DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96383

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-AA-C 15 September 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
ATTN: ACofS, G3
APO 96383

1. (C) Name and Type of Operation: Operation LAMAR PLAIN.

2. (C) Dates of Operation: 15 May - 14 Aug 69

3. (C) Location: TAN PHUOC Dist and HAU DUC Dist, TAM KY (P), RVN (Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 series L7014).

4. (U) Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Colonel Frank L. Dietrich.

6. (C) Task Organization: 1 -46 Inf Bde Control 1-501 Inf 2-320 Arty (-) 1-502 Inf C/1-14

A/4-77 ARA (-)
B/2-17 Cav
A/326 Engr (-)
A/501 Sig (-)
A/101 AHB
Sec/C/159/ ASHB
Sec/D/AHB 1st FSSE
A/326 Med
B/601 Maint
Plat/426 SxS
HHC(-), 1st Bde
42d Inf Plat (SDT)
1/265 RRU
1/101 MID
TACP 20 TASS
1/101 MP
Weather Det

AVDG-AA-C 15 September 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)
7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. A/4-77 ARA (DS) provided close artillery support during LZ preparation and for ground troops in contact. The ARA was also used in coordination with LOH Reconnaissance teams from the Brigade Aviation platoon. This combination proved to be extremely effective in conjunction with visual reconnaissance missions. On occasion ARA gunships were used to cover medical evacuation air -craft, but only when gunship support from other resources was not immediately available or when such employment was consistent with the tactical operation. The fire support provided was excellent and timely as the section kept gunships on strip alert 24 hours a day. A combination of sound maintenance procedures and close control of operating hours kept availability in the 80% plus range.

b. TACP 20 TASS (Tac Air) provided tactical air support during the opera -tion furnishing the ground commanders with preplanned and immediate airstrikes, "Skyspots", and "Beacon" airstrikes. Statistically the USAF flew 626 preplanned sorties, 189 immediate sorties, with a total of 880.7 FAC and VR hours and 397 missions in delivering the following ordnance:

1230.4 GP Bombs (Tons)

931 Napalm (Cannisters)

1030 2.75 Rockets

148,095 20mm Rounds

44 CBU-24 (Cannisters)

The results produced by the Air Force speak for themselves as well placed ordnance killed 94 enemy, destroyed 530 bunkers, 392 structures, 6 12.7mm positions, 2 mortar positions and produced 157 sustained fires and 70 secondary explosions.

c. 1st Forward Support Supply Element (FSSE) did an outstanding job of supporting the BDE regardless of the situation or circumstances. Immediately after deployment the FSSE established its base of operation at Camp PAPE, remaining there throughout the operation. Its primary mission being the resupply of units in the field, the FSSE programmed and rigged from 10 to 30 CH47 sorties per day. Other missions included establishing and operating refuel and rearm points for support and gunship helicopters. These were frequently located in forward field locations such as HAU DUC and LZ PROFESSIONAL. Under the control of the 1st FSSE and supporting the Brigade were A/326 Med, B/801 Maint and a platoon of the 426th S&S Battalion.

d. B/2-17 Cav provided aerial and ground reconnaissance, fire support for troops in contact and a ready reaction force for downed aircraft or other emergency type missions. Whenever possible, the Cav was employed as an independent element with the mission of conducting extensive aerial reconnais -sance in these zones not occupied by ground forces. On several occasions the Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted to exploit intelligence gathered from these reconnaissance missions. The troop proved indispensable as a reaction force for downed aircraft. Due to the high volume of ground fire and the number of aircraft being forced down in the AO the troop was given the mission of maintaining four aircraft and the Aero-Rifle Platoon on strip alert. On several occasions the quick reactions of Cav elements were instrumental in securing lives and equipment.

e. The 101st Assault Helicopter Battalion provided a direct support company throughout the entire operation, with A Co supporting the Brigade from 15 May to 7 July and B Co supporting from 8 July through 14 August. Both companies provided dependable and responsive air lift support to the Brigade. Balancing operational and maintenance requirements, both companies provided a minimum of ten UH1H aircraft daily in addition to one command and control aircraft. Mission ready aircraft averaged 80% plus throughout the entire operation. D/101 provided 3 gunships under the OPCON of the direct support company. These gunships were utilized on combat assault missions and for coverage of medevac missions.

f. 2d Bn, 320th Artillery (-) deployed to TAM KY Province with the mission of providing direct support artillery. The task organization consisted of the Battalion headquarters and two assigned batteries, A and C. C/1-14 Arty, Americal Division, was placed under OPCON to 2-320 Arty upon its arrival at TAM KY and provided each infantry battalion with direct support battery. General support (GSR) for the 1st Brigade was provided by B/3-lo Arty. The initial mission assigned the artillery was to relieve enemy pressure on LZ PROFESSIONAL. The immediate course of action was to develop a responsive counter battery fire plan. Another enemy activity which required immediate reaction was the intensive anti-aircraft fire throughout the AO. Tube artillery and ARA began to engaged suspected and confirmed AA locations on an almost instantaneous basis.

g. A/326 Engr provided excellent support, particularly in the development of new firebases. During the operation the company played a part in the construction of 6 different firebases. Included in these firebase construction missions were the building of TOC's, reinforced bunkers and sleeping positions. another recurring mission included destruction of an assortment of defective explosive devices.

h. A/501 Signal (-) provided excellent direct support. The communications support provided included general communications by FM radio and telephone using land line and VHF to Division headquarters and subordinate units on firebases. Although many breaks in communication occurred, the speed with which problems were alleviated was commendable. RTT communications were also provided along with long distance telephone patches to the EAGLE switch at CAMP EAGLE. One well used morale builder was the MARS station. Soldiers of the Brigade made frequent calls to their families in the States using this facility.

i. 42d Inf Scout Dog Platoon: The Scout Dog Platoon did and excellent job of supporting units during Operation LAMAR PLAIN. It effectiveness can easily be assessed by the fact that they kept an average of 10 teams operational with more than half of these in field locations with the companies. Several critique sheets praised the ability of the team to alert on enemy and caches.

j. USAF:
1. USAF provided air transport for all elements of the Brigade with the exception of the 1st FSSE. The entire move between HUE-PHU BAI and TAM KY and CHU LAI was accomplished using 69 C-130 sorties over a three day period. Subsequent airlift capability, in the form of two C-123 sorties per day was also provided.

2. USAF Tactical Air was available throughout the operation and consisted of a variety of missions and ordnance. The USAF ALO attached to 1st Brigade provided excellent support through both FAC and VR missions.

k. ARVN Artillery, in OPCCORD, provided mutual fire support in those missions, while co-located with US artillery of firebases.

l. 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion provided support throughout the operation. Initially one section from B/159 supported; they were replaced by a section from C/159. The missions were scheduled and coordinated by the 1st FSSE.

8. (C) Intelligence: The initial phase of Operation LAMAR PLAIN was characterized by heavy contact against a determined, highly motivated and well entrenched enemy. Indicative of the enemy's tenacity was the large number of ground to air contacts reported during the early stages of the operation. As Allied operations intensified the enemy suffered heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw in order to reorganize, resupply and retrain. Accordingly, enemy operations changed to small size elements employing harassing and delaying tactics in order to cover their withdrawal. At the termination of Operation LAMAR PLAIN there were indications the a new enemy offensive was being prepared, although no significant incident occurred in the 1st Brigade area of operations. (See Inclosure 1, Intelligence).

9. (C) Mission: The 1st Brigade will move with two battalions and designated support elements to the Americal Division currently operating in Southern I Corps and come under their operation control for immediate combat operations to relieve the pressure on TAM KY Province and its headquarters.

10. (C) Concept of the Operation: 1st Brigade conducted extensive airmobile and reconnaissance in force operations with three maneuver battalions, supported by one direct support artillery battalion and one air cavalry troop providing aerial and ground reconnaissance.

11. (C) Execution:
a. Methods of Operations:

1. The use of pre-packaged TOC bunker kit proved to be an invaluable innovation which permitted expeditious displacement and construction vital to in -command facilities.

2. The designation of Recon zones in those areas not assigned to maneuver units facilitated responsive and methodical reconnaissance activities by various brigade reconnaissance assets. By establishing fire clearance prior to entering the zone, the reconnaissance elements could engage targets of opportunity without further delay.

3. The air cavalry troop, in direct support, operated as an entity rather than as fragmented sub-elements. Specific areas were assigned and the Troop Commander, operating under guidance by the Brigade Commander, could employ his flexible organization as a aerial/ground maneuver element, thereby making optimum use of his total assets, to include available artillery and Tac Air, to develop the situation. One control measure placed upon the Cav Troop Commander's assets was the Brigade Commander's final authority to commit the Aero-Rifle Platoon. Because of the constant requirement to maintain a responsive ready reaction force, this control was absolutely essential.

4. Special training was given to the Brigade Security Platoon in preparation for the special mission of downed aircraft security/recovery. Heretofore the platoon was primarily employed in static defensive roles, but the platoon could by virtue of this newly acquired skill, be inserted, to include by repelling, into a downed aircraft site for security and recovery rigging of the aircraft. This capability released the Aero-Rifle Platoon for other missions.

5. Aviation training and qualification were continued throughout the operation. Additionally, coordination was effected with the 16th Avn Grp and a Ground Control Approach (GCA) facility was established at TAM KY N. This facility paid significant dividends to Brigade Aviation operations.

6. Brigade support aircraft were employed in pairs due to the high density of anti-aircraft fires. Doubling up of flights allowed decreased exposure time during logistical missions as well as reducing resupply time for any given unit. Additionally, a second or chase ship provided immediate suppressive fire should an aircraft receive ground fire or be downed.

7. On specific airmobile operations, a forward refuel/rearm point was established daily to facilitate aircraft support in remote areas. The technique used was basically to transport fuel, ordnance and personnel by CH47 to the selected point, secured by sufficient ground forces, service any aircraft operating within that area, and extract the element at night. This technique significantly reduced blade time.

8. Whenever possible an artillery aerial observer accompanied the AF FAC. This technique allowed closer coordination of artillery and tactical air support.

9. Rapid and effective fighting/defensive positions were prepared by use of galvanized steel culvert sections. Used in conjunction with sandbags, these expedient devices proved to be safe and protective as well as reusable and portable.

10. The air cavalry troop was used to conduct bomb damage assessment of B52 strikes. Their organic air assets permitted immediate response thereby providing a more valid evaluation and subsequent exploitation than could be provided by insertion of ground troops. The organic Aero-Rifle Platoon was immediately available to exploit suitable targets.

11. Whenever possible, DS US artillery units and ARVN artillery units were co-located. Not only was maximum fire power thereby available, but security forces were minimized thereby releasing FWMF for maneuver missions. The mutual understanding and appreciation which ensued promoted an operational rapport for subsequent combined operations.

12. Aggressive training programs, oriented toward the small unit leaders, were in effect throughout the operation. Essential facets of operations were presented; a partial list of which included fire support assets and procedures, scout dog team support, medevac methods and helicopter repelling (for selected units).

13. Normally, a minimum of one rifle company was maintained in a reserve posture although not designated as a reserve. Rather, the unit(s) remained in such a position so as to be available within 30-60 minutes, but still conduct operations. Most often the company which was securing FSSE was given this mission; its location was capable of securing itself if necessary. By maintaining a reserve force, the brigade had the reaction capability necessary to complement the far reaching reconnaissance effort.

14. On numerous occasions, the 1st Brigade conducted combined operations with ARVN forces. These operations in OPCOORD with the 2d ARVN Div revealed that the allied forces were aggressive and willing to engage the enemy. Furthermore, the combined operations proved both well coordinated and well executed.

15. Pathfinders were habitually used for aircraft control at firebases and airheads as well as during airmobile operations. Additionally, pathfinders provided instruction to ground units on control/coordination aspects of Airmobile operations.

16. The system used to secure certain critical installations satisfied two important requirements. Rather than fragment battalions by causing them to secure those installations within their AO and still conduct offensive operations, each battalion was tasked on a rotational basis as "security" battalion. The primary mission of security was accomplished; concurrently, the battalion underwent standdown, refitting and training activities. In this manner, the battalion commander was able to maintain unity of command and full field strength as well as insure that the unit was properly conditioned to assume/resume field operations.

17. The DS engineer company fell under staff supervision of the S4 rather than the S3. This concept was necessitated by two factors the majority of engineer support was directed to base development, an S4 function; the S3 was absent from the brigade base area during most of the day conducting operational coordination, therefore close and continual coordination and supervision was better accomplished by the S4.

18. Scout dog teams were extensively and successfully employed and only in a few instances did the teams fail to alert. In one case, a dog team was responsible for the disclosure of a ten ton cache of weapons and munitions.

19. One battalion, 1-46, developed a provisional reserve company comprised of administrative and logistical personnel from battalion rear. The S4 served in leadership positions. The provisional reserve company (PROSERVCO) was armed with M16 and M79 and could conduct defensive and limited offensive operations for 3-4 days. Although targeted for security type missions (firebase, pickup and landing zone) the company could, and did conduct airmobile and RIF operations.

b. Operations Narrative:

15 May: Op LAMAR PLAIN commenced with the 1st Brigade TF organizing and deploying from the 101st Airborne Division AO to the Americal Division AO in QUANG TIN (P). At 0045H, the 1st Brigade received a verbal warning order from the 101st Airborne Division to move with two battalions, 1-501st Inf and 1-502d Inf, and designated support elements to the Americal Division currently operating in southern I Corps; the first elements of the brigade were to be prepared to depart by air NLT 151200H May 69 from the PHU BAI Departure Air -field (DAF). The 1-501 Inf and 1-502 Inf were alerted to move to PZ for extraction from the AO commencing at first light; concurrently, the 2-327 Inf was alerted to assume security of all fire bases in the AO upon extraction of the 1-501 Inf and 1-502. At 0400H, representatives from the 101st Airborne Division met with the 1st Brigade and coordinated the deployment of the brigade, to include division assets to accompany the brigade, and support to be furnished by the division. At 0830H, the 1st Brigade liaison team arrived at Americal Division Headquarters in CHU LAI and was briefed by the general staff, thereby effecting preliminary coordination between brigade and division staff representatives. At 1415H, the Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, reported to the Commanding General, Americal Division, and the 1st Brigade fell under OPCON of the Americal Division. The Arrival Airfield (AAF) was TAM KY S and brigade elements began to arrive that afternoon with the TAC CP, 1-501 Inf and C/2-320 Arty closing by 2130H. At 2345H, the 1st Brigade TF staging area received 5-7 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative results.

16 May: The 1st Brigade TF continued to deploy from the DAF at PHU BAI to the AAF at TAM KY S and the 1-501 Inf conducted a CA into the AO. At 0830H, the 1-502 Inf and 2-320 Arty (-) began movement by air from DAF to the AAF. At 1200H the 1st Brigade TF assumed OPCON of the 1-46 Inf and C/1-14 Arty which were located at LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT173077). The 1-46 Inf continued to conduct local reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of LZ PROFESSIONAL. At 1445H, C/2-320 Arty completed an airmove from TAM KY S to LZ YOUNG (BT188158) where it established a firing position with a battery from the 2d ARVN Div, secured by forces of the 5th ARVN Regt. At 1454H, 1-501 Inf conducted a CA into an LZ to the southwest of LZ YOUNG and commenced RIF operations to the south toward LZ PROFESSIONAL. At 1745H, B/1-501 Inf vic BT259156 engaged three enemy soldiers with small arms fire; the enemy fled south and the element pursued with negative results. At 2230H, the remainder of the 1st Brigade TF combat elements closed into TAM KY S; also at that time, the AAF staging area received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in three US lightly wounded.

17 MAY: Activity was light in t he AO as the enemy avoided contact on the ground. At 1416H, a LOH from B/2-17 Cav received 15 rounds of .30 cal ground fire from an estimated enemy platoon. The aircraft was hit twice, but managed to return to the airfield. At 1825H, a brigade LOH reconnaissance team observed 6 to 8 enemy soldiers; the aircraft engaged the enemy with M-60 and M-16 fire, accounting for 1 VC KIA. Throughout the AO, reconnaissance and support aircraft received light to moderate ground fire, ranging in size from .30 cal to .51 cal (12.7mm). The enemy demonstrated a complete willingness and capability to engage aircraft at any speed or altitude.

18 MAY: The day was punctuated with a series of sharp clashes as enemy activity increased in the AO. At 0700H, B/3-16 Artillery engaged an enemy force at BT131163 resulting in 6 NVA KIA; the battery was firing in support of the TIEN PHUOC Popular Forces. At 0710H, B/1-501, vic BT162123, engaged a single NVA who fled; the unit pursued and captured the wounded enemy who later died. At 1127H, C/1-501, vic BT162123, began to receive heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from a well dug-in and bunkered enemy. The element employed artillery and ARA and maneuvered against the enemy through- out the day. That afternoon the enemy position was over-run, resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 6 IWC. C/1-501 sustained 3 KIA and 1 WIA in the bitter day-long fight. At 1240H, B/1-501, vic BT178112, again received 82mm mortar fire, resulting in 4 US KIA, including the company commander, and 6 US WIA. At 1605H, C/1-501 vic BT163124, observed four enemy soldiers; the element employed artillery, accounting for 4 NVA KIA and 1 weapon captured. At 1753H, B/2-17 Cav vic BT190117 engaged an enemy mortar position with 40mm fire, resulting in 4 NVA KIA. Throughout the day, the enemy resisted the 1-501 in its movement to the south.

19 MAY: Activity lessened in the AO as the 1-501 continued to push south toward LZ PROFESSIONAL. At 1250H, a LOH of C/2-17 Cav, vic BT182007, received automatic weapons fire, taking hits in the tail rotor and crashing. The crew was slightly injured and evacuated without incident. At 1215H, B/1-46, vic BT178057, found a small equipment and weapons cache with 4 IWC and miscellaneous communication equipment, documents, medical supplies and other military equipment. At 1710H, B/1-46, vic BT168113 captured 1 NVA soldier and, at 1815H, captured a second VC soldier. Both PW were evacuated to the Brigade CP for further interrogation.

20 MAY: The enemy continued attacks by fire in the LAMAR PLAIN AO as mortar and anti-aircraft fire increased. At 0800H, the CP of 1-46 Inf and C/1 -14 Arty, located at LZ PROFESSIONAL received 60mm and 62mm mortar fire resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. Counter-mortar was fired with negative assessment. At 1245H, scouts of B/2-17 Cav observed an enemy 12.7mm AA weapon vic BT165098. The scouts directed an airstrike into the area, destroying the weapon.

21 MAY: 1st Brigade elements engaged in heavy contact as the 1-501 fought a day long struggle against a determined, well dug-in enemy. At 0500H, C/1-501, vic BT164115, detected movement outside an NDP and engaged the suspected enemy with M-79 and hand grenades. A first light sweep disclosed 2 VC KIA. At 0642H, B/1-501, vic BT165108, received intensive small arms and heavy machinegun fire from an enemy force of unknown size. The ensuing contact continued throughout the day. C and D Co and Recon/1-501 converged on the area to assist the heavily engaged B Co. At 0730H, C/1-501 engaged an enemy force in the area and began a daylong fight in the immediate vicinity. At 0900H, Recon/1 -501, vic BT165105, observed 4 NVA with a 12.7mm HMG and engaged the enemy position. At 1000H, D/1-501 joined the bitter fighting by engaging an enemy force in the area. The fighting continued throughout the day as the enemy tenaciously defended from steel-reinforced concrete bunkers. Tactical air, artillery and Air Cav support was used throughout the fighting, but the ground units remained locked in close combat throughout the afternoon. As the elements disengaged, t he enemy left 25 KIA on the battlefield with the 1-501 suffering 12 KIA and 46 WIA in the fight. Contact was scattered elsewhere in the AO as the ground elements began to uncover mute evidence of the effectiveness of the intensive air and artillery strikes throughout the AO. At 0645H, a LOH from B/2-17 Cav received heavy small arms fire resulting in 2 US WIA; the LOH returned to TAM KY without further incident. At 0835H, three companies of the 1-46 moved by air to BT1410633 to recover personnel MIA during a previous action and to initiate RIF operations to the east, straddling LZ PROFESSIONAL with the RIF axes of advance. At 0900H, another B/2-17 Cav LOH, vic BT162096, observed the charred remains of 4 VC KIA. At 211210H, a medevac aircraft from 54th Med Bn was hit by small arms fire and forced down vic BT136128; resulting in two US WIA.

22 MAY: Moderate enemy activity continued in the AO as scattered contacts of varying intensity ground and air were reported. At 0530H, D/1-501, vic BT162106, engaged and killed an NVA soldier moving outside the unit NDP. At 0615H, 1-46, vic BT185053, received five 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown enemy location, resulting in 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA; the element employed counter-mortar fie with negative results. At 0835H, an UH1H medevac air- craft from the 54th Med Bn, on an evacuation mission, was riddled by small arms and HMG fire; the aircraft exploded, crashed and burned with no survivors. At 0840H, A/4-77 ARA observed and killed one VC. At 0850H, Recon/1-501, vic BT141052, captured one VC attempting to hide in a trench. At 0925H, B/1-502, vic BT141052, received small arms fire, resulting in 1 US WIA; the element returned fire, killing 2 NVA. At 0945H, C/1-46, vic BT132078, recovered the remains of personnel MIA during Op FREDRICK HILL; the 12 US KIA were evacuated and the RIF operation continued. At 1025H, a Brigade FAC directed an air-strike against an enemy 12.7mm AA weapon, destroying the weapon with 250 pound bombs. At 1100H, B/1-502, vic BT136059, received machine gun fire from a concealed position, resulting in 1 US KIA; the element returned fire, but the enemy broke contact. At 1315H, B/1-502, vic BT140046, found the remains of 5 NVA killed by an airstrike conducted the previous day. At 1330H, B/1-46, vic BT165110, discovered a small weapons cache consisting of nine individual weapons. At 1407H, B/1 -501, vic BT165110, found the body of one NVA who had been killed in an earlier skirmish. At 21455H and 1457H, two Brigade aircraft were hit by ground fire; a LOH from 2-320 Arty was hit vic BT215161 and a HU1H C&C ship of 1-501 was hit vic BT165110 with a total of 3 US WIA. At 1545H, B/2-17 Cav continued to pressure the enemy forces by engaging and killing 1 VC with M-60 fire. At 1910H, B/1-501, vic BT162109, observed 2 NVA in an open field; engaged the enemy with M-79 fire, killing one. At 2018H, Recon/1-501, vic BT128068, observed a small enemy force and engaged them with small arms, accounting for 2 NVA KIA.

23 May: All units continued RIF operations in the area and contact continued as the sweeping 1st Brigade forces ferreted out small enemy forces. At 0850H, a logistics aircraft for 1-501, vic BT163108, received small arms fie which wounded one crewman. At 1100H, B/10501, vic BT163108, engaged an enemy force hidden in bunkers; the unit employed small arms fie and tactical air, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1115H, Recon/1-502, vic BT125054, captured 1 NVA soldier and discovered the remains of 1 VC killed by an earlier airstrike. At 1353H, B/1-501, vic BT161111, received unknown caliber mortar fire and M-79 fire, resulting in 3 US KIA and 7 US WIA; the element returned fire with negative assessment. At 1855H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT152127, engaged a hut complex killing 1 NVA. Just 35 minutes later at 1930H, the air cav engaged a small enemy force, accounting for one NVA KIA.

24 MAY: Activity decreased in the AO with only three minor contacts getting reported. At 0830H, A Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT138068, engaged 3 VC with ARA support, accounting for 3 VC KIA. At 1425H, B/1-501, vic BT158112, had 1 US WIA by small arms fire from an undetermined size enemy force. At 1615, B/1-501, vic BT154106, again received small arms fire, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA; the unit returned fire with negative assessment. 25 MAY: All units continued RIF operations in their respective AO as the enemy increased ground-to-air fire and continued to resist in the face of increasing pressure. At 0720H, a LOH from B/2-17 Cav vic BT145114 was hit by small arms fire and crashed, injuring the three crewmen. As other Cav elements converged on the downed aircraft, a second LOH was hit by 12.7mm AA fire, wounding one of the crew; the damaged LOH returned to safety and an airstrike was summoned. The airstrike was accurately placed and the 12..7 mm AA weapons was destroyed. At 0945H, A/1-502, vic BT153117, suffered 2 US WIA by small arms fire from an unknown enemy force. At 0850H, the Brigade FAC, vic BT155104, placed another airstrike and assessed 1 VC KBAS. At 1120H, a logistics air -craft for B/1-501, vic BT155118, had 1 US WIA from ground fire. At 1309H, Recon/1-502, vic BT135045, found the remains of 2 NVA killed by an earlier airstrike. At 1410H, an air observer from C/1-14 Arty spotted five VC in the open; the observer engaged the enemy with artillery recording 3 VC KIA. At 1620H; A/1-501, vic BT165098, engaged an enemy force with small arms. The alert soldiers quickly maneuvered and over-ran an enemy 82mm mortar position, killing 6 NVA and capt uring 11 NVA who was identified as the squad leader. Additionally, the aggressive company claimed 3 IWC and the complete 82mm mortar At 1825H, B/1-501, vic BT152117, had 2 US WIA from small arms fire; the element Recon/1-502, vic BT136045, engaged and killed 1 NVA and, at 1915H, C/1-501, vic BT164115, closed out the day's activities when it discovered 1 VC KIA from an earlier clash.

26 MAY: Sporadic contact continued as the 1st Brigade fought a series of small clashes against small bands of the determined enemy force. Operation LAMAR PLAIN was supported by two B-52 raids during the daylight hours against the suspected location of the 2d NVA Division Headquarters. At 0800H, A/1-501, vic BT165098, received enemy hand grenades within the perimeter leaving 2 US WIA; the element returned fire but the enemy fled the area. At 0808H, B/1-502, vic BT131078, received heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from a hidden enemy force, suffering 5 US WIA; the unit returned fire with negative assessment. At 0925H, B/1-501, vic BT155117, received heavy and accurate small arms and automatic weapons fire from a well concealed enemy force, resulting in 2 US KIA; the unit returned fire, but the enemy broke contact fleeing in an unknown direction. At 1150H, A/1-46, vic BT192082, found 1 VC KIA hidden in a tunnel. At 1430H and 1630, B-52s delivered two strikes vic BT180010 and BT170015 respectively. At 1725H, B/1-501 vic BT153114 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA.

27 MAY: Activity was relatively light in the AO as a bomb damage assessment (BDA) was conducted in the area of the B-52 strikes and all units continued RIF operations in the area At 0615H, B/2-17 Cav flew into the B-52 area and began to assess the results. At 0735H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT270735, engaged a two man enemy force, recording 2 NVA KIA. At 1005H, D/1-502, vic BT130081, found the remains of 4 NVA KBA. At 1225H, the Aero-Rifle Platoon, B/2-17 Cav, was inserted vic BT185005 to further check out a portion of the B-52 strike area. Almost immediately the unit received sniper fire; the Aero-Rifle Platoon returned fire, surrounded the enemy sniper and captured him and two individual weapons. However, the PW died before evacuation and the platoon was extracted without incident. The BDA had revealed significant bunker and structure damage as well as numerous trails interdicted, but limited in enemy casualties. At 1430H, B/3-17 Cav, vic BT172995, engaged and killed 1 NVA in the open. At 11725H, A/1-46, vic BT213075, observed an estimated enemy platoon in the open at a range of 600 meters; the element employed artillery which accounted for 5 NVA KIA.

28 MAY: All units continued RIF operations and activity was minimal throughout the AO. At 1235H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT 181003, observed and engaged 2 NVA in the open, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1250H, Recon/1-502, vic BT119067, engaged an enemy soldier attempting to cross a river, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC.

29 MAY: The 1st Brigade continued to press the search in the AO as the enemy apparently chose to avoid contact. At 1135H, D/1-501, vic BT164117, found 2 NVA KBAS. At 1620H, Recon/1-46, vic BT189092, engaged and killed 2 NVA, capturing one individual weapon in the brief skirmish. At 1700H, A/1-501 vic BT183113, found 1 NVA KIA by napalm.

30 MAY: The 1st Brigade, in compliance with a COMUSMACV directive, participated in a 24 hour "cease fire" in honor of Buddha's birthday. All elements engaged in limited, local defensive patrolling and the air cav was confined to reconnaissance activities with orders to fire only if fired upon. At 0815H, 6 NVA violated the cease fire when they opened fire on a B/2-17 Cav LOH, vic BT203132; the LOH returned fire accounting for 2 NVA KIA. At 1355H, a second breach occurred when a 1st Brigade LOH reconnaissance team received small arms fire from an NVA soldier; the element returned fire killing the enemy soldier. Also during this date, the 1st Brigade received an order from the Americal Division directing an operation specifically against the 1st MF VC Regiment. The concept prescribed a battalion combat assault into the SONG TRAM Valley vic BT1800, followed by RIF operations to the northeast toward the suspect 1st MF Regimen CP, vic BT2608. This attack was to be supported by a similar move from the north by two battalions of the 5th ARVN Regiment which would conduct RIF operations south toward the suspected enemy CP location. Blocking positions to the west would be occupied by 1-46 and the east by elements of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade, both to be occupied on order based on the rate of movement of the maneuver forces. Coordination and liaison were effected with the 2d ARVN Div and the 5th ARVN Regt prior to the operation. D -day was set as 1 June 1969. B/1-14th Arty placed OPCON to 2-320 Arty and assigned DS mission to 1-46. C/1-14 Arty terminated Brigade OPCON.

31 MAY: Action flared briefly in the AO as the units continued to search for the enemy and 1-502 staged in the field for the combat assaults on the following day. At 1025H, D/1-501 vic BT163115 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned fire and maneuvered against the determined enemy force. The enemy resistance was overcome and 6 NVA KIA were found with D/1-501 suffering 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E).

1 JUNE: The enemy still avoided contact as evidenced by minimum activity throughout the AO. At 1015H, B/1-501, vic BT162111, found two graves containing the remains of 2 NVA KIA by artillery or air. At 1200H, 1st Brigade initiated the operation with the 1-502 conducting combat assaults into SONG TRAM Valley LZ vic BT165005, closing Companies A, B, and C at 1247H. There was negative enemy contact and all elements began RIF operations northeast along separate axes. At 1215H, B/1-501 vic BT164109 observed one enemy hiding in a bunker; the element engaged the bunker with hand grenades killing one VC.

2 JUNE: Activity increased in the AO as the units reported scattered enemy contact with the Aero-Rifle Platoon of B/2-17 Cav becoming decisively engaged by a numerically superior enemy force and being reinforced later in the day by B/1-501. At 0740H, B/1-502, vic BT182996, captured 1 NVA with an AK47 during the conduct of an area sweep. At 0855H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT214123, received ground fire from an enemy soldier; the element returned fire recording 1 VC KIA. At 0915H, A/1-502, vic BT180009, engaged 5 VC with small arms the enemy broke contact and fled leaving behind 1 VC KIA. At 1000H, D/1-502, vic BT180002, found a grave containing 1 VC KBA, and at 1015H, C/1-502, vic BT181001, found one grave with 1 NVA KBA. At 1230H, the Aero-Rifle Platoon, B/2-17 Cav, was inserted into an LZ, vic BT210128 to conducted ground reconnais-sance in the area. The area had been a source of ground fire throughout day with numerous reported incidents. Immediately after moving from the LZ, the platoon came under heavy fire from a well-concealed enemy force. Gunships, ARA and tube artillery were all employed in support. The supporting fires were lifted and the platoon moved forward in the assault. The platoon was met with withering fire that inflicted moderate casualties and pinned down the element. Air and artillery were employed at close range and the decision was made to insert a reaction force to extricate the trapped platoon. At 1440H, a platoon from B/1-501 was inserted into the LZ to link-up and relieve the pressure on the Aero-Rifle Platoon. At 1550H, the C&C, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT202129, was hit by 12.7mm AA fire and forced down, seriously wounding the artillery LO aboard. The crew and aircraft were recovered without further incident. At 1700H, B/1-501 enroute to the relief of the Aero-Rifle Platoon, vic BT202127, engaged an enemy force firing from bunkers. The company quickly returned fire and reduced the enemy bunker accounting for 2 NVA KIA and 3 IWC; the unit suffering 1 US WIA. At 1745H, B/1-501 closed into the LZ thus completing the relief and reinforcement. The situation was stabilized and the Aero Rifle Platoon became OPCON to B/1-501 for the night. The fighting had been extremely bitter through -out the afternoon and the outnumbered platoon had been pinned down a majority of the time from the well concealed and bunkered enemy. The unit had accounted for 6 NVA KIA and 1 IWC and had suffered 5 US KIA and 4 US WIA (E). Else-where in the AO, at 1400H, B/1-46, vic BT205070, engaged an unknown size enemy force with artillery, accounting for 3 NVA KIA.

3 JUNE: The 1st Brigade continued to develop the situation in the area in which the B/2-17 Cav Aero-Rifle Platoon had been in heavy contact the day prior. The 1-501 combat assaulted two more companies into the area, encounter -ing light enemy resistance. At 0900H, D/1-501 conducted a CA into an LZ vic BT203126 and initiated RIF operations to the southeast. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was extracted at the conclusion of the CA. At 0915H, A/1-501 conducted a CA into the same LZ and closed the entire unit at 0931H; the unit then conducted RIF operations to the northeast. At 1240H, B/1-501, vic BT208128, received small arms fire from two enemy soldiers who immediately fled; the element returned fire with negative enemy assessment and suffered 1 US WIA.

4 JUNE: Action increased sharply as the 1-501 continued to search the area. The 1-502 continued RIF to the northeast toward the 5th ARVN Regiment with negligible enemy contact. At 1455H, a HU1H from A/101 AHB vic BT265125 was hit by an unidentified type explosive round from an undisclosed location and crashed, killing all five passengers aboard. The mysterious incident was immediately investigated but the findings were inconclusive. At 1555H, fighting erupted in the 1-501 area as B/1-501, vic BT206124, received heavy small arms and machine gun fire from an unknown size enemy force; B/1-501 returned fire and employed air and artillery against the enemy. Simultaneously, D/1-501 vic BT207123 received mortar and machine gun fire from a concealed enemy force; the element returned fire. The fighting continued throughout the afternoon as both elements attempted to find and fix the well hidden enemy. Contact was broken with no decisive results; B/1-501 accounted for 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC and suffered 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA, while D/1-501 suffered 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA. At 1745H, A/1-502, vic BT210029, tripped an unknown type booby-trap resulting in 2 US WIA.

5 JUNE: Significant contact continued in the 1-501 area as the enemy demonstrated a determination to stay and fight, though elsewhere in the AO, contact was light and sporadic. At 0815H, B/1-46, vic BT217076 engaged one enemy soldier moving east, resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 IWC. At 1400H, B/1-502, vic BT220015, found 1 VC KIA by artillery. At 1530H, D/1-501, vic BT20112, discovered the remains of 1 US KIA during the previous afternoon fighting. While recovering the remains the element was hit by a command detonated mine and began receiving small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force; the element returned fire with negative results. In the fighting, D/1-501 suffered 4 US KIA, all killed by the mine, 1 US MIA and 1 US WIA; the MIA was recovered on 16 June 1969 and reclassified as KIA.

6 JUNE: Activity increased throughout the AO as all units reported enemy contact. At 0950H, B/1-46, vic BT216072, found a grave containing the remains of 1 NVA KIA. At 1020H, A/1-502, vic BT218054, observed two NVA; the point element engaged the enemy force killing 1 NVA, inducing the other to rally to the government cause and capturing one weapon. At 1450H, an aerial observer from C/2-320 Arty, vic BT210152, engaged an enemy 12.7mm AA position with artillery resulting in the destruction of the weapon. At 1650H, D/1-502, vic BT260060, observed and engaged two enemy soldiers, resulting in 1 VC KIA.At 1750H, D/1-501, vic BT202123, received automatic weapons fire from a dug-in position resulting in 2 US WIA.

7 JUNE: Bitter fighting continued in the 1-501 area as all three companies were in significant contact while the 1-46 recorded sporadic contact in its operations to the west. At 0800H, D/-501, vic BT202123 received automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force; the element returned fire, but was pinned down by the volume and accuracy of the fire. A brigade LOH reconnaissance team flew into the area to assist the ground unit and was subjected to heavy ground fire, resulting in one aerial observer being sightly wounded. Contact was broken that morning with D/1-501 suffering 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA during the fighting. At 1035H, C/1-46, vic BT209099, engaged and killed 1 NVA with 1 IWC. At 0450H, B/1-501 vic BT209119 received heavy small arms fire from an enemy bunker position on the side of trail; the element returned fire and maneuvered against the stubborn enemy. During the fighting, B/1-501 lost 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA and accounted for 1 NVA KIA and the capture of an enemy RPG launcher. At 1140H, Recon/1-46, vic BT178860, engaged three enemy soldiers, recording 21 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. At 1250H, D/1-501, vic BT202122, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force in tow locations, suffering 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA; the element returned fire with negative assessment. At 1320 H, A/1-501, vic BT2051<3, received small arms and 82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force; the element returned fire and maneuvered against the enemy force. During the afternoon of fighting A/1 -501 suffered 2 US KIA and 10 US WIA and accounted for 6 NVA KIA and 3 IWC. In the 1-501 area the enemy fought tenaciously against the attacking force; fighting from fortified and prepared positions, the NVA were able to extract a considerable toll from the dogged, yet determined troops of the 1-501 as they methodically drove the enemy from the battlefield.

8 JUNE: Fighting continued into the fifth day in the area of HILL 376 as the 1-501 again met determined enemy resistance while elsewhere in the AO contact was light. At 0345H, A/501, vic BT206124, detected movement outside the unit NDP, and engaged with claymores; the enemy returned RPG fire. A first light sweep confirmed 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. At 0603H, CP/1-46, vic LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT185053), received 10 rounds of 57 RR fire resulting in 3 UW WIA. At 0750H, C/1-46, vic BT203099, observed and engaged a 7 man enemy force, resulting in 1 US WIA and negative enemy assessment. At 1200H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT176993, observed a hut complex and a well used trail network and began receiving small arms fire from the area; the element employed gunships and artillery accounting for 4 VC KIA. Also at 1210H, a and D/1-501, vic BT202123, received small arms, light machinegun and grenade fire from an unknown size enemy force; the element returned fire and employed air and artillery against the enemy. The fighting continued until 1840H with the units accounting for 2 NVA KIA and 1 IWC, while suffering 1 US MIA and 9 US WIA.

9 JUNE: Heavy fighting broke out in the area of HILL 376 as the 1-501 clashed with determined enemy forces throughout the day; elsewhere in the AO, the tempo of activity increased as all units were engaged during the day. At 0900H, B/1-46, vic BT210100, received heavy sniper fire from three enemy, resulting in 2 US KIA and 4 US WIA; the element returned fire and maneuvered against the enemy, pursuing him as he attempted to break contact and flee. The determined element accounted for 3 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. At 0935H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT101029, observed and engaged one enemy soldier, resulting in 1 VC KIA, and again at 1035H, observed and engaged one enemy soldier, result-ing in 1 VC KIA. At 1100H, D/1-46, vic BT217080, found one K44 rifle hidden in the bushes. At 1155H, D/1-502, vic BT202123 engaged one enemy in a tunnel with hand grenades, killing the 1 NVA and capturing his weapon. At 1155H, Recon/1-502, vic BT271075, found 1 VC sleeping in a hammock; when confronted, the VC surrendered and was evacuated. At 1300H, A/1-501, vic BT206121, received 82mm mortar and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA; the element returned fire with negative enemy assessment. At 1410H, D/1-501, vic BT208133, received small arms and mortar fire from a well-hidden enemy force; the element returned fire and maneuvered against thee enemy force employing air and artillery in support. D/1-501 recorded 7 NVA KIA while suffering 1 U.S. KIA and 3 U.S. WIA in the fighting. At 1445H, C/1-501, vic BT202123, after having airmoved into the area some five hours earlier, came under heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA; the element returned fire, but the enemy was able to break contact without apparent casualties. At 1520H, Recon/1-501, vic BT202131, received a heavy volume of accurate small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire that effectively pinned the platoon down; fighting from an untenable position, the element suffered 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA, but continued to return fire and employed air and artillery against the dug-in enemy. Contact was broken with negative enemy assessment. At 1605H, C/1-46, vic BT203099, observed an enemy soldier run into a hut ; the hut was engaged with artillery and the unit accounted for 1 NVA KIA. At 1830H, A/1-501, vic BT204120, found a small arms cache containing 4 AK47, 1 Mauser rifle and 1 RPG launcher. At 2045H, C/2-320 Arty, vic BT188158, received 30 to 40 rounds of 82mm mortar and one round undetermined caliber RR fire, resulting in 2 US WIA and 3 ARVN WIA; element called for counter-mortar fire.

10 JUNE: Activity slackened around HILL 376 as the 1-501 continued to search the battlefield while the 1-46 continued to move north in the direction of HILL 376 to block any enemy forces attempting to withdraw from or reinforce the contact area. At 0620H, Recon/1-502, vic BT272071, engaged and 3 NVA. At 0735H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT184104, observed 1 NVA KIA floating in a creek. At 0900H, A/1-501, vic BT205121, found 1 NVA KIA by artillery. At 1000H, A/1-501,vic BT204119, found two AK47 and another NVA KIA by artillery. At 1053H, C/1-502, vic BT222093, found a grave containing the remains of 1 VC KIA. At 1610H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT153107, observed and destroyed one complete 82mm mortar. While the gunships were destroying the mortar, they received fire from an enemy force; the element called in an airstrike and the BDA revealed 2 NVA KIA. At 1620H, D/1-501, vic BT202124, received 4-5 rounds of sniper fire, lightly wounding 1 US; the element employed artillery accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 1825H, B/1-502 and C/20320 Arty received 8 rounds of 82mm RR fire resulting in 8 US WIA; the element returned fire to the suspected enemy locations with negative assessment.

11 JUNE: Activity decreased in the LAMAR PLAIN AO as the 1-501 continued to search in the area of HILL 376 while 1-46 continued RIF south of the area to interdict any enemy movement to and from the area. At 0340H, C/1-501, vic BT203118, observed one enemy solider moving along a trail; the element engaged the enemy accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 0900H, C/1-46 vic BT191106, observed 10-12 enemy; the element engaged the enemy with artillery, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1015H, B/2-17 CAv, vic BT194105, observed and engaged two enemy soldiers in the open, accounting for 2 NVA KIA. At 1305H, C/1-501, vic BT203112, engaged two enemy with small arms, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 2010H, B/1-501, vic BT207106, engaged two enemy soldiers with small arms, killing one.

12 JUNE: Sporadic activity continued in the AO as 1-501 was extracted from the AO after 9 days of continuous fighting and given security missions within the AO; the 1-46 continued RIF operations toward the 1-501 AO and reported sporadic contact while the 1-502 continued RIF in the eastern portion of the AO in conjunction with the 5th ARVN operations in the area. At 1030H, C/1-46, vic BT166038, engaged three enemy with small arms; the enemy broke contact and fled, leaving 1 VC KIA. At 1205H, C/1-46, vic BT198109, engaged three enemy with small arms, resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 US lightly wounded. C/1-46 continued to encounter small numbers of the enemy throughout the afternoon as they accounted for 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC at 1340H vic BT195104; and 5 minutes and 100 meters later they killed another NVA in a brief fire fight. At 1800H, B/1-502, vic BT211069, tripped an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 2 US WIA.

13 JUNE: The enemy resorted to attacks by fire as the 1-46 continued RIF operations to the north toward HILL 270 (BT19614) and the 1-502 conducted combat assaults into multiple LZ in the SONG TRAM Valley. At 0800H, B/1-46, vic BT207107 received small arms, automatic weapons and 82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force; the element returned fire accounting for 1 NVA KIA and suffering 1 US WIA. At 1000H, B/1-46, in the same area, received a heavy mortar attack of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in 3 US KIA and 25 US WIA; the element returned fire and accounted for 6 NVA KIA in the subsequent fight -ing. At 1045H, a gunship from A/4-77 ARA, vic BT249096, crashed from tail rotor damage resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1135H, A/1-502, vic BT102024, engaged one enemy with small arms resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. At 1150H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT258079, engaged one enemy, listing 1 NVA KIA. At 1555H, B/1-502, vic BT154002, engaged an unknown size enemy force; the element captured one enemy weapon and suffered 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA. At 1830H, a Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT165043, observed and engaged three enemy with ARA, resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 2130H, A/1-502, vic BT106026, captured 1 NVA who walked into the unit NDP.

14 JUNE: Activity decreased in OP LAMAR PLAIN as 1-46 and 1-502 continued RIF operations in the AO. At 1730H, A/1-502, vic BT165093, found two SKS rifles. At 1750H, B/1-502, vic BT147005, engaged 10-15 enemy with small arms, resulting in the capture of 1 NVA. At 2105H, LZ PROFESSIONAL received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar fie, resulting in 1 US KIA and 8 US WIA.

15 JUNE: Activity was light in the AO as the enemy continued to avoid decisive contact despite the aggressive RIF operations in the AO. At 1000H, B/1-502, vic BT153018, found a weapons and ammunition cache containing 2 RPG rocket launchers, four 60mm mortars and 1 AK47 as well as assorted types and quantities of small arms and crew-served weapon ammunition. At 1515H, B/1-46, vic BT196088, engaged one enemy at 50 meters with small arms fire, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1835H, B/1-502, vic BT138998, engaged an unknown size enemy force with tube artillery and ARA, accounting for 2 VC KIA. A verified report was received from the 5th ARVN Regiment that at 1315H, vic BT225123, elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment found 10 NVA KIA by artillery during the fighting with the 1-501 around Hill 376.

16 JUNE: Activity continued to decrease in the AO as 1-46 and 1-502 conducted RIF operations in the area. At 0945H, D/-502, vic BT139028, received a burst of small arms fire from a range of 15-30 meters which wounded 1 US; the element returned fire with negative assessment. At 1730H, A/1-502, vic BT121004, engaged 5-7 enemy with small arms, accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 193 B/1-502, vic BT132995, engaged an enemy soldier who had ignited a trip flare, resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

17 JUNE: Activity was light in LAMAR PLAIN AO. At 1140H, A/1-46, vic BT170097, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA; the element returned fire and employed gunship accounting for 8 NVA KIA. At 1245H, A/1-502, vic BT144021, found the remains of 1 NVA KIA by artillery approximately one week earlier. At 1800H, a Brigade LOH reconnaissance team engaged 2 en soldiers with M-60 machineguns, recording 2 VC KIA.

18 JUNE: Activity continued to decrease as only the 1-502 reported significant activity. At 1230H, D/1-502, vic BT173028, observed and engaged 2 VC in the open, the enemy broke contact and fled south leaving behind 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC.

19 JUNE: The enemy continued to avoid contact as the 1-46 and 1-502 conducted RIF operations in the AO with negligible enemy activity reported. At 0930H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT281083, found a small hut complex and engaged one enemy hiding in a hut; the element engaged the enemy and accounted for 1 VC KIA. At 1105H, the far ranging B/2-17 Cav, vic BT285083, conducting a search of the immediate area confirmed 2 VC KIA.

20 JUNE: The 1st Brigade AO was quiet in the LAMAR PLAIN AO as the enemy avoided contact. 1-502 conducted a CA into vic BT081013 with negative contact and B/2-17 Cav conducted a maintenance standown, significantly limiting the brigade aerial reconnaissance capability.

21 JUNE: Enemy activity increased as the 1-502 reported sporadic contact and B/2-17 Cav conducted a maintenance standown, significantly limiting the brigade aerial reconnaissance capability.

21 JUNE: Enemy activity increased as the 1-502 reported sporadic contact and B/2-17 Cav returned to the air over the LAMAR PLAIN AO with numerous enemy sightings and contacts. At 0730H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT264120, observed three enemy running into a hut; the element engaged the hut with gunships, recording 2 VC KIA. At 0945H, Recon/1-502, vic BT085120, received scattered small arms fire; the element returned fire and captured one AK47 in the ensuing search. At 1009H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT268123, observed two enemy hiding in the river; the element employed artillery and confirmed 2 VC KIA. At 1115H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT269210, observed and engaged one enemy hiding in the bushes, resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1205H, A/1-502, vic BT042018, engaged five enemy with small arms, accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 1745H, Brigade LOH Reconnaissance team, vic BT211102, observed and engaged two enemy soldiers with an M-60 machinegun, killing both. At 1830H, the same team, vic BT202103, observed an engaged on enemy with the Minigun, accounting for 1 VC KIA.

22 JUNE: Ground activity remained light in the AO as the air activity increased proportionately as the aggressive aerial reconnaissance program continued. At 0910H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT268118, engaged and killed 1 VC. At 0920H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT2655113, engaged another enemy soldier and accounted for 1 VC KIA. At 1730H, D/1-502, vic BT087003, found a hospital complex and a search of the area revealed the graves of 10 NVA KIA. At 1800 H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT200053, observed 5 enemy run into a bunker; the element directed ARA into the area and confirmed 1 VC KIA. At 1817H, A/1-46, vic BT135087, found three graves containing the remains of 3 VC KIA.

23 JUNE: Activity was limited in the AO as B/2-17 Cav reported heavy ground fire vic BT2406, and the 1-501 was targeted for that area on the follow -ing day. At 1723H, C/1-502, vic BT152007, found one grave containing the remains of 1 NVA KIA. At 1800H, C/1-502, vic BT152007, found one grave containing the remains of 1 NVA KIA. At 1800H, C/1-502, vic BT152007, had one platoon accidentally fire on another platoon during the search of an enemy bunker complex, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA.

24 JUNE: Enemy contact was again light in the AO as the 1-501 conducted a CA into a highly suspect area and the other battalions continued aggressive RIF operations in their respective areas. At 0901H, elements of the 1-501 began landing, vic BT257083, as the battalion conducted a CA with two companies and the reconnaissance platoon; the LZ was cold and all elements commenced RIF operations in the area. At 1045H, A/1-501, vic BT257083, engaged one enemy with small arms and hand grenades; accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 1130H, A/1-501, vic BT257083 detained 23 VN civilians for evacuation and further interrogation; subsequent questioning confirmed that one detainee was a VC. At 1750H, A/1-46, vic BT139057, engaged and killed 1 NVA. At 1905H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team vic BT203121, engaged two enemy in the open with M-60 machinegun and Minigun fire, killing both enemy.

25 JUNE: The enemy continued to avoid contact as all elements conducted extensive RIF operations in the AO. At 0910H, B/1-502, vic BT047976, found 1 SKS hidden in a hut complex. At 1210H, B/1-502, vic BT041961, detained two VN civilians in the area, and upon interrogation one was determined to be a VC. At 1630H, C/1-46, vic BT184055, found the graves of 5 NVA DBAS. At 1745H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT163097, engaged two enemy hiding in a bunker, killing one.

26 JUNE: Activity was extremely light in the AO as the 1st Brigade elements continued RIF operations with negligible enemy contact and B/2-17 Cav conducted aerial and ground BDA of two B52 strike areas adjacent to the AO. At 0911H, a B52 strike was placed vic AS930975 and at 1125H, a second B52 strike was placed vic AS930955. B/2-17 Cav began extensive aerial recon -naissance and at 1155H inserted the Aero-Rifle Platoon for a ground assessment. The BDA revealed little evidence of enemy damage or casualties, though at 1515H, the Aero-Rifle Platoon, vic AS906969, found 1 AK47. In the AO at 1135H, A/1-46, vic BT152049, received 5-10 rounds of small arms fire.

27 JUNE: Activity remained light throughout the AO as 1-502 conducted multiple combat assaults into the area of the B52 strikes conducted on 26 June At 1100H, C/1-502 conducted a CA into an LZ vic AS955951 with negative enemy contact. At 1400H, D/1-502 conducted a CA into an LZ vic BS017970 with negative contact. At 1455H, B/2-17 Cav vic BT188104, received small arms fire from one enemy; the Cav returned fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1510H, D/1-502, vic AS953933, found one grave containing the remains of 1 VC KIA. At 1835H, B/1-502, vic BS0300961, received small arms fie from a hut; the element returned fire, registering 1 NVA KIA.

28 JUNE: The tempo of enemy activity increased as the 1-502 began to encounter small groups of enemy forces in sporadic contact throughout the day; 1-501 recovered to HOI CHANH and several Vietnamese who had recently escaped from the VC. At 0748H, D/1-502, vic AS937952, found 6 AK47 rifles wrapped in cosmoline and paper. At 0900H, Recon/1-502, vic BT061011, engaged 4-5 enemy and captured 1 AK47. At 0925H, B/1-501, vic BT219068, detained 13 Vietnamese in the area; upon questioning it was determined that two were HOI CHANH and the remaining 11 had recently escaped from the VC. At 1115H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic AS9121954, observed three NVA KIA who had been killed in the B52 strike on 26 June. At 1147H, D/-502, vic AS934956, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 "Kit Carson" scout KIA and 1 US WIA; the enemy returned fire with negative assessment. at 1238H Recon/1-502, vic BT060010, engaged a small enemy force, accounting for 1 NVA KIA. At 1620H, the Command and Control aircraft for 1-502, vic LZ PROFESSIONAL, received small arms fire, forcing the aircraft to land at LZ YOUNG and resulting in 1 US WIA.

29 JUNE: Activity was light in the LAMAR PLAIN AO with the day marked by a sharp clash in the 1-502 AO. At 0835H, D/1-502, vic AS932955, received intensive small arms, machinegun and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force at a range of 75 meters. D Co returned fire and employed gunships and ARA in support. The enemy broke contact and fled, leaving behind 4 NVA KIA and two individual weapons. D Co suffered 2 US KIA and 7 US WIA (E) in the close, intense fighting. At 0955H, B/1-502, vic BS025969, engaged and killed alone enemy soldier. At 1615H, D/1-502,vic AS935956, found and SKS.

30 JUNE: All units continued RIF operations in the AO as activity continued on a minor scale; the enemy was apparently avoiding decisive contact. At 0618H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT222171, received a burst of small arms fire, resulting in slight aircraft damage and 1 US WIA. At 0700H, B/1-46, vic BT149087, engaged two NVA at 100 meters, recording 1 NVA KIA with the second fleeing to the west. At 1215H, the Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic AS997970, observed and engaged three NVA fleeing toward the river, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1324H, D/1-46 conducted a CA, a battalion first, into an LZ vic BT128090, the LZ was cold. At 1415H, D/1-502 observed two NVA swimming in the river; the element engaged the swimmers, killing 1 NVA. At 1705H, C/1-502, vic AS961960, received enemy small arms fire that resulted in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA; the element returned fire with negative assessment. 1 JULY: The 1st Brigade and the 1-502 observed the new fiscal year with the largest cache discovery of Operation LAMAR PLAIN as all units continued extensive RIF operations with light enemy contact. At 1034H, D/1-052, vic AS944955, had their point man engage and wound 1 NVA at a range of 75 meters. the NVA and two weapons were captured and evacuated. At 1204H, C/1-502, vic AS997963, observed and engaged an NVA, and in the ensuing fire fight suffered 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1445H, Recon/1-502, vic AS932955, found 5 huts measuring 15 by 12 feet and containing approximately 10 tons of weapons and munitions to include 29 SKS, 72 AK47, one M-1, three 60mm mortars, thirty -seven 122mm rockets, 13 cases AK47 ammunition, thirteen 75mm RR rounds, 284 RPG rounds, 8 assorted artillery rounds, 10 cases SKS ammunition, 19 cases of blasting caps and numerous mortar fuzes. At 1810H, C/1-502, vic AS975971 found a small lean-to containing two hundred 82mm mortar rounds and 78 RPG rounds.

2 JULY: Activity was light throughout the AO. At 0740H, B/1-46 vic BT152100 detonated an unknown type of boobytrap resulting in 2 US WIA. At 07435H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT212120, engaged an enemy soldier in a hut with white phosphorous and M60 machinegun fire, accounting for 1 VC KIA. At 1020H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic AS9811985, observed and killed 1 VC with organic small arms.

3 JULY: The enemy continued to avoid major contact as all units continued to search for the enemy; the 1-501 conducted multiple CA into LZ to the east of LZ PROFESSIONAL with negative enemy contact. At 0920H, B/1-46, vic BT155099, engaged one NVA moving down a trail, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1045H, D/1-502, vic AS947954, received sporadic sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1047H, C/1-502, vic AS979968, recorded a second sniper incident resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1520H, C/1-502, vic AS993961, engaged 2-3 enemy, recording 1 NVA KIA and 2 IWC.

4 JULY: Activity was light in the AO as the lull in the ground fighting continued. At 1450H, a Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT986942, received heavy ground fire and crashed the aircraft then exploded and burned, resulting in 3 US KIA. At 1650H, Recon/1-501, vic BT227090, tripped a pressure-type mine resulting in 4 US WIA. At 1910, D/1-46, vic BT149087, found the remains of 1 NVA KIA by small arms fire.

5 JULY: The 1st Brigade continued RIF and search in the area with light enemy contact reported. At 0654H, A/1-502, vic BS031953, found a recently abandoned PW compound containing US and NVA clothing, 2 SKS rifles and 1 US 1903 Springfield rifle. At 0925H, D/1-502, vic BT265093, triggered an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 2 US WIA. At 0830H, B/1-46, vic BT164086 found a hut containing 1 US Garand and 1 Russian SMG (NF1). At 1130H, A/1-502, vic BT029950, engaged a three man enemy force at 50 meters, capturing 1 VC and his weapon. At 1220H, D/1-46, vic BT150079, observed movement in a hut; the element engaged the hut and captured 4 detainees and one US M-79 grenade launcher, suffering 1 US lightly wounded.

6 JULY: The tempo of activity was escalated in Operation LAMAR PLAIN with two B52 strikes in the area, followed by a major BDA effort conducted by the 1-501. At 0440H and 0649H, B52 strikes were put in vic BS2399 and BS2698. B/2-17 Cav conducted extensive aerial BDA in the area at first light and received ground fire from several locations. AT 0820H, 1-501 began the BDA by conducting a CA into and LZ vic BT299028 and establishing FSB HUSTLER. At 1301H, two more companies combat assaulted into the B52 strike area for an extensive ground BDA. Elsewhere in the AO, 2-17 Cav continued its aerial BDA. At 0930H, A/1-502, vic BS019946, engaged an unknown sized enemy force result-ing in 1 US KIA. At 1010H, A/1-502, vic BS038948, engaged and killed 1 VC and captured his weapon. At 1335H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BS255966 observed 2 VC KIA by the air strike and, again at 1550H, vic BS255967, a fifth VC KIA was observed. At 1520H, A/1-502, vic AS041963, engaged two VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and the other fleeing to the east. B/101st AHB was placed OPCON to 1st Brigade, replacing A/101st AHB.

7 JULY: Activity was limited to one incident at 1425H when B/2-17 Cav, vic BS282984, engaged and killed 1 VC.

8 JULY: Bitter fighting erupted in the 1st Brigade AO as elements of the 1-502 were engaged by a superior NVA force in the extreme western section of the AO. At 0800H, C/1-46, vic BT266038 observed six enemy and engaged them with air cav elements and artillery, resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1210H, elements of A/1-502 were engaged by an estimated enemy platoon. The lead elements of the company were moving forward by squad bounds when the lead squad came under effective small arms fire from a well concealed enemy force. This squad was immediately reinforced with a second squad and the composite group came under heavier fire as the fight continued. The company minus began to maneuver in an attempt to relieve the beleaguered force in place. At 1400H,radio contact was lost with the trapped force, though the unit continued to fight against the strong NVA force. Supporting air and artillery were employed throughout the area in an attempt to break the determined enemy. At 0910H the following day the company regained contact with the separated force. The entire unit suffered 11 US KIA (1 US KIA was listed as MIA until recovered on 10 Jul 69) and 6 US WIA. Enemy losses were confirmed at 4 VC KIA and 3 IWC.

9 JULY: Activity quieted in the area as the 1-502 linked up with its separated element and assessed the battlefield after the previous day's con-tact; 1-46 reported one minor contact. At 0908H, C/1-46, vic BT283033, engaged one enemy with small arms at 300 meters, recording 1 NVA KIA.

10 JULY: Activity was light throughout the AO as 1-502 reported scattered contact with small enemy forces. At 1040H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic AT09203, observed and killed 1 NVA. At 1100H, B/1-502, vic BS043995, captured 1 NVA who wandered into the company position as it waited near an LZ. At 1145H, a 1/4 ton truck from 2-320 Arty, vic BT293240, detonated a boobytrap near the brigade water point resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1443, D/1-502, vic BS040999, engaged a small enemy force and in the ensuing fire fight suffered 3 US WIA; there was negative enemy assessment. At 1600H, A/1-502, vic BS037991, found a hooch and bunker complex containing two individual weapons.

11 JULY: At 0700H, A/1-502, vic BS042994, found 1 NVA KIA in an earlier fire fight.

12 JULY: There was negative significant contact in the AO.

13 JULY: Activity increased in the AO as the 1-501 reported light contact and a Brigade LOH reconnaissance team recorded significant contact. At 0800H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT084025, engaged 10 VC with the Minigun resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1140H, B/1-501, vic BS258967, observed and engaged 1 enemy recording 1 VC KIA. At 1350H, B/1-501, vic BS258965, found the remains of 1 VC KIA by an earlier airstrike.

14 JULY: Activity was light in the AO as all units continued RIF and search operations, uncovering numerous enemy KIA from previous contacts and air/artillery strikes. At 0824H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BS170979, observed and engaged 4 enemy soldiers with M60 machineguns, resulting in 4 NVA KIA. At 0910H, B/2-17 Cav, in the same area, killed another NVA with a well-placed white phosphorous grenade. At 1000H, Bde LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT284007, observed a platoon of enemy soldiers; the team called in ARA and recorded 1 NVA KIA in earlier air strikes. At 1030H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BS170975, vic BT077021, observed two enemy moving toward their position; allowing the enemy to close, the element engaged and killed the two VC soldiers.

15 JULY: Contact was sporadic throughout LAMAR PLAIN as all units continued to seek the enemy with 1-501 uncovering numerous enemy KIA from earlier air/ artillery strikes. At 0904H, B/1-501, vic BS260972, found the remains of 1 NVA KIA in a grave. At 1100H, D/1-501, vic BS261976, found two small huts, one of which contained the remains of 1 NVA KIA by an earlier air strike and a US Browning automatic rifle. At 1125H, A/1-502, vic BT067013, engaged 1 NVA soldier with small arms, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK47 captured. At 1210H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT262087, observed 4 NA, the element called in an air strike on the fleeing enemy listing 3 NVA KIA. At 1335H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT271075, observed 3 huts with bunkers and a single enemy soldier in the ara; the element engaged the area, destroying the huts and recording 1 VC KIA.

16 JULY: Contact continued light in the AO as 1-501 continued to uncover the effects of the previous intensive air/artillery strikes in the area and 1-502 reported one small clash in the late afternoon. At 1045H, B/1-501, vic BS270975, found a small hut complex containing 1 British SMG (NF1). At 1430H, D/1-501, vic BS270974, found 2 AK47 and 1 Russian SMG (NF1) and other miscellaneous equipment. At 1440H, B/1-501, vic BS280985, found and NVA base camp containing 1 NVA KIA by an airstrike, 3 carbines and miscellaneous weapons parts. At 1905H, A/1-502, vic BT079016, engaged 3 enemy with small arms fire at a range of 50 meters, resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

17 JULY: Activity was light in the 1st Brigade AO as 1-502 began to extract from the AO and assume security missions throughout the Brigade AO for the next 12 days and 1-46 began an aggressive RIF operation to the southwest, south and southeast of LZ PROFESSIONAL. At 0745H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT094014, observed and engaged one enemy recording 1 VC KIA,; at 1015H, the team vic BT215071 recorded a second NVA KIA. At 1110H, D/1-501, vic BS273973, engaged and killed 1 NVA with small arms fire; the element also captured an AK47. At 1326H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT205123, observed and engaged two enemy hiding in a hut, resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1550H, A/1-46, vic BT170059, found two graves with the remains of 2 VC KIA.

18 JULY: Contact was limited to light ground-to-air contact with elements of B/2-17 Cav and the Brigade LOH reconnaissance teams. At 0955H, B/2-17 Cav, vic Bt233117, observed and engaged 6 enemy in the open, resulting in 2 NVA KIA; at 1024H, the Cav, vic BT237118, engaged and killed a single VC. At 1450H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team vic, BT175104, engaged and killed 1 VC with M60 fire.

19 JULY: Contact was limited to light ground-to-air contact with elements of B/20-17 Cav, vic BT233117, observed and engaged 6 enemy in the open, resulting in 2 NVA KIA; at 1024H, the Cav, vic BT237118, engaged and killed a single VC. at 1450H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team vic, BT175104, engaged and killed 1 VC with M60 fire.

20 JULY: Brigade units reported small clashes in the AO as Operation LAMAR PLAIN continued with light enemy contact. At 0705H, B/1-46, vic BT138042, engaged and killed 1 NVA with small arms fire. At 1015H, Brigade LOH recon -naissance team, vic BT76094, engaged one enemy soldier with ARA, recording 1 VC KIA and suffering 1 US WIA. At 1024H, D/1-501, vic BS286996, engaged and enemy soldier at 200 meters, accounting for 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK47 captured. At 1800H, D/1-501, vic BT285014, received small arms and automatic weapons fire that killed the US point man; the element returned fire, but the enemy broke contact with negative assessment.

21 JULY: Activity continued light in the AO as the 1-46 recorded a small contact. At 1130H, C/1-46, vic BT172032, engaged a five man enemy force with small arms fire at a range of 25 meters, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1250H, Recon/1-46 vic BT172061 found two graves with the remains of 2 NVA KIA in an earlier contact. At 1500H, Brigade LOH reconnaissance team, vic BT178104, engaged 1 VC with the Minigun and M60, killing the enemy.

22 JULY: All units continued their current mission with light contact reported. At 1213H, DE/1-501, vic BT281057, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT195110, observed and engaged one enemy soldier, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1805H, A/1-46 vic BT216051 observed 60 enemy soldiers moving in a valley below their position at a range of 2500 meters. ARA was employed resulting in 6 NVA KIA. Cav was also employed but the deteriorating weather and rainfall precluded an accurate assessment.

23 JULY: At 1145H, C/159 ASHB CH47, vic BT170165, received two rounds of small arms fire and one hit, resulting in 1 US lightly wounded. At 1445H, Recon/1-46, vic BT200075, found a single grave containing the remains of 1 VC.

24 JULY: Activity remained light in the LAMAR PLAIN AO as the 1-502 conducted a two company combat assault into the HILL 376 area, the area of heavy fighting in early June. At 0930H, A/1-502, vic BT205125, conducted a CA into a cold LZ and commenced RIF operations in the area; at 0949H, B/1-502 followed A Company into the LZ and commenced supporting RIF operations in the area. At 0935H, D/1 -501, vic BT287043, found the remains of one NVA KIA. At 1243H, A/1-502, vic BT201121, found a grave containing the body of one NVA KBA. At 1605H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BT233116, reported the results of a BDA, listing two NVA KIA by the airstrike. At 1627H, B/1-502, vic BT202124, engaged three VC with small arms fire, killing two VC in the ensuring fire fight. 25 JULY: The 1st Brigade continued Operation LAMAR PLAIN with sporadic contact in the AO and the recovery of the crew of a disabled F4C that crashed in the AO. At 1100H, B/1-46, vic BT168015, engaged a five man enemy force with small arms fire; the enemy broke contact and fled in a disorganized fashion, leaving behind seven SKS carbines and assorted equipment that was captured by the pursuing element. At 1300H, A/1-502, vic BT198116, found the remains of two VC KIA by an earlier air strike. At 1403H, and F4C aircraft conducting an air strike for the 1st Brigade experienced mechanical failure and spun out of control; the crew ejected before impact and were recovered un -injured at 1410H by B/2-17 Cav and 1412H by a USMC recovery CH46.

26 JULY: The 1st Brigade continued to record sporadic contact as all elements conducted extensive RIF operations in the AO. 1-46 conducted a combat assault into a cold LZ with its provisional reserve company (PROSERVCO), composed of the administrative and logistical personnel of the battalion rear. At 0955H, PROSERVCO/1-46 conducted a CA into an LZ, vic BT224055, with negative enemy contact. At 1020H, A/1-502, vic BT196118, found a grave containing one NVA KIA by an air strike. At 1125H, PROSERVCO/1-46 observed and engaged two NVA soldiers at a range of 100 metes, killing one NVA. At 1145H, B/1-502, vic BT207109, engaged and killed one VC at 15 meters. At 1155H, B/101 UH1H, vic BT202124, received small arms fire forcing the aircraft to land; one passenger in the aircraft was WIA. At 1530H, B/2-17 Cav, vic BS105981, engaged a single NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1540H, B/1-502 vic BT2122122, found the remains of 3 NVA KIA by artillery. At 1610H, B/2-17 Cav vic BS105908, found two NVA KIA in an earlier air strike. At 1800H, B/1-502 vic BT219124 found a hut containing one M16.

27 JULY: There was negative ground contact in the AO. At 1115H, a USAF FAC supporting QUANG TIN Province vic BT146109 observed 4 enemy soldiers in the open and engaged them with artillery, resulting in one VC KIA.

28 JULY: At 0840H, vic BT226094, a Brigade reconnaissance team observed and killed one enemy standing in a bunker entrance. At 1100H, vic BT189121, A/1-502 apprehended two VN females and evacuated them as detainees. At 1205H, vic BT218137, a Brigade reconnaissance team engaged one enemy, killing him with M60 MG fire. At 1435H, vic BT207106, B/1-502 discovered hut with bunker, a tunnel and five coops with chickens. Detecting movement, the element reconnoitered by fire which resulted in four women and four children being detained. Two of the women were wounded; medevac was made. At 1725H, vic BT224093, A/1-501 evacuated two males, one female and two children as detailed. One male had napalm burns which were covered with an NVA bandage.

29 JULY: Activity through the AO was characterized by extensive recon- naissance missions, both ground and aerial, which indicated recent activity. A number of bunker and hut complexes were found and various materials and foodstuffs were uncovered; all were destroyed, thereby denying the enemy use of these needed facilities and resources. No contact was recorded.

30 JULY: Reconnaissance activities increased and numerous signs of recent activity and bunker/hut complexes were found. At 0822H, C/1-501 conducted a move by air from CHU LAI Beach to TAM KY Refuel pad for the purpose of constituting a readily deployable RRF. At 0875H, the intensive reconnaissance developed positive enemy action as a LOH from B/2-17 Cav, vic BT155003 was fired upon with 15 AK47 rounds while flying at 40 feet and 40 knots. One round passed through the main beam thereby damaging the aircraft. At 0900H, vic BT165001, a LOH from B/2-17 Cav took a .30 cal round in the transmission caus-ing it to make an emergency landing. A RRF was inserted at 0944H and the air-craft was secured and prepared for evacuation which was accomplished by 1051H. As planned, at 0901H, vic BT234137, C/1-502, conducted a CA and began reconnaissance in force operations to the NE. At 0925H vic BT205125, B/1-502 was extracted from the field, returning to the TAM KY refuel Pad. At 1000H, vic BT213132, a scout dog working with A/1-502 tripped a booby trap; no injuries resulted. At 1025H, vic BT224061, A/1-501 uncovered a grave which contained one male body; cause of death determined to be by air strike four days prior. Some 20 minutes later, while searching the area, the unit found a 68 year old man hiding in a hut. Further search disclosed medical supplies and a grave which contained the body of a female who had been killed by an air strike approximately four days prior. Results: One VC BDA and one detainee. At 1120H, vic BT212008, a scout from B/2-17 Cav observed one enemy moving SW; the enemy was engaged with artillery with no further results. a change in plans diverted Recon/1-46 from RIF operations to LZ PROFESSIONAL. At approximately 1130H, vic BT166003, a LOH from B/2-17 Cav received moderate AK47 and SA fire but no hits were taken. at 1135H, vic BS163995, the Aero- Rifle Platoon found 10-15 large bunkers; at 1158H, 200 meters to the N, the platoon observed and engaged five enemy. Five NVA were killed; one female, obviously wounded, fled to the W. At 1410H, vic BT158002, scout from B/2-17 Cav observed ten large huts. Indications were that this was an exploitable area and the RRF was inserted a approximately 1425H. One female and four children were apprehended and evacuated as detainees. While observing an air strike at 1455AH, vic BS139999, members of Aero-Rifle Platoon, B/2-17 Cav witnessed one body flying through the air as a result of the air strike; results were 1 NVA KBAS. At 1550H, the Aero-Rifle Platoon wa extracted from PZ vic BT155003 and returned to TAM KY airstrip. At 1705H, vic BT215125, Recon/1-502 observed ten enemy moving to S; enemy taken under fire resulting in one VC KIA.

31 JULY: Extensive ground and aerial reconnaissance continued, however, ground contact was light. At 1000H, vic BT168105, D/1-46 located a bunker/ hut complex and apprehended 3 VN males, 9 females and 14 children; person were evacuated as detainees. At 1040H, vic BT213124, Recon/1-502 apprehended and evacuated as a detainee, one VN female approximately 35 to 40 years of age. At 1100H, vic BT227066, B/1-501 detained and evacuated 7 male and 4 female VN persons. At 1105H, vic BT332120, C/1-502 apprehended one male and one female VN; evacuated two detainees. At 1200H, vic BT216115, A/1-502 located 2 VN males, documents and 1500 pounds of salt. The VN were evacuated and the salt destroyed. At 1456H, vic BS140971, scouts from B/2-17 Cav, conducting BDA for air strike, assessed 2 NVA KBAS and four bunkers and five bunkers destroyed. At 1620H, vic BT138010, a B/2-17 Cav LOH received .30 cal and AK47 fire while flying at 40 feet and 40 knots. Four to five rounds were taken in the cockpit, wounding one US and damaging the aircraft.

1 AUGUST: Ground units reported light enemy contact during a day of light activity. At 1720H, vic BT213125, and element of Recon/1-502 engaged and killed 1 VC at 20 meters. Aerial reconnaissance continued with light enemy contact. At 0730H, vic BT266118, a LOH of the Brigade reconnaissance team engaged and kill 3 VC with their M60. At 1125H, vic BS173997, an aerial element of B/2-17 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC. A new operation plan was formulated calling for a two battalion operation to include the SONG TRAM and SONG VANG Valleys. The 1-501 Inf would initially combat assault two companies into the SONG TRAM Valley and one company would air move into an LZ and construct and secure a firebase to be occupied later in the day by A/2-320 Arty. On the following day the 1-502 would combat assault two companies into the west end of the SONG VANG Valley with a mission to conduct RIF operations to the east. Two other companies would combat assault into the east end of the SONG VANG Valley and establish blocking positions on the avenues of escape to the east of the other two companies of the 1-502 and south of the two companies of the 1-501.

2 AUGUST: The new OPLAN was executed as two companies of the 1-501 conducted a combat assault into the SONG TRAM Valley and another began construction of FSB BOXER. LZ were green but, at 1400H, B/1-501 ran into heavy automatic weapons fire vic BS131010. The contact was heavy for a short period as the unit suffered 5 KIA and 3 WIA. Enemy losses were unknown. In other contacts, at 1020H, vic BS116979, an element of A/1-501 found 1 grave with two VC killed by ARA. At 1100H vic BT283102, a Brigade LOH reconnaissance team engaged and killed 1 VC with their M60.

3 AUGUST: Operations continued with light enemy contact as the 1-502 conducted a 4 company combat assault into the SONG VANG Valley complex. All LZ were green but contact was scattered in the AO. At 0915H, vic BS159192, D/1-501 observed and killed 3 VC while suffering 1 WIA. At 11225H, vic BT135013, B/1-501 found a grave with a Chinese body 24 hours old KBA. Also at 1125H, vic AS092918, B/1-502 engaged and killed 1 NVA at 1430H, vic BS146926, D/1-501 found a 19 year old female VC killed by ARA.

4 AUGUST: All units reported light enemy contact as extensive RIF operations continued in the AO. At 0915H, vic BS97923, B/1-502 engaged and killed 1 NVA. At 1205H, vic BS133997, B/1-501 found 2 graves each containing a VC body wearing khakis. At 1410H, vic BT149078, Recon/1-46 engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire killing 1 VC. At 1745H, vic BS125996, B/1-501 engaged 3 VC with ARA and 81mm mortars killing 1 VC. Aerial reconnaissance by the Brigade reconnaissance team and B/2-17 Cav continued with negative enemy contact.

5 AUGUST: Air to ground contact predominated today as aerial missions by Brigade Aircraft netted 1 NVA and 4 VC killed. At 0830H, vic BS061972, B/2-17 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC. At 0945H, vic BS157979, a LOH from Brigade reconnaissance team observed and engaged 1 VC with ARA resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1450H, vic LZ PROFESSIONAL, a LOH from the Brigade reconnaissance team received small arms fire and was forced to land with 2 US WIA 1 VC was also engaged and killed in this action. At 1455H, vic AB098908, B/2-17 Cav observed 1 VC killed by an air strike. At 1430H, vic BT185105, a LOH from the Brigade reconnaissance team received 15 rounds of small arms fire and returned fire with ARA, killing 1 NVA. In ground action at 0700H, vic LZ PROFESSIONAL, a booby trap was detonated by a man from A/1-46 resulting in 1 US wounded. At 1400H, vic BS162982, A/1-501 found 2 assault weapons (9mm French type). At 1630H, vic BS092920, an element of B/1-502 engaged and killed 1 NVA with small arms at approximately 10 meters.

6 AUGUST: Action was highlighted by several small contacts by the 1-502 in the SONG VANG Valley area. At 0930H, vic BS090922, element of B/1-502 engaged and killed 1 NVA with small arms at range of approximately 10 meters. At 1035H, vic BS18872, an element of B/2-17 Cav observed a grave with 2 VC. At 1126H, vic BS162982, D/1-502 found 1 AK47. At 1425H, vic BS092941, an element of A/1-502 engaged and killed 1 NVA with small arms. At 1500H, vic BS092949, C/1-502 engaged 2 NVA with small arms; 1 was killed while the other fled south.

7 AUGUST: Several enemy contacts were reported today including contacts which ensued in the downing of two LOH from the 2-17 Cav. Recovery of the downed LOH resulted in still further enemy contact as the ARP/B/2-17 Cav was inserted to secure the downed aircraft. Contact for the day began at 0840H, vic BS095940, as A/1-502 engaged two NVA with small arms fire at 40 meters resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 weapon captured. At 0930H, vic BT207075, Recon/ 1-46 captured 1 VC with medical supplies. At 1130H, vic AS0849333, an element of A/1-502 found a large hut complex which contained two individual weapons. At 1310H, vic BT269070, one aircraft from B/2-17 Cav received ground fire and went down. ARP/B/2-17 Cav was inserted to secure the area. Two soldiers in the LOH were wounded and evacuated. While on the ground the security force found two SKS rifles. At 1530H, vic BS132969, an element of B/1-502 captured two .51 cal machineguns and uncovered 3 NVA graves. At 1545H, vic BT293066, a LOH from the Brigade reconnaissance team engaged and killed 1 NVA with ARA. At 1700H, vic BT289066, another LOH from B/2-17 Cav was downed by enemy ground fire. The ARP/B/2-17 Cav was again inserted to secure the area. While on the ground the platoon had a sharp engagement with 3 NVA in a bunker. 1 NVA was killed and 2 fled. US casualties were 2 killed and 10 wounded.

8 AUGUST: Activity was very light today as only one minor contact was reported. At 0935H, vic BS182973, D/1-501 found 5 VC bodies killed by artillery. At 1055H, vic BS128968, B/1-501 OPCON to the 1-502 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, suffering 1 wounded.

9 AUGUST: Activity was light in the AO with one contact at 0715H, vic BT206031, as an element of D/1-46 engaged approximately 10 VC dressed in black pajamas. At 1530H, vic BS105931, an element of B/1-502 found 1 grave approximately 2 days old which contained 1 NVA dressed in khakis. Final plans were coordinated to begin the withdrawal of the 1st brigade. The move would be executed using CH47 and UH1H aircraft to extract from the AO and Air Force C130 and Navy LST to move back to CAMP EAGLE.

10 AUGUST: Operations continued with light enemy contact as the Brigade began preparation to move north and rejoin the 101st Abn Div. The 1-501 moved from field locations and firebases by UH1H and CH47 to FSSE at CAMP PAPE to stage for further movement by C130 on 11 August. In ground action, at 0920H, vic BS106947, an element of A/1-502 found a grave with 1 NVA KIA. At 1010H, vic BT225024, an element of D/1-46 engaged 5 to 6 VC at 400 meters with small arms, killing one. At 1415H, vic BT187093, an element of Recon/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NVA at 30 meters.

11 AUGUST: Operation LAMAR PLAIN continued as the first elements of the Brigade departed from TAM KY South to return to the OPCON of the 101st Airborne Division. The last element of the 1-501 Inf departed TAM KY S by C130 at 1340H. In other activities, the 1-502 Inf released two companies to the OPCON of the 1 -46 and extracted two others to FSSE, CAMP PAPE. In the only action reported at 1220H, vic BT128059, an Air Force FAC observed and engaged with ARA several VC in black pajamas, killing one.

12 AUGUST: The 1st Brigade continued to redeploy forces today while encountering light enemy contact. The 1-46 continued RIF operations around LZ PROFESSIONAL. The 1-501 returned OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, upon arrival at CAMP EVANS. In the only contact of the day, at 1015H, vic BT181046, an element of B/1-46 engaged 4 enemy dressed in black pajamas and captured 1 AK47.

13 AUGUST: The 1st Brigade continued OP LAMAR PLAIN with negative enemy contact. The 1-46 continued RIF operations vic LZ PROFESSIONAL; then reverted to OPCON of the 196th Inf Bde at 1200H. The 1-502 moved two companies to FSSE, TAM KY to assume a security mission.

14 AUGUST: The 1st Brigade terminated Op LAMAR PLAIN as the 1-502 and last elements of the Brigade Headquarters departed TAM KY Airstrip by C130. All elements returned to OPCON of the 101st Airborne Division upon arrival at CAMP EAGLE. Operation LAMAR PLAIN officially terminated at 141200H Aug 69.

12. (C) Results:
a. Operation LAMAR PLAIN met with significant success as the enemy in TAM KY province was dealt heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Extensive aerial and ground reconnaissance, in consonance with artillery, both field and ARA, and tactical air denied the enemy a chance to stage and conduct an assault on any size in TAM KY Province during the period of the operation.

b. Enemy losses, categorized as follows:

1. 253 KIA (BC)
2. 69 KBAA (BC)
3. 100 KBA
4. 77 KBAF
5. Captured: 13 VC, 8 NVA, 257 IWC, 25 CSW.

c. Friendly losses:

1. 116 KIA
2. 1 MIA
3. 404 WIA

d. Body-to-weapons ratio (enemy): 1.84 to 1.

e. Enemy-friendly killed ratio: 4.47 to 1.

13. (C) Administration: See Inclosure 3.
14. (C) Logistics: See Inclosure 4.
15. (C) Chemical: See Inclosure 5.
16. (C) Civil Affairs: See Inclosure 6.
17. (C) Psychological Operations: See Inclosure 7.
18. (C) Communications: See Inclosure 8.
19. (C) Engineer: See Inclosure 9.
20. (C) Artillery: See Inclosure 10.
21. (C) Army Aviation: See Inclosure 11.
22. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:
a. The ground transponder (B??CON), used in guiding USMC A6 aircraft, was co-located with and monitored by 1-46 Inf. The effectiveness of the system was marginal primarily due to equipment failure or incorrect frequencies being used. The batteries proved unreliable and became ineffective long before the prescribed battery life. Frequently, the aircraft arrived on station with the wrong frequency, thereby preventing proper and timely air-to-ground communications with consequent mission abort.

b. Skyspot mission were flown throughout the greater portion of the AO but were somewhat restricted by the range capability of the radar site in CHU LAI. There fore, complete skyspot coverage was not possible.

c. Both personnel detector and red haze missions were flown on an almost daily basis, depending on the weather conditions and tactical situation, and both type mission provided invaluable intelligence for the commander's tactical considerations.

d. Sensor devices were extensively employed, especially in the vicinity of LZ PROFESSIONAL. Monitor stations at LZ PROFESSIONAL were able to detect enemy activities and react in a timely manner, thereby significantly improving the security and defense of the fire base.

23. (C) Commander's Analysis:
a. Lessons Learned:

a. Selection of positions:

a. Discussion: In Operation LAMAR PLAIN, the 1st Brigade moved into an area that had been the exclusive territory of the enemy, except for a short -lived operation in the area by FWMF. The terrain was open in spots and afforded good observation from various vantage points in the area, consequently, the enemy was intimately familiar with the area and had all prominent terrain features registered for indirect fire. The enemy understood our preoccupation for the defensible positions and the high ground. This became painfully evident as the brigade suffered numerous casualties from mortar fire, the bulk of which came from first round direct hits, indicative of registered data.

b. Solution: The maneuver elements avoided establishing night defensive positions or temporary security perimeters in the vicinity of prominent terrain features, regardless of how inviting or defensible the terrain appeared. The casualties from mortar fire decreased dramatically.

2. Item: Neutralization of enemy 12.7mm anti-aircraft fires.

a. Discussion: The enemy displayed an impressive arsenal of anti- aircraft weapons in the early stages of Operation LAMAR PLAIN and demonstrated a complete willingness to employ them anytime and against any aircraft. Small arms fire was routine and 12.7mm AA fire was entirely frequent. OB carried 15-20 12.7mm weapons in the AO during this phase of the operation. Realizing the threat that 12.7mm AA posed to sustained airmobile operations, the 1st Brigade gave a special priority to the neutralization and destruction of these weapons. The enemy countered the brigade's intensive effort with an on-again, off-again pattern of 12.7mm AA weapons employment. During the "on-again" day, the weapons were emplaced and firing,. The "off-again": day was quiet as the enemy moved these to alternate positions.

b. Solution: Whenever 12.7mm AA fire was reported all assets were immediately diverted into the area to include tube artillery, gunships, ARA and most effectively, air strikes. The suspect area was literally inundated with ordnance, relying on overkill to destroy or neutralize the 12.7mm AA weapon. The brigade also identified the enemy tactic of on again, off-again and was doubly vigilant on the on-days which further neutralized the enemy's effectiveness. This tactic was particularly effective as the brigade accounted for eleven 12.7mm AA weapons destroyed in the first 22 days of the operation.

3. Item: Control of aviation fire support during contact.

a. Discussion: The 1st Brigade task force configuration enabled the brigade to immediately support units in contact with a sometimes overwhelming collection of fire support agencies. Normally gunships, ARA, air cavalry and air strikes were within minutes of the contact and were on stations on the ground command net with the resulting confusion and control problem.

b. Solution: With the arrival of the aviation fire support in the area of contact, the brigade commander or operations officer immediately designated an air mission commander. Normally this was the ranking aviation unit commander in the area who assumed control and coordination of the aviation fire support assets. The air mission commander directed all supporting agencies to establish radio contact with him on a designated VHF; on this frequency the control of the ARA, gunships and other air support was coordinated with one another. Simultaneously the air mission commander coordinated with the ground commander on FM, thus enabling the ground commander to coordinate his air support with one man, in lieu of trying to talk to everyone on an already coded FM net. Once the type and sequence of support was selected, the appropriate support was employed with the fire support element coming up on FM if required. The air mission commander continually informed the aviation assets with regard to the situation, the priorities of support, the assigned orbit patterns and the safe air corridors exclusive of artillery and mortar support. Thus the air mission commander carefully orchestrated the support to insure maximum utilization with a minimum of the confusion normally associated with numerous fire support elements trying to contact and assist the ground commander. With all elements oriented to this SOP, operations were greatly facilitated and support was logical, continuous and well controlled.

4. Item Brigade Aviation LOH aircraft and ARA as combined visual reconnaissance teams.

a. Discussion: The enemy's willingness and capability to engage friendly aircraft dictated the lightly armed brigade LOH aircraft team, "white team", be augmented to continue its reconnaissance role. Normally, the "white team" would deploy with one LOH conducting tree-top reconnaissance while the second aircraft remained at altitude, marking locations and maintaining cover for the lower LOH. The higher LOH was normally equipped with a minigun and could place effective suppressive fire on isolated areas of ground fire to enable the low LOH to evade the area. The volume of ground fire encountered in the early phases of Operation LAMAR PLAIN severely inhibited the concept of "white team" employment.

b. Solution: Noting the success of the air cavalry's scout combination of a LOH a cobra, the 1st Brigade combined a "white team" with a section of ARA, thus maintaining the reconnaissance ability of the brigade aviation platoon and simultaneously employing ARA in an aggressive role immediately exploiting enemy sightings. The "white team" remained low with one ship at tree top and the second ship trailing and above the first. The ARA section orbited at altitude to support the reconnaissance element when required. This combination was extremely successful throughout the operation and was respons -ible for numerous enemy sightings, several confirmed enemy kills, innumerable hooches and bunkers destroyed and other reconnaissance activities.

b. Commander's Notes: None

Recommendations: None. 11 Incl FRANK L. DIETRICH
1 - Intelligence Colonel, Infantry
2 - Not used Commanding
3 - Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Chemical
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Psychological Operations
8 - Communications
9 - Engineer
10 - Artillery
11 - Army Aviation

1. (C) Terrain: Terrain analysis of the area bounded by AT9115-BT3015 -BS3090-AS1190. The area is bordered on the west by the Song Tranh River (AT9215-AS9196) and on the south by the Song Vang River (AS9797-BS0994) and its tributaries, the Song Truong (BS0994-BS1294) and Song Ca Da (BS0994-BS0890) and Song Cha Nang (BS1094-BS1690). Two rivers, the Song Tram (BT1212-BS1899) and the Song Bong Mieu (BT1710-BT2603) interdict the area north to south.
a. Relief: The terrain south and west of the Song Tram is rugged and step with elevations up to 593 meters and slopes of 15-40%. Two east-west valleys (vic AT9511-BT1206 and BS9796-BT120) divide the area and consist of gentle rolling errain. East and north, between the Song Tram and Song Bong Mieu is rugged mountainous ter-rain with elevations up to 593 meters, and slopes from 10-40% split by a valley of rolling hills between the 07 and 08 (E-W) grid lines. The area to the north and east of the Song Bong Mieu is characterized by gentle rolling hills with occasional high points reaching up to 376 meters. In contrast, the terrain to the south consists of mountains with elevations beyond 800 meters interdicted by many intermittent streams. Along the Song Tranh to the west, the terrain is generally steep with slopes up to 50% and elevations in excess of 300 meters. The area south of the Song Vang is characterized by steep mountains with elevations up to 1357 meters and slopes up to 50%.
b. Vegetation: The vegetation covering the mountains consists of multi -pied, dense undergrowth forest characterized by thick, semi-closed canopy of species with generally dense undergrowth of bushes and inter-tangled vines. areas in the mountains have been cleared by civilians and military personnel who have been in the area, leaving sparse patches of low grass and wild crops. The Valleys are characterized by large open areas covered with small scrubs and cultivated fields of corn, vegetables and rice often flooded with water. Hedgerows divide fields, many of which are overgrown from lack of activity in the area. Hills bordering the valley floors are covered with tall grass and scattered trees.
c. Observation and Fields of Fire: Generally the dense undergrowth and thick forest found on the high terrain greatly restricts observation and fields of fire, with only scattered cleared areas and trails offering any relief from the vegetation. In contrast, the large open valley floors with the cultivated fields afford the best observation and fields of fire, although the hedgerows and numerous man-made structures scattered about the area do hinder surveillance to some extent. Additionally restricting observation are the thick areas of tall grass located in the area and the small gorges located along streams in the area.
d. Cover and Concealment: The high terrain combined with the dense vegetation offer good cover from flat trajectory weapons and excellent concealment from group observation, while providing only limited cover and concealment from aircraft. Exceptional cover and concealment is provided by numerous hootches, bunkers, tunnels and other fortified positions the enemy has constructed. These ar especially effective against aerial observation and engagement.
e. Obstacles: The steep mountains with accompanying dense undergrowth restricts foot movement and canalizes it along the well used trails that are located through out the area. The dense jungle precludes the use of any type of vehicle. Although the valleys can accommodate vehicles with negligible difficulty, they cannot be used as they are not wide enough to allow for proper dispersion. The only obstacles encountered along the valley floors are the thick, high grass areas and the numerous structures which (because of their fortification and protection from observation) would require the units to employ extensive and time consuming pre- cautionary measures to include a thorough search of all structures. All main rivers and, to a large extent, most streams in the area can be used as routes of movement both by boat and foot. With very few exceptions, most rivers and streams are easily fordable and in no way hinder troop movement.

f. Key Terrain:

1. LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT173077) controls the E-W valley between the Song Tram and Song Bong Mieu.

2. Tien Phouc (BT117140) with its outposts controls the Song Khang and the junction of the Song TRam and Song Bong Miewu.

3. New Hau Duc (BT073064 controls the eastern end of the valley vic AT9511-BT1206.

4. Old Hau Duc (BS024978) controls the southern end of the N-S valley leading to New Hau Duc.

5. FSB HUSTLER (BT295030) as location of logistical support, fire port and control of operations in the southeastern area of the AO.

6. FSB YOUNG (BT188157) controls the Tien Phuoc-Tam Ky Road.

7. FSB BOXER (BS112976) location of logistical support, fire support and control of operations in the southwestern area of the AO.

g. Avenues of Approach:

1. Tam Ky-Tien Phuoc Road (BT1113-BT3020) 2. Song Tram River
3. Song Bong Mieu River
4. Song Khang River
5. Song Vang River
6. Song Tranh River
7. Road from Tha Bon (AT9511) to Song Sen (BT2207)
8. Road from Old Hau Duc (BS0297) to Huong Lam (BT0705)
9. Valley from Phu Than (BT0501) to the Song Tram (BT1202) 10. Valley along the Song Ca Da to the southwest (BS06900BS0992)
11. An extensive trail network throughout the hills and mountains of the area.

Weather: Weather during the operation was generally excellent and typical of the south -west monsoon. Skies were fair to partly cloudy in the morning and early afternoon; mostly cloudy with isolated thundershowers in the late afternoon, clearing in the evenings. Thundershowers occurred mostly over the mountains. Visibility remained unrestricted except during thundershowers. Shallow fog formed in the valleys in the early morning hours burning off by 0900H. Winds were light and variable during the night and early morning hours, blowing out of the south at 8-10 knots. During the day, on 10-11 July with the passing of a typhoon to the east of the area of operations, visibility and ceilings were lowered, hindering air operations. At 1st Bde Hqs, 4.31 inches of rain fell during this period hindering ground operations and reducing mobility throughout the area.

3. (C) Enemy Activities:
a. Enemy Situation and Order of Battle at the Start of Action: Enemy units in the area of operations at the start of Operation LAMAR PLAIN had completed supply and retraining activities and appeared prepared for sustained offensive activities. Primary targets were population centers such as the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp (BT1114) and Tam Ky City (BT3022) which is the capital of Quang Tin (P). Tam Ky City was threatened by one enemy regiment, one provincial infantry battalion, one provincial sapper battalion and three local force companies. The Tien Phouc USSF/CIDG Camp and the surrounding areas were threatened by two regiments, one Province force infantry battalion and two local force companies. LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT1707) was in the early stages of a siege. Air-craft carrying supplies and ammunition into LZ PROFESSIONAL were receiving heavy ground fire consisting of .50 cal and small arms fie. On 15 May 69, a CH -47 was hit with .50 cal fire causing it to crash and burn on the logistics pad of LZ PROFESSIONAL. LZ PROFESSIONAL was subjected to enemy harass ing fire daily, consisting of 60mm and 82mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle fire and .50 cal and .30 cal machine gun fire. Friendly ground units from the 1st Bn, 46th Inf had been in heavy contact with enemy units in the area and had been forced to withdraw to the area around LZ PROFESSIONAL. The enemy's disposition and strength at the beginning of Operation LAMAR PLAIN were as follows:

UNIT
LOCATION
STRENGTH
1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div
BT2611
1035
Regt Hqs
BT2611
325
40th Bn
BT2611
250
60th Bn
BT2611
250
90th Bn
BT2611
210
3rd NVA Regt, 2nd NVA Div
BT1301
800
Regt Hqs
BT1301
250
1st Bn
BT1118
150
2nd Bn
BT1310
200
3rd Bn
BT1301
200
90th MF Bn
BT2513
100
72nd LF Bn
BT2520
250
74th MF Bn
BT1718
350

UNIT
LOCATION
STRENGTH
78th Rkt Bn
BT3601
350
409th Sapper Bn
BT3508
250
V-16th Sapper Bn
BT1632
165
C-7 Co
BT1610
70
74th Co
BT3606
50

b. Description of Enemy Activities During the Operation: Initially, Operation LAMAR PLAN was characterized by heavy contact with the enemy conducting a sustained offensive operation against LZ PROFESSIONAL. The enemy was well trained, well supplied and, as a result of previous successful operations in the area, highly motivated. The extent of his offensive capabilities was indi-cated by the large number of ground to air contact reported during the early stages of the operation. Ordnance encountered included .50 cal, 75mm RR, 82mm and 60mm mortars, .30 cal and numerous automatic small arms. Following contact with the 1st Bn, 501st Inf. near Ban Quan (BT2012) during the early part of June in which they took heavy casualties, the enemy began to conduct defensive operations. Confrontation with friendly forces was made only from heavily fortified defensive positions normally consisting of mutually supporting concrete bunkers with 2-3 feet of over head cover reinforced by numerous fighting positions and spider holes connected in a tunnel network. The enemy suffered heavy losses due to artillery, air strikes, aerial rocket artillery, causi ng him to disperse into small groups which avoided contact with friendly forces except when they could be assured success. Throughout the operation, the enemy withdrew to the southeast, southwest and west in order to reorganize, resupply and retrain. Confrontation with US forces, especially in large numbers, was avoided unless the enemy was numerically superior and relatively sure of victory.

c. Enemy Situation and Order of Battle at Conclusion of Operation: At the close of the Operation, there were indications that the enemy was pre -paring for a large offensive to be conducted in conjunction with a country-wide enemy offensive. Agent reports, document readouts and interrogation reports veri-fied the drafting of citizens to transport foodstuffs and equipment for the enemy. In addition, the enemy conducted intense psychological operations in order to gain the support of the populace by inferring that the Allied Forces had been defeated and were withdrawing their forces. Sporadic contacts with squad size or less enemy forces were reported during the latter phase of the operation. During the week pre-ceding the departure of the 1st Brigade, numerous incidents of intense enemy mortar and rockets against friendly units in Quang Tin (P) were reported, although only one attack consisting of 3x122mm rockets was reported in the 1st Brigade AO. The enemy disposition and strengths at the close of the operation were as follows:

UNIT
LOCATION
STRENGTH
2nd NVA Regt
BT1598
520
GK35 NVA Sapper/Recon Bn
BT1108
120
GK37 NVA Transportation Bn
BT1598
200
GK38 NVA Medical Bn
BT1598
200
74th MF Bn
BT1911
250
V-16 LF Sapper Bn
BT2011
165
C-7 LF Co
BT1712
50
V-18 LF Co
BT2415
100

4. (C) Intelligence Operations:

a. SLAR: Missions were flown nightly during the operation with marginal success primarily because results were usually received several hours after the mission, thus rendering the information of little value.

b. Photo Readouts: Photo readouts were used during the operation for planning and served as valuable intelligence sources. Possible enemy positions exposed by aerial photographs were normally engaged with artillery and/or air strikes. In addition, were taken of all Fire Support Bases in the area of operation which aided in planning the defense of the bases.

c. Red Haze: Red Haze missions were also flown throughout the operation. ?ings from Red Haze were inconclusive and of minimal intelligence value due to the large number of civilians scattered throughout the area of operations. Civilians inhibited free fire areas and reconnaissance zones, thus rendering Red Haze results unreliable as to the actual number of enemy heat emissions in the area. The results were used to some extent in planning and served as H & I intelligence targets.

d. Agent Reports: Agent Reports were received continually during the operation. In addition to normal distribution of USARV intelligence reports, the Americal Div-ision issued timely agent reports received from both ARVN and SF sources. Although highly evaluated as to reliability and probability, they served to reinforce the intelligence gathered by organic units in the field.

e. APD (Airborne Personnel Detector): APD missions were also flown during the operation with minimal success due to the large concentration of personnel throughout the area of operations and the many civilians still living in the free fire zones. As a result, conclusive readings concerning enemy strength and disposition could not be determined by this means of detection.

f. Visual Reconnaissance:

1. White Teams, consisting of two LOH's, one armed with a mini-gun, and two ARA gunships, achieved excellent results during the operation. Normally three missions were flown daily; one in the morning, one in the afternoon and one at last light. Additional missions were flown as the tactical situation demanded. Flying both in direct support for the battalions and reconnoitering in the brigade reconnaissance zones, White Teams were able to pinpoint enemy base areas and troop concentrations which added in planning and provided for more effective employment of brigade resources. Often, White Teams directed the destruction of enemy structures which enabled other supporting elements to be utilized elsewhere. In addition to marking ARA, artillery and air strikes targets, White Teams engaged targets of opportunity. It is believed that these missions had a profound effect on the enemy. During the operation, White Team LOH's accounted for 27 enemy killed.

2. "B" Troop, 2nd Sqdn, 17th CAV, also provided excellent aerial reconnaissance support. Employing organic aircraft organized as a Cavalry Team consisting 1-5 one LOH armed with a mini-gun and two AH-1H gunships, B Troop was assigned mission by the brigade S2 Section. If a reconnaissance mission proved to be especially fruitful or the aircraft were engaged by ground fire, the aerial rifle platoon ("BLUES") assigned to B Troop, were inserted into the area to develop the situation. "Blues" were also deployed to secure downed aircraft and for assessment of areas engaged by air strikes, ARA and artillery. they were also inserted to assess the results of ARC LIGHTS and to exploit the results. B Troop, 2nd Sqdn, 17th CAV accounted for 61 enemy killed during the operation while the "Blues" killed 10 additional enemy.

3. Aerial reconnaissance missions were also flown by commanders at all levels. Intelligence gathered during these mission was usually disseminated immediately from the commander in the air to his subordinate units on the ground. This facilitated timely reaction to "hard" intelligence while enabling the commander to have first hand knowledge of the situation.

g. Interrogation of Prisoners of War: The IPW Section from the 101st Military Intelligence Detachment deployed with the 1st Brigade to Tam Ky. During the operation, 1,277 detainees were classified with 1,180 being innocent civilians, 94 were civil defendants and 3 were classified returnees. In addition, over 389 pounds of documents were received and initial readouts made. The IPW Section also interned 18 of the 21 PW's captured during the operation.

h. Counterintelligence: The Counterintelligence Section, consisting of two specialists from the Counterintelligence Section of the 101st Military Intelligence Detachment, also deployed with the 1st Brigade. Seven incidents of possible sabotage were investigated by the CI Section during the operation. In addition, the team conducted a counterintelligence survey of the physical security of Tam Ky N? and conducted investigations in conjunction with SOI extracts.

1. (C) Unit Strengths as indicated: Strengths as of 15 May 1969
OFF
WO
EM
HHC, Bde
26
13
185
1-501
28
0
469
1-502
33
0
454

Strengths as of 15 June 1969

OFF
WO
EM
HHC, Bde
32
18
207
1-501
30
0
518
1-502
37
1
668

Strengths as of 15 July 1969

OFF
WO
EM
HHC, Bde
32
18
195
1-501
25
0
537
1-502
31
0
498

Strengths as of 15 May 1969

OFF
WO
EM
1-327
40
1
796
2-327
39
2
748
2-502
42
2
742

Strengths as of 15 June 1969

OFF
WO
EM
1-327
36
1
742
2-327
39
2
732
2-502
44
2
665

Strengths as of 15 July 1969

OFF
WO
EM
1-327
34
3
735
2-327
30
2
735
2-327
669
2-502
36
2
698

2. (C) Other Aspects:
a. AG Functions

1. Personnel Services: A continuing problem existed in strength accountability due to the physical separation of the forward units and the Division AG in BIEN HOA which actually prepares the morning report (DA Form 1). A system of assigning all personnel, E-1 through E-6, to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of a battalion for further assignment to rifle companies has greatly reduced the number of personnel actions necessary to insure the individual is properly assigned and that his records reflect that assignment.

b. PMO - Military Police supported the Brigade by investigating traffic accidents and incidents involving Brigade personnel. The Military Police also operated three sentry gate posts for control of personnel and traffic and provided prisoner of war collecting points. The prisoner of war collection point processed 799 personnel; categorized as follows:

VC
10
NVA
6
Civilian Detainees
61
Innocent Civilians
278
HOI CHANH
3
Detainees
2
Children
439

c. Finance - A list was compiled of all individuals not paid for the month of June with the necessary data for each pay complaint and submitted to Division Finance Office at CAMP EAGLE. The Finance Officer from CAMP EAGLE came to TAM KY with money to pay all personnel who had pay due.

e. Chaplain - Protestant coverage for the Brigade was provided by the two protestant chaplains assigned to the Brigade. Catholic coverage was initially provided by the Brigade Catholic Chaplain and, upon his departure, was provided by the 2d Brigade Catholic Chaplain and a Catholic Chaplain from the Americal Division.

c. Finance - A list was compiled of all individuals not paid for the month of June with the necessary data for each pay complaint and submitted to Division Finance Office at CAMP EAGLE. The Finance Officer from CAMP EAGLE came to TAM KY with money to pay all personnel who had pay due.

e. Chaplain - Protestant coverage for the Brigade was provided by the two protestant chaplains assigned to the Brigade. Catholic coverage was initially provided by the Brigade Catholic Chaplain and, upon his departure, was provided by the 2d Brigade Catholic Chaplain and a Catholic Chaplain from the Americal Division.

1. (C) Transportation:
a. Air Movement. The Brigade was redeployed from locations in the Thua Thien Province commencing 15 May 1969. A total of sixty-nine (69) C-130 sorties, one (1) LST, and three (3) days were required to move all elements of the Brigade to Tam Ky and Chu Lai. Initial plans called for the 1-501st Infantry to have a four (4) hour stand down at Hue-Phu Bai, and then be the first unit lifted out, followed closely by one (1) battery of the 2-320th Arty. Due to the simultaneous extraction of two (2) Infantry battalions, one scheduled for Phu Bai and the second for Camp Eagle, there was some initial confusion resulting in a few CH-47 loads being discharged at Camp Eagle that should have been brought to Phu Bai. Scheduling a stand down and processing for air movement was too much activity to accomplish in the time allotted. Accordingly, the first flight out was deployed one (1) hour and fifty (50) minutes. Midway through the first day procedures were improved and streamlined and the move was accomplished with more efficiency. Loading plans were useful to establish priorities, however to utilize the maximum capacity of aircraft frequently require cross-loading of different units and/or material on the same aircraft. The unit Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) consisted of the Brigade S4 who set all priorities and exercised control over Army elements and coordinated with the Air Force ALCE and combat loading team (??AF) An augmentation to the unit DACG from DISCOM of 1 NCO was provided. Additional communications equipment is needed in order to communicate between DACG and AACG (Arrival Airfield Control Group). This can best be accomplished through an augmentation by DISCOM of an ANGRC 106 at the DACG and the Bde ANGRC 106 at the AACG. In addition unit S4 officers must be programmed to depart on the last air-craft of their unit in order to provide assistance in control

1. Subsequent air transportation was provided by two (2) C-123 aircraft per day. Except for one or two instances this was quite adequate. Scheduling, how -ever, remained a problem and caused lost man hours by person waiting up to four (4) hours for a flight. Follow-up efforts through ALO channels improved the situation only slightly.

2. Air resupply within the area of operations was provided by 16th Aviation Group UH-1H and CH-47 aircraft. The service and support provided by aviation personnel was outstanding. Every effort was made to reduce "blade time" of all aircraft involved in aerial resupply. Forward supply points, forward refuel points, forward refuel points, and the move of an OPCON Americal Division battalion supply operation from Chu Lai to Camp Pape were instituted for this purpose.

b. Ground transportation: Organic vehicles in the airmobile TO&E are in-adequate for semi-independent operations. Due to distances involved bulk resupply was accomplished by surface transportation. Americal Division provided the majority of trucks; however, internal supply, movement of troops, trash collection, and general purpose requirements need to be supplemented by a ? truck company.

c. Sea movement: the 1st FSSE deployed from the Tan My docks to Chu Lai using one (1) LST. Because of the heavy tonnage and outsized loads, such as Fork-lifts, wreckers, ets., air movement could not be employed. The entire move to include loading and unloading required eighteen (18) hours and caused the 1st FSSE to be operational by the time the combat elements had completed their move.

e. Future movement plans: Plans for future moves have been developed to include all contingencies such as total air, combination air and sea, and air and land convoy. The most efficient plan calls for combat elements plus command and control vehicles to move by air estimating thirty-two (32) C-130 sorties and the remainder moving by sea estimating a minimum of three (3) LST loads.

2. (C) Concept of Supply:
a. Supply operation differed from previous routines in two ways, One, all requests for supplies and services were re?t ??????????second, the operation of an ASP and aviation POL points by ???????. All classes of supply were requisitioned through Americal Division ??????? non-common TO&E items were requisitioned through 101st Airborne Division???. Who 1st FSSE stocked a minimum of five (5) days Class I and three ??? days Class III and Class V. Units other than the 1st FSSE were prohibited from dealing directly with the DSO which resulted in a smoother operation reduced "double ordering", and maximized the utilization of available transportation.
b. Movement of supplies to firebases was done by CH-47 and UH-1H aircraft.
CH-47 sorties were allocated to the 1st FSSE which handled bulk resupply to battalions while UH-1H sorties were allocated to the using battalions under the coordinated control o the S3 and S4.

c. Battalion S4's were co-located with the 1st FSSE as were maintenance facilities.

3. Material and Services: a. Supply:

1. Class I. Units were fed C rations for the first two (2) weeks prior to the establishment of the semi-permanent base area, Camp Pape. Due to lack of refrigerated transportation and storage, there was an unacceptable degree of spoilage of rations. Rations were shipped from Chu Lai, 35 miles distance, by one (1) refrigerated van for the entire brigade. The one truck was insufficient to carry all of the menu, therefore, issues of fresh vegetables were kept to a minimum. Little consideration was given to the site selection for mess halls. Three (3) out of five (5) messes were established in the lower elevations of their unit's area. Infrequent but heavy rain showers made proper se??? pits and general sanitation measures inadequate. Future quartering parties should include a food service representative, preferably the Brigade Food Service Warrant Officer to coordinate the location of unit messes and insure the mess halls are not situated incorrectly with relationship to other facilities.

2. Class II and IV. All requests for Class II were routed through Americal Division DSO. While very responsive in the majority of cases, items that were not common to airmobile TO&E could not be obtained as they were not in stock; nor were depots on which Americal Division placed demands set up to handle airmobile items. Delays in receipt of repair parts and replacement components were common. Combat losses took and average of two (2) weeks to replace. Due to rapid deploy -ment and the original expectation of remaining (2) weeks, minimal TO&E equip-ment, except combat gear, was brought. DISCOM, 101st Airborne Division, and Americal Division were successful in obtaining sufficient tents after three (3) weeks. Specialty items were found to be more useful in this AO than previously thought. Flame throwers and 90mm recoilless rifles were required during early phases of the operation. The 90mm recoilless rifles were brought from the rear area; however, flame throwers had previously been turned in as not required, necessitating issue from Americal Division. There are many items of TO&E equipment not required when in a permanent base camp and other items that are of little use in certain types of terrain. The airmobile organization makes possible the rapid deployment into wide areas and environmental areas, thus all equipment should be readily available to meet contingent needs. It is recommended that weapons, weapons systems, and other items needed to establish a new base camp or operate in a new AO be retained or pooled by DSO to insure more rapid availability when needed. This should be done by the parent Division rather than expect the recipient Division to support an additional brigade out of available resources. Also, the 1st FSSE moved without its ASL which caused extensive delays in routine resupply. Approximately ten (10) CONEX containers will hold the ASL and would have enabled the 1st FSSE to establish full operations immediately upon arrival. Class IV. The large amounts of barrier material required to establish a brigade size CP area, FSSE, and battalion rear areas, plus fire bases temporarily exhausted Americal Division's resources. In addition, the difference in concept of TOC and bunker construction between Americal Division and 101st Airborne Division caused initial questions about quantities and delays in ?? of required material. Most of the delays were caused by a lack of supplies ??? Americal Division and insufficient transportation to meet all requirements. /?? commanded that depot priorities be shifted concurrent with the move ?? brigade size unit to expedite the flow of supplies, and an additional ?? truck company be provided on a full time basis to support a brigade. The 1st Brigade was able to provide a list of demands for establishing the CP and rear areas after 24 hours. The ex -perience thus gained has resulted in a consolidated list that is appended to loading plans of the 1st FSSE to preclude any future delay.

3. Class III. An aviation POL point was established adjacent to the Brigade CP, co-located with an Americal Division air cavalry unit. A total capacity of 80,000 gallons of JP4 was reached within two (2) weeks. Extensive engineer effort to build up berms and construct barbed wire fence around not only the POL area but the entire CP and FSSE complex, capable of handling up to 02 Air Force planes and two (2) air cavalry troops was needed. Constant supervision and checking of the JP4 resulted in continuous operation and no contamination of fuel. Even with the close proximity to the CP, the number of personnel available for guard was insuf -ficient. Air cavalry troops have insufficient personnel to maintain the desired level of security posts. An augmentation of ten (10) additional men is necessary. To further clarify the requirement both air cavalry troops returned to Chu Lai in the evening because maintenance facilities were far superior there. ??eri??? ment. Since these points were in operation only a few days it was not determined if any problems would have been encountered over grater periods of time. Average time to set up and begin refuel operations is ten (10) minutes.

4. Class V. One of the unique aspects of Operation LAMAR PLAIN was the operation of a complete ASP by the 1st FSSE. All munitions were received, issued, and stored by the Class V section. Several lessons were learned pertaining to site selection and construction of an ASP. Hastily established, the ?? ??? had to be expanded as more items were added. During infrequent but heavy rain storms the point became extremely difficult to operate. Continuous efforts by A Company 326th Engineer Battalion raised the level of the point and provided better drain-age, however, lack of proper engineer equipment resulted in an uncompleted job. Routine functions of the point were smooth, accountability excellent, and control of allocated and suspended items better than average. Class V allocations for 2.75 inch rockets were critically low throughout the period. Close management by all concerned, plus re-orientation of aviation units from rockets to other weapons systems resulted in rockets being available for hard targets. During the month of June an additional allocation of rockets was transferred from 101st Airborne Division to Americal Division for use by the 1st Brigade. Repair kits for claymore mines, wire and blasting caps only, were received resulting in a two thirds (2/3) reduction in turn-in of the mines. Future operations must include space for expansion of physical facilities, hard surface pads, proper drainage, and distance from friendly troops to meet minimum safety requirements.

b. Services:

1. Maintenance. Field level maintenance was provided by Company, 801st Maintenance Battalion, the DS unit normally supporting the 1st Brigade. ?SL ?? were brought from Camp Eagle as part of the unit move and replacements were ? be requested through 723rd Maintenance Battalion, Americal Division. ??? the operation the bulk of repair parts continued to be provided by HQS, 801st Maintenance Battalion, particularly major assemblies. Support for signal and artillery repair parts from 723rd Maintenance Battalion was good. ?ale parts (tires, tubes, magnetos, and starters) and the Case M450 Mini-dozer parts, ?ota airmobile items, were critical resulting in extended periods of down time and lack of equipment for essential jobs. Organizational maintenance for the infantry units was good. The artillery, military police, engineers, support and service, radio research unit, and signal units did not bring maintenance personnel with them requiring the 1st Brigademotor pool to provide organizational maintenance. ???? ??? the resources of the motor pool. Ancillary units must bring one mechanic to provide support, these individuals would then be placed for duty with the HHC. Frequent use of road side spot check teams consisting of two (2) maintenance men and one (1) MP provided the tool necessary to check on unit maintenance. User maintenance showed a definite improvement with command interest being expressed. The Brigade HHC motor pool requires more knowledge and supervision than can be expected from an E5 motor sergeant. The authorized vehicles for a HHC is 17-1/4 ton, 8-3/4 ton, 6-1/2 ton platform, 1-2 1/2 ton plus support to units habitually attached to the headquarters such as Combat Tracker Team, and Scout Dog platoon, an additional 2-1/2 ton, 4-3/4 ton, 4-2/1/2 ton bringing the total vehicles assigned for maintenance to 42. In comparison an Infantry battalion with a total of 50 vehicles is authorized an E6 motor sergeant and a maintenance technical MOS 631A.

2. Medical Service. The use of medevac helicopters taking patients directly to hospitals from the field with the resulting reduction in triage makes it apparent that the Brigade aid station provided by A Company 326th Medical Battalion can be reduced in size and staffing. The ability to handle emergencies and routine sick call is sufficient.

4. Base Development: Base development and perimeter defense are habitually the responsibility of the S4 in this Brigade. One complements the other, therefore they are discussed jointly. Berms, protective wire, and bunkers were ??? within three (3) days and continuously improved. Due to limited facilities the perimeter defense duty officer (PDO) was placed in the TOC with the side benefit of coordination directly with the S3 duty officer and artillery liaison officer. Communications from the PDO to the five (5) sectors was by land line and radio, however, a shortage of TA-312 phones precluded bunker to bunker or even ??? -sector communications. A separate TOA for equipment is needed to operate an effec-tive defense network, primarily communications equipment. Minimum essentials are radios, switchboard, telephones, and at least one RC-292 antenna. These items should be considered installation property but with authority to deploy with the responsible unit. Base development was slow because of lack of equipment and supplies, both previously discussed. The site selected for the ?ase c?re and rear areas was well chosen in every respect except drainage. Being rice paddy land, any rain stayed within the confines of the camp. Concrete floors were poured for the S1/4 tent, S2/3 tent and one floor for each mess hall, the APO, and hospital.

Inclosure 5 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) Mission: Chemical combat support activities conducted in support of Operation LAMAR PLAIN were provided by Americal Division Chemical and the Brigade Chemical Officer, which consisted of the following: a. Employment of airborne personnel detector (APD) in an intelligence gathering role.

b. Conduct of classes on safety, servicing and firing of portable flame thrower.

c. Preparation of fougasse to be used in perimeter defense in the rear areas and the Brigade CP perimeter and fire support bases.

d. Chemical equipment inspection and maintenance.

e. Installation of E-6 CS launchers.

f. Seeding enemy bunkers and hooch complexes with CS.

g. Conduct of gas chamber exercise.

2. (C) Statistics: a. Americal Division Chemical conducted an airborne personnel detector (APD) mission.

b. On 7 and 14 June classes on safety, servicing and firing of the portable flame thrower were conducted. Personnel from the 1-501 and 1-502 who attended the classes observed a demonstration on the firing procedures. The personnel then serviced and fired the flame throwers themselves under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

c. On 7 June twenty-one 55 gallon drums were filled with thickened fuel to be used as fougasse. Nineteen of the fougasse were installed around the rear area of the 1-501 and 1-502 and the Brigade CP. The other two were installed at fire support base HAU DUC. On 24 July, ten fougasse were installed at fire support base HUSTLER. On 26 July an additional fourteen fougasse were installed.

d. On 19 June the Brigade Chemical Officer inspected A Battery, 2-320 Artillery protective masks. The correct procedure for marking and tagging was explained. On 23 June the Brigade Chemical Officer inspected A and C companies and the reconnaissance platoon of the 1-501 protective masks. The correct procedures for marking and tagging was explained.

e. Each battalion, the 1-501 and 1-502 were issued 22 E-8 CS launchers. The launchers were installed on fire support bases on the perimeter.

f. The 1-502 used 80 eight pound bags of CS for seeding bunker and hooch complexes.

g. On 23 July, the 1-502 conducted a gas chamber exercise, sending B and ? Company (approximately 150 men) through to check their protective masks for leaks.

h. A Trail Dust mission was flown from coordinates BT0798 to BT2798.

3. (C) New methods: No new methods of conducting chemical support activities were initiated during the operation.

Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN

1. General: There were approximately 1298 detainees in the area o Operation LAMAR PLAIN. The detainees who were in free fire and recon zones were extracted to Brigade. The innocent civilians were taken to refugee areas. Rice, food stuff and salt caches were extracted and taken to the refugee areas. Food and other commodities were distributed as follows: 10,000 pounds of rice to refugees 600 pounds of food stuff to refugees 100 pounds of salt to refugees 200 pounds of candy in the TAM KY area 150 pounds of soap in the TAM KY area.
a. Medcaps were conducted on 22 and 29 July and BIEN HOA (H), KY BIEN (V), TAM KEY (D). One hundred and twelve patients were treated. A medcap was conducted on the 27th of July at the Brigade collecting point for refugees. One hundred patients were treated.

b. On 10 August the following salvage items were given to the CORDS Refugee Advisor, QUANG TIN Province; for distribution to the refugees.
25 tents
25 ponchos
10 cots
25 air mattress
25 pair boots
20 canteens
50 water cans
1 poncho liner

No major projects were initiated due to the undetermined time to remain OPCON to the Americal Division.

Inclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) General: During Operation LAMAR PLAIN the 1st Brigade directed this psychological operations efforts against the 1st Main Force Regiment and the 3d NVA Regiment. Vulnerabilities such as living conditions, shortage of food, sickness and separation from family, with no hope of winning the war, were exploited by leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcast. The enemy was urged to stop fighting and surrender to the GVN or allied forces.

2. (C) Results a. The target audience, as stated above, the 1st Main Force Regiment and the 3d NVA Regiment, was urged to give up their hopeless idea of winning the war.

b. There were 2,377,000 leaflets dropped in the 1st Brigade area of operation. There were 13 hours of ground loudspeaker broadcast and 6 1/2 hours of aerial broadcast used in conjunction with the leaflet drops.

3. (C) Conclusion: Exploiting known weaknesses of a particular unit have proved successful in the past, and should be considered in future operations.

7-1 Inclosure 8 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) General:
a. The signal combat support mission of the 1st Brigade Communications Section was to install, operate and maintain adequate communications for the Brigade headquarters to support the Brigade displacement from CAMP EAGLE to TAM KY TAC CP and fire support base.

b. The Standard Brigade radio nets were an operation with the exception of the Admin/Log RATT which was not used because the maneuver battalions did not bring AN/VSC-2's to the field.

c. Since the 1st Brigade was OPCON to the Americal Division the following Division nets were entered.

Division Command - Americal
Division Secure - Americal
Division Command Operations Net #1 RATT - Americal
Division Command Operations Net #1 RATT - 101st Airborne Div
Landline teletype to Americal Communications Center

d. VHF Systems were provided by both division and were installed between 1st Brigade Headquarters and active fire support bases, 1st Brigade Headquarters and Americal Division Headquarters, 1st Brigade Headquarters and 101st Airborne Division Headquarters.

e. The 101st Airborne Division SOI was utilized plus Americal SOI items to enter the nets in 1.c. above and 1-46th Infantry.

2. (C) Problems:
a. Signal equipment and personnel were on the last plane, making it exceedingly difficult to establish communications on a timely basis. This problem should be alleviated as the Brigade Communications Section has been assigned sorties 12 to 14 in future movements.

b. Many frequency problems were encountered upon moving into an area with frequencies that had been assigned for the 101st AO. In future operations where the brigade is outside the parent Division AO a new SO1 should be issued for the assigned Brigade AO.

c. The Maneuver battalions did not take the necessary communications equip-ment to the field. For example, AN/PRC-25's were being used in place of VRC-12 series radios. This resulted in unreliable communications and loaning of Brigade Communications Section radios to the battalions until theirs could be brought up. Some battalions communications chiefs were also left behind. The place of duty for them should have been at the TAC CP where problems requiring their skills are most likely to occur.

d. The one voice trunk to EAGLE was unsatisfactory. This line was only about 65% reliable and of poor quality. Outages have run up to 33 hours with times up to 15 hours being common. An additional voice circuit was requested many times and was finally scheduled to be in operation by 14 July 1969. Americal provided the Brigade with two DTOC lines, two voice common users initially and one additional in July.

8-1
Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) General: Commencing on 15 May 1969, Co A, 326th Engr Bn provided engineer support to the 1st Brigade. A major effort was directed toward base development and improvement of CAMP PAPE, FSB HUSTLER, FSB YOUNG, FSB BOXER. Defensive positions and facilities were installed around helicopter pads; roads and storage sites were constructed, upgraded and maintained; boobytraps and dud ordnance were destroyed; mine sweeps were conducted; enemy bunkers and tunnels were destroyed; classes in demolitions were presented and, as a major recurring project, a water point was established and operated throughout the operation.

2. (C) Problems: Perhaps the most significant problem occurred in the base development of 1st Brigade Headquarters and adjacent facilities. Due to the high water table, excavation proved virtually impossible and defensive positions and command and control bunkers had to be constructed above ground Another disadvantage inflicted by the high water table was the poor drainage system. After short but hard rainfall many areas, became quagmires. The resolve was basically to build on the highest terrain available, place fill in low ground and construct drainage ditches. Another problem area arose with equipment deadline. Many phases of base development projects were such as to require heavier equipment than is available in the DS engineer Company TO&E; to accomplish these missions equipment is often stressed beyond its capabilities and, coupled with almost constant usage and consequently limited maintenance time, equipment is prone to breakdown. The resolve in this case was to schedule work loads and maintenance programs to meet the priority of missions. Additionally, heavy equipment was placed on loan from heavy construction units and utilized accordingly.

9-1
Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) Mission: to provide artillery supporting fires in the execution of Operation LAMAR PLAIN.

2. (C) Concept of Operations: Hq, 2d Bn, 320th Arty (-), A and C Batteries were deployed to TAM KY, RVN, to support the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, which had been placed OPCON to Americal Division. C Btry occupied FB YOUNG to provide fire support for 1-501 Inf which conducted a combat assault south of FB YOUNG. A Btry occupied TIEN PHUOC to provide fire support for the 1-502 Inf which conducted a CA to the east of HAU DUC. C/1-14 Arty, Americal Division, at FB PROFESSIONAL, was placed OPCON to 2-320 Arty and provided support to 1-46 Inf. A/4-77 Arty (ARA) was in general support, reinforcing. B/3-16 Arty was also in general support, reinforcing. The operation was planned to force the enemy to withdraw from the vicinity of FB PROFESSIONAL, thereby relieving the pressure on that base, and to extend Free World Forces influence in the area of operations. Displacements and changes in dispositions are as follows:

30 May: B/1-14, at LZ PROFESSIONAL, placed OPCON to 2-320 Arty (-).

Unit replaced C/1-14.

31 May: A/2-320 displaced to LZ PROFESSIONAL.
15 June: C/2-320 displaced to NEW HAU DUC.
20 June: B/3-18 displaced two 8" HOW from TAM KY to FB YOUNG.
26 June: C/2-320 displaced three HOW from NEW HAU DUC to Hill 162.
27 June: B/3-16 displaced from TIEN PHUOC to NEW HAU DUC; C/2-320
displaced remainder of battery to Hill 162. 6 June: A/2-320 displaced from LZ PROFESSIONAL to FB HUSTLER.
9 July: C/2-320 displaced from HILL 162 to HAU DUC.
10 July: B/3-16 displaced three HOW from NEW HAU DUC to LZ PROFESSIONAL.
23 July: C/2-320 displaced from NEW HAU DUC to FB YOUNG.
2 August: A/2-320 displaced from FB YOUNG to TAM KY airport;
B/3-16 (-) displaced from FB BOXER to TIEN PHOUC.

11 August: Hq, 2-320 (-) displaced from TAM KY to CAMP EAGLE; A/2-320 displaced from FB BOXER to TAM KY airport.

10-1
Inclosure 10
12 August: B/3-16 (-) displaced from FB PROFESSIONAL to TIEN PHOUC.
13 August: Hq 2-320 (-) rear displaced from TAM KEY to CAMP EAGLE.

Recapitulation of ammunition fired:

UNIT
TOTAL MISSIONS
TOTAL ROUNDS
A/2-320 (105T)
3,471
20,756
C/2-320 (105T)
3,540
18,815
B/1-14 (105T)
506
4,399
B/3-16 (155T)
1,426
5,676
3-18 (8"/175MM SP)
876 (8")
2,460
715 (175mm)
1,164
A/4-77 (ara)
544
17,653 (2.75 rkt)
969+03 HR
258,200 (?
21,517 (?

4. (C) Analysis:
a. When the Brigade initially deployed, the mission was to relieve enemy pressure on LZ PROFESSIONAL. The artillery developed a counter-battery fire plan which provided immediate fire on suspect or confirmed enemy firing positions. The executed plan proved effective as LZ PROFESSIONAL received no enemy fire since 14 June.

b. At the start of the operation enemy anti-aircraft fire was intensive throughout the AO. To counter this situation, tube artillery and ARA were instructed to immediately engage all suspect or confirmed locations. This program significantly reduced enemy fires.

c. ARVN and US artillery were co-located on the same fire base which facilitated clearance procedures and thereby provided more timely and effective fire support.

d. ARA was employed extensively against anti-aircraft fire, in support of visual reconnaissance missions and in close support of infantry operations. When necessary, close fire support was fired to within 50 meters of friendly positions.

10-2
Inclosure 11 (Army Aviation) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) Mission:
a. The mission of the DS assault helicopter company was to provide lift capability for redeployment of ground forces by combat assault and extraction, administrative movement and aerial resupply.

b. The mission of the assault helicopter support section was to provide lift capability for administrative troop movement and logistical resupply.

c. the mission of the Brigade Aviation Platoon was to provide command and control, courier and visual reconnaissance aircraft.

2. (C) Concept of Operation: The concept of supporting the operation was that the direct support helicopter company commander controlled all direct support assets, under the supervision of the brigade operations officer, and the Brigade Aviation Platoon Leader controlled all Aviation Platoon assets, again under supervision of the operations officer.

3. (C) Execution: Each preplanned airmobile operation was characterized by deliberate preparations in the form of an air mission commander's meeting which normally incorporated coordination among the AMTFC, AMC, Pathfinders, ARA, gunship, artillery, Tac Air and any other special agency concerned with the mission. Map and visual reconnaissance preceded and followed these meetings, whenever possible. All efforts were made to complement and support the tactical ground maneuver plan. Flight routes were basically determined by factors of distance and fire support; formation were basically determined by factors of number of aircraft and LZ/PZ shape and capacities.

4. (C) Analysis: The aviation support rendered during the operation was considered extremely effective. Of significant importance was the high availability rate of aircraft.
a. Maintenance. The high availability rate can be attributed to the combined general support efforts of both the 101st Abn Div and the Americal Division which provided increased replacement parts. The large amount of sand found in the eastern portion of the AO created a significant maintenance problem. This sand caused undue wear on bearing surfaces and pitting of windshields thereby requiring frequent replacements of bearings and wind- shields. Engines had to be flushed more frequently (2-3 days) thereby increasing man-hours. Generally speaking the PLL was not adequate to meet these demands for replacement parts.

b. Weather and terrain: Generally speaking the weather and terrain were favorable for aviation activities. The salt water in the air did require daily washing of the aircraft to preclude erosion of bare surfaces.

c. Suitability of LZ/PZ; LZ/PZ sites were generally adequate through- out the AO.

d. Organization of pickup zones: Ground commander demonstrated thorough knowledge of PZ techniques thereby enhancing efficient airmobile operations.

11-1 Inclosure 11 (Army Aviation)

e. New techniques: To avoid the intensive ground to air fire, the technique of high overhead approach and departure was practiced which reduced aircraft exposure time. Another technique, relatively new to the AH company was the practice of flying logistics missions with two aircraft instead of single aircraft. This technique allowed one or the other aircraft to respond to a downed aircraft or to place suppressive fires in enemy firing positions.

f. Problem area: None other than previously stated.