The following improvements were also noted: Class V and other material were "piggy-backed" beneath the 1½ ton trailer which reduced the number of sorties. By using this system over a period of one week, the CH-47 helicopters gained 3.5 hours of flight time.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that external loads should be used where practical.

3. (U) Anchor System for MEAL Matting

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

a. Observations:

(1) The two most common methods for anchoring MEAL matting used on an airfield or helipad is to either:

(a) Extend portions of the end panels, bend them downward into a trench and backfill the trench.

(b) Use anchors consisting of 3/4" reinforcing rod approximately 40" long that are driven into the ground and bent over the matting.

(2) The method of burying the end panel is very effective but requires an excess amount of time and effort to install the system. The use of anchor rods is very fast but the anchors have a tendency to work out of the ground after periods of heavy traffic.

(3) A new method of anchoring the MEAL was required that could be employed with a minimum of time and effort and would not fail under repeated heavy loads.

b. Evaluation: In order to have a method that could be employed quickly and would not fail, a new method for anchoring MEAL matting was employed (See Inclosure 3). The anchorage system employs a 2" metal pipe for an anchor. The pipe is driven through a hole cut in the matting, a small explosive charge is detonated in the pipe causing the end to splay and then a steel plate is welded to the top of the pipe to form a cap.

c. Recommendation: The method of anchoring MEAL matting, similar to the plan at Inclosure 3, be disseminated to all engineer units.

G. Communications

1. (U) SUBJECT: Emergency Operation of the AN/GRC 122, AN/GRC 142

a. Observation: AN/GRC 122 and AN/GRC 142 RATT Stations have no effective backup power source.

b. Evaluation: Since the van air conditioner must be operated to cool the equipment a 10KW generator is the smallest power source that will effectively power the equipment. 5KW generators normally issued will not take the load. Additionally, if the PP-4763 power supply (which converts 110v AC to 28v DC to power the radio equipment) fails there is presently no emergency backup power source.

c. Recommendation: The operator's manual outlines the procedures to by-pass the PP-4763 and use a 3KW 27.5v DC generator for radio equipment power and a 5KW 110v AC generator for TT and air conditioner power. A

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test of this procedure proved successful. It is recommended that all outlying RATT sites be provided with JMW 27 Jv DC generators to insure an effective means of backup.

2. (U) SUBJECT: AN/GSA-7

a. Observation: When used in an RMI setup, the AN/GSA-7 has a tendency to overheat. Failure of AN/GSA-7 results in the loss of RMI capability.

b. Evaluation: A very satisfactory method of employing RMI without the AN/GSA-7 is possible by using an SB-22. Setup for RMI using an SB-22 is as follows:

(1) Cut in two the cable which is normally connected to the transmission outlet in the RT-524 and splice WD-1 or other suitable wire into it. Connect the other end of the WD-1 to a line pack in the SB-22.

(2) Connect a TA-312 to another line pack in the SB-22 using WD-1.

(3) Connect both line packs together using WD-1.

(4) The TA-312 will act as a microphone and no significant heat problems will arise.

c. Recommendation: That the RMI setup outlined in paragraph 2 above be used in hot areas for the heat will have less effect on the SB-22 than on the GSA-7 and provide a highly reliable means of communications. Further by using an SB-22, a higher percentage of backup is normally available.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Repair by Replacement Program

a. Observation: Many units in USARV are unaware of the "repair" by replacement program for standardized generators within the command.

b. Recommendation: Each unit in the command should be made aware of USARV Reg 750-21. Action should be taken to insure full utilization is made of this program.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Developing Chemical

a. Observation: Glacial Acetic Acid is in short supply in Vietnam. This acid is used in aqueous solution as a Short Stop Bath, the second step in black and white film processing.

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b. Evaluation: It was found that an equally effective Stop Bath solution can be effected by using vinegar in place of the Acetic Acid.

c. Recommendation: Vinegar may be substituted for Glacial Acetic Acid.

H. Material. None.

I. Psychological Operations

1. (U) SUBJECT: Organic Divisional aircraft in support of PSYOP.

a. Observation: The 196th Brigade is employing a light observation helicopter as an Early Word aircraft. The brigade has connected a HRC-25 radio with retransmission capability to a four-bank speaker system. The system can easily be adapted to play taped messages or live broadcasts from the helicopter.

b. Evaluation: The LOH Early Word system as employed by the 196th Brigade is extremely effective. The system does not have the wattage output of the system mounted in the O-2B aircraft, but it gives the unit an immediate response capability of its own. It has been effective for both daylight and night operations.

c. Recommendation: That this information be disseminated to all PSYOP units.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Artillery Dissemination of Leaflets

a. Observation: Divisional Artillery units are effectively employing the EE M-84 (105mm smoke round) to disseminate leaflets. The round minus the smoke canister can be loaded with approximately 750 leaflets, depending upon the weight and size of the paper.

b. Evaluation: This method of dissemination is particularly effective when normal aerial delivery means are curtailed by inclement weather. The leaflets are rolled and taped with one wrap of tape at the top and bottom of each roll. The diameter of the leaflet roll must be sufficient to facilitate a snug fit into the EE M-84 round. Any number of leaflet rolls may be loaded into the EE M-84 round provided the length of the stacked rolls does not exceed 10½ inches.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that spacer material such as cardboard be utilized to take up the unused space in order to prevent the rolls from shifting, which could result in erratic rounds. Cardboard spacers also prevent leaflet damage upon expulsion.

AVIF-GCDO

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
(RCS-GSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Joseph G. Clemons

JOSEPH G. CLEMONS
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

3 Incl

- ~~1. Information Sheet~~
2. Americal Div Troop List
3. Diagram of MEAL STL MAT Anchor

Incl 1 wd HQ, DA
DISTRIBUTION:

1-ACSFOR-DA (Thru USARPAC)	1-CO, H Troop, 17th Cav
2-ACSFOR-DA (Thru USARV)	1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
2-CINCUSARPAC	1-CO, 14th Avn Bn
3-CG, USARV	10-CO, 3d MIL Hist Det
1-OCMB-DA	1-ACofS, G1
2-CO, 11th Inf Bde	10-ACofS, G2
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde	10-ACofS, G3
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde	1-ACofS, G4
2-CO, Americal Div Arty	1-ACofS, G5
8-CO, Americal DISCOM	1-Chemical
2-CO, 16th GAG	1-Engineer
1-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	1-Signal
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn	1-Aviation
1-CO, 523d Sig Bn	1-Provost Marshal
1-CO, 23d MP Co	1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-CO, HHC, Americal Div	1-Information Officer
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf	1-Inspector General
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf	1-Surgeon
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf	1-Chaplain
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf	1-Adjutant General
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf	1-III MAF LNO
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf	2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf	
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf	
1-CO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf	
1-CO, 2d Bn, 1st Inf	
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52d Inf	
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty	
1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty	
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty	
1-CO, 3d Bn, 16th Arty	
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty	
1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty	
1-CO, E Troop, 1st Cav	
1-CO, F Troop, 17th Cav	

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AVEGC-DST (10 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSPOB-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375; 2 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Authenticity of Service Members' Claims", section II, page 62, paragraph A1; nonconcur. Dates of arrival in RVN are included in assignment orders published by the replacement battalions. The arrival date has been included on all orders since 20 July 1969. The Americal Division has been informed of this date and will use the assignment orders to verify dates of arrival in RVN.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Cashier "Express" Line", section II, page 63, paragraph A3; concur. An "Express" line was established by the finance office effective with the October pay day for the purpose of paying normal pay and selling piasters to personnel during the pay day period.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Changing the Concept of Assigning Number of Chaplains to a ROAD Infantry Division", page 63, paragraph A4; concur. Experience in Vietnam has shown that a standard table of organization for chaplains is not adequate for the flexible tailoring of the ROAD division. Further recommend that DA consider a more flexible method of adding or reducing authorized chaplains in the ROAD Infantry Division consistent with staffing levels suggested in AR 570-2.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Unit Reenlistment Personnel", section II, page 66, paragraph A7; concur. This headquarters will continue to assign career counselors, MOS OOE, to the Americal Division as vacancies occur.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Police of Positions Prior to Abandonment", section II, page 67, paragraph G1; concur. Commanders must continue to insist on the thorough police of all friendly positions and that the individual soldier must be made aware of the necessity of accounting for his basic load of ammunition. Night defensive positions must be carefully checked prior to departure to insure that no ammunition has been discarded. Additionally, maximum effort should be made to assure US personnel understand that enemy soldiers continue to acquire the largest proportion of their American-made ammunition from abandoned night defensive positions.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Armored Cavalry Operations During the Monsoon Season", section II, page 67, paragraph C2; concur. During monsoon conditions cavalry units should adopt formations other than the file. When a file formation is necessary units utilizing the same axis should be no longer than a platoon, this will reduce traction loss for vehicles in the rear of the file. Further concur that armored cavalry units be encouraged to move during the torrential downpours common throughout the monsoon season. This is effective in reducing the enemy's ability to audibly or visually perceive the units movement.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Security of ACAV's at Night", section II, page 68, paragraph C3; concur. This item was included in a USARV publication, "Armor in Vietnam - Combat Notes".

h. (C) Reference item concerning "Fire From the Rear", section II, page 69, paragraph C4; concur. The use of ammunition cans filled with dirt to provide the gunner with rearward protection is an excellent expedient. This item will be considered for inclusion in USARV publication "Battlefield Report-Tips for Commanders".

i. (C) Reference item concerning "Revolutionary Development Support", section II, page 69, paragraph C6; concur. The benefits of combined operations accrue to both US and GVN forces. GVN forces gain confidence from having US assistance readily available and the RF/PF soldiers familiarity with the area of operations facilitates US unit operations. Collocation of US and GVN units is being widely employed in accordance with existing MACV guidance.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)", section II, page 70, paragraph C7; nonconcur. The unit commander, and in this case the battalion commander, is authorized to allocate his resources as required to meet the situation. A TOS modification is not considered to be required on the basis of information provided.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Training Range", section II, page 71, paragraph 2E; concur. The recommendation to make training interesting and challenging is recognized as essential. Nonconcur with the use of 81mm mortar increments to indicate target hits. The visible indications of a target hit is desirable but the risks associated with the handling and storage of unused powder increments make their use unacceptable from a safety stand point. Unused powder increments should be destroyed as prescribed by FM 23-90, 81mm mortar, M29.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "New Rucksack, Tropical (DDA10069003)", section II, page 71, paragraph F1. This comment deals exclusively with equipment and is not an operational lesson learned. Recommendations of this nature should be submitted by the unit as an EIR under provisions of TM 38-750.

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AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

m. (U) Reference item concerning "Anchorage System for M84 Matting", section II, page 72, paragraph F3. Sufficient data is not provided to allow an evaluation of this technique. A technical evaluation has been directed to determine the value of this technique. If the results of the evaluation are favorable appropriate dissemination of the necessary information will be made.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Emergency Operation of the AN/GRC-122 and AN/GRC-142 Radios", section II, page 73, paragraph G1; nonconcur. Rather than jury rig the set with two generators, a larger capacity generator should be requested through supply channels. A 10kw generator is available for issue in lieu of Generator Set PU-322/U which is the recently authorized 10kw power supply for the AN/GRC-122 and AN/GRC-142 radios.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "AN/GSA-7", section II, page 74, paragraph G2; nonconcur. The recommendation calls for the application of a modification that defeats the purpose of the AN/GSA-7. Action should be taken to provide cooling by fan or air conditioning. If cooling is not feasible an alternate method of accomplishing HMI is shown on inclosure 4. The AN/GSA-7 is still the standard A item, however, ECOM Laboratories at Fort Monmouth have stated that a modification to the Radio Control Group AN/GRA-39 will be fielded in 1970 and will replace the AN/GSA-7.

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Developing Chemical", section II, page 74, paragraph G4; concur. There is no apparent loss of quality when using vinegar in place of acetic acid, however, it is advisable to make a test to determine the time needed to stop development.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Organic Divisional Aircraft in Support of PSYOP", section II, page 75, paragraph I2; concur. The use of a light observation helicopter as an Early Word aircraft is a good means of having immediate response capability for units. This information has been disseminated to all PSYOP units.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Artillery Dissemination of Leaflets", section II, page 75, paragraph I2; concur. FM-33-5, Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures, recognizes these problems with the M84 shell. The use of cardboard in the manner described is an effective method to help stabilize the round and protect the leaflets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
Added 1 Incl
as
Cy furn:
America! Div


I. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (10 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Division for Period Ending
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 1 November 1969)

1. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)

24th Engr Bn
160th Engr Det

23d Sig Bn

23d MP Co
146th MP Plat, 50th MP Bn

3d MIL Hist Det

USAMID (PROV)
52d MI Det
569th MI Det
635th MI Det
636th MI Det

328th ER Co

OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQB, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty

1st Bn, 14th Arty

3d Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

G Btry, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)

Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

3d Plat, G Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

Inclosure 2

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251st FA Det (Radar)

252d FA Det (Radar)

271st FA Det (Radar)

3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band

23d S&T Bn

23d Med Bn

723d Maint Bn (-)

23d Admin Co

Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf

63d Inf Plat (CIT)

Americal Combat Center (PROV)

Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)

14th Combat Avn Bn

71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

174th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

176th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

534th Med Det

756th Med Det

14th Security Plat

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)

D Troop, 1st Sqn, 1st Cav

E Co, 723d Maint Bn

F Troop, 8th Cav

415th Sig Det

570th Trans Det

335th Trans Co

5. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
E Trp, 1st Cav
59th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
90th Chem Det
31st Public Information Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 2

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 46th Inf
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
F Trp, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
27th Chem Det
10th Public Information Det
Combat Weather Team 1

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf

5th Bn, 46th Inf

1st Bn, 52d Inf

H Trp, 17th Cav

57th Inf Plat (Scout Bop)

87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)

Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)

Det 3 (DS of LZ Baldy)


Det 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

46th Engr Det

9. Request notification of any changes/corrections be made to
G3 DOT 493/3776.

ENCLOSURE 3




SCALE BEFORE SETTING

SCALE AFTER SETTING

PLATE DETAIL

MBAI STL MAT ANCHOR DETAILS
 AMERICAN DIVISION
 CHU LAI
 2 MAY 61
 6920



* Remote control is used if monitoring by loudspeaker is desired.
 Not required to complete phone patch service.

Incl 4

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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